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iABSTRACT
TURCO-GREEK DISPUTE AND TURKEY’S RELATIONS WITH
THE EUROPEAN UNION
Behice Özlem Gökakın
M.A., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal
January 2001
Turkish-European Union relations are strained by a number of conflicting issues,
such as human rights, and the Turco-Greek dispute. Until the Helsinki Summit of
1999, Greece was the most vocal opponent of Turkey joining the EU and it appeared
the single most difficulty in the way of Turkey’s accession to the EU. At the Helsinki
Summit of 1999, Greece dropped its opposition, allowing Turkey to be declared by
the EU as a candidate and this has changed the course of both the Turco-Greek and
Turkey-EU relations. There is no doubt that all this heralded a new beginning in
relations. But a closer examination of the Greek foreign policy towards Turkey
seems to suggest that Greece’s expectations from Turkey with regard to Cyprus and
the Aegean have not changed. The aim of this thesis is to analyze the connection
between the two very important foreign policy issues of Turkey, namely the Turkey-
European Union relations and the Turco-Greek dispute and the role played by the
Greek factor in Turkey-EU relations.
Keywords: Turkey-EU relations, Turco-Greek dispute, Greece and the EU, Linkage
or conditionality policy of Greece.
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ÖZET
TÜRK-YUNAN ANLAŞMAZLIĞI  VE TÜRKİYE’NİN
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ İLE İLİŞKİLERİ
Behice Özlem Gökakın
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Hasan Ünal
Ocak 2001
Türkiye’nin AB ile ilişkilerinde insan hakları, ve  Türk–Yunan anlaşmazlıkları gibi
bir çok sorun mevcuttur. Bunların yanı sıra Yunanistan’ın Türkiye ile arasındaki
problemleri Avrupa-Türkiye sorunu haline getirme çabası, Türkiye–Avrupa Birliği
ilişkilerini olumsuz yönde etkilemiş ve Türkiye için AB’ye giden yolda önemli
engellerden birini teşkil etmiştir. 1999 yılında, Yunanistan’ın Helsinki zirvesinde
Türkiye’nin AB’ye aday ülkeler arasında ilan edilmesine yönelik vetosunu
kaldırması sonucu hem Türk–Yunan ilişkileri hem de Türkiye-AB ilişkileri yön
değiştirmiştir. Şüphesiz ki, bu olumlu gelişme Türkiye’nin Yunanistan ve AB ile
ilişkilerinde yeni bir dönem başlatmıştır. Fakat Yunanistan’ın  Türkiye’ye yönelik dış
politikası dikkatle incelendiği takdirde özellikle Kıbrıs ve Ege meselelerinde
Yunanistan’ın Türkiye’den isteklerinde esasa mahsus bir değişiklik olmadığı,
taktiksel bir yaklaşım değişikliği olduğu görülmektedir. Bu tezin amacı Türk dış
politikası için önem arz eden iki konunun, Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği ilişkileri ve Türk-
Yunan sorunları arasındaki bağlantıyı ve Yunanistan faktörünün Türkiye–Avrupa
Birliği ilişkilerinde oynadığı rolü incelemektir.
Anahtar Sözcükler: AB-Türkiye ilişkileri, Türk-Yunan Sorunları, Yunanistan ve AB,
Yunanistan’ın bağlantı politikası.
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1INTRODUCTION
Turkey’s European orientations are well-known, and since the end of the Second
World War Turkey became part of the Euro-Atlantic system having been admitted to
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. Turkey remained within
NATO and became a strong and reliable member of this powerful alliance
throughout the Cold War and after. It has cooperated with its alliance partners over a
number of security issues in Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East.
Though Turkey has won an admirable reputation within NATO, this has never been
the end of Turkey’s Western orientation and aspirations. Turkey would like to join
the European Union (EU) and it has made strenuous efforts towards the achievement
of this goal. The issue of the European Union is probably the most dominant one in
Turkish politics, and it seems that it will continue to be so in the foreseeable future.
However, the indications are that this is going to be a long and hard process. It is
likely to take more time than many of us sometimes assume, and quite a number of
difficulties lie ahead. Turkish-European Union relations are strained by a number of
conflicting issues, such as human rights, and related problems, the problem of the
role of military in Turkish politics, and the Turco-Greek dispute. Until the Helsinki
Summit of 1999, Greece somewhat appeared the single most difficulty in the way of
2Turkey’s accession to the EU. Although there were many other problems, Greece
was the most vocal opponent of Turkey joining the EU.
At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, as a result of protracted behind-the-scenes
diplomatic negotiations, Greece dropped its opposition, allowing Turkey to be
declared by the EU as a candidate. This, many thought, was the dawn of a new
relationship between the two countries in future. They also thought that the way to
Turkey’s final accession was now open.
There is no doubt that all this heralded a new beginning. But a closer examination of
the Greek foreign policy towards Turkey seems to suggest that all this might be
exaggerated. For instance, Turkey might not meet Greece’s expectations from
Turkey with regard to Cyprus and the Aegean, and in such a case the relations
between the two countries might continue to hinder Turkey’s accession to the EU. Or
alternatively, things might go quite smoothly and Greece could play a positive role in
the relations between Turkey and the EU.
The aim of this dissertation is to look into the changing patterns of Greece’s foreign
policy towards Turkey, particularly within the context of the European Union. An
attempt has been made to understand how Greece has altered its foreign policy
towards its neighbor, and at what level these changes, if any, have taken place
whether they be at the tactical level or at the level of substance, and also what shape
new policies employed by Greece have taken. This dissertation aims to answer these
questions. It also aims to come up with predictions about the future of Turkey’s
relations with the EU, in general, and Greece, in particular.
3To this end, extensive literature survey has been conducted into the secondary
material, books, articles and published thesis and reports. Unpublished dissertations
and reports have been made use of. Newspapers, Turkish and Western languages
have also been made use of, while internet sources, Turkish and Greek Foreign
Ministry sites, as well as a number of similar ones on EU and related matters have
been searched through. I have realized, during the course of my studies, that further
research is necessary: particularly, Greek newspapers, parliamentary records and
other material need to be looked at. Similarly, interviews with people involved in the
foreign policy-making process on both shores of the Aegean, as well as EU
diplomats and others would be a good idea in order to have a fuller understanding of
the subject. This present dissertation sets out the basic facts and makes initial
analysis, which, I would hope, would help lead to further research.
In the first chapter, the historical account of the Turkey-EU relations is outlined with
the aim of revising the development of Turkey’s ties to the European Economic
Community, the European Community and the European Union (EEC/EC/EU). This
chapter specifically focuses on the cornerstones of the relationship between Turkey
and the EEC/EC/EU, such as the Ankara Agreement, the Additional Protocol and the
Customs Union. Special attention is paid to the events between 1995 and 2000. There
were three critical events, the conclusion of the Customs Union in 1995, the
Luxembourg European Council Summit of 1997 and the Helsinki European Council
Summit of 1999.
The second chapter explores and analyzes major differences between the EC/EU and
Turkey. The third chapter is a general look at the relations between Greece and its
4EC/EU partners. The reasons behind the Greek application to the EC/EU and
Greece’s policies inside the EC/EU after accession are touched upon in this chapter.
Fourth chapter elaborates on the Greek security and foreign policy in 1990s. Special
emphasis is made on the formulation and the priorities of the Greek foreign policy as
well as the definition of strategic interests of Greece after the end of the Cold War.
The fifth chapter is devoted to Greek policy within the EC/EU against Turkey. A
detailed analysis of the policy of  ‘conditionality or linkage’ employed by Greece vis
á vis Turkey is made for illustrating how Greece has used its position to prevent
Turkey’s full integration to the EC/EU from the day it joined the Community. In the
conclusion an overall analysis of Turco-Greek and Turkey-EU relations is made with
some policy formulations for Turkey in its future relations with the EU and Greece.
5CHAPTER 1
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RELATIONS
BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE ECC/EC/EU
Though the relations between the Turks and the West, in general, and Europe, in
particular had a long history,1 these changed profoundly with the establishment of the
Turkish Republic by Atatürk in 1923. Turkey with Atatürk’s reforms2 and legacy3
started to build a new state on Western model in 1930s.  Turkey was the first Moslem
country with Western democratic state system.
                                                
1 For western orientation in the Ottoman Foreign Policy and  ‘identity crisis’ of the Ottoman Empire
to be recognized as a part of the West, see Roderic H. Davison, “Ottoman Diplomacy and Its Legacy,”
in L. Carl Brown (ed.), Imperial Legacy: Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, New
York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp.172-199; for relations between Turkey and the West, see
B.R. Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West,” in Foreign Affairs, Vol.70 (2), Spring 1991; for more, see
Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds.), Turkey Between East and West -  New Challenges for a
Rising Regional Power, USA: Westview Press, 1996;  for an interesting analysis of the role and
continuation of the identity crisis in both external and internal policies of Turkey, see  Dov Waxman,
“Turkey’s Identity Crises: Domestic and Foreign Policy,” in Conflict Studies, 311, United Kingdom:
Risct (Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism), August 1998, pp. 1-26.
2 See also Alexandre Jevakhoff, Kemal Atatürk Batı’nın Yolu  (Kemal Atatürk: A Way to West),
(Zeki Çelikkol trans.), Ankara: İnkılap, 1998; for Atatürk’s life and ideology of ‘Kemalism’, see Lord
Kinross, Atatürk Bir Milletin Yeniden Doğuşu (Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation), (Necdet Sander
trans.), İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1990; for the Turkish revolution, see Taner Timur, Türk
Devrimi ve Sonrası  (The Turkish Revolution and After), Ankara: İmge, 1993; for the Turkish War of
Independence, see A. M. Şamsutdinov, Mondros’tan Lozan’a Türkiye Ulusal Kurtuluş Savaşı Tarihi
1918-1923 (History of the Turkish War of Independence from Mudros to Lausanne 1918-1923),
(Ataol Behramoğlu trans.), İstanbul: Doğan, 1999; for Modern Turkish history, see Erik J. Zürcher,
Turkey - A Modern History, London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1993.
3 For the continuation of the Atatürk’s legacy in internal and external policies of Turkey, see Paul B.
Henze, Turkey and Atatürk’s Legacy, Turquoise Series: 2, Haarlem - Netherlands, 1998.
6Starting from 1952 onwards Turkey began to play a pivotal role in most Western and
European institutions,4 like NATO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and the Council of Europe (CE). It has played an important
role in the defense of Europe during the Cold War. And, it has made efforts to
become part of the EEC/EC from its inception onwards.
1.1 The Ankara Agreement
In July 1959, Turkey made its first application to join the European Economic
Community,5 which had been established in 1958. The EEC proposed Turkey the
establishment of an association until Turkey’s circumstances permitted its accession.
The negotiations resulted in the signature of the Ankara Agreement, creating an
association between the Republic of Turkey and the EEC, on 12 September 1963.6
This agreement (which entered into force on 1 December 1964) aimed at securing
Turkey’s full membership in the EEC through the establishment of a three-phased
                                                
4 As the former Turkish President Süleyman Demirel put it; “...Turkey became a member of NATO.
Turkey was not only compelled by her anxieties emanating from Soviet claims concerning her
territorial integrity and sovereignty, but also by her strong belief in the common values of the alliance.
By deciding to join NATO, the Turkish nation anchored its destiny in the West. Furthermore,
Turkey’s membership of NATO also constituted a reconfirmation of Turkey’s Western orientation.”
(Süleyman Demirel, “Turkey and NATO at the Threshold of a New Century,” in Perceptions, Vol.
IV(1), March/May 1999, pp.5-13). (Emphasis mine).
5 “Turkey’s reasons for applying for membership in the European Community were clear in the early
1960s: desire to complete Turkey’s orientation to the West, need to avoid discrimination in favor of
Greece, which had also applied for an association agreement, desire to obtain a firm trade agreement
with Turkey’s largest market; the feeling that it would enable external financial aid to be attracted (to
promote Turkish economic development) more easily and greater quantities, the prospect of the EC as
an outlet for the Turkish labor force, thereby alleviating domestic unemployment, desire to influence
the setting of EC duties and other restrictions, particularly on agricultural goods.” (John Redmond,
The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Community - Turkey, Cyprus and Malta?
Great Britain: University Press, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 24-25).
6 See the text of The Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Economic
Community and Turkey, 12 September 1963, from  (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/) or from web site of the
Representation of the European Commission to Turkey, (http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/).
7Customs Union, which was believed to serve as an instrument to bring about
integration between the EEC and Turkey.7 In order to bring it closer to itself, the
EEC offered financial assistance to Turkey. It provided Ankara with loans worth up
to 175 million European currency unit (ECU) with the First Financial Protocol,
which covered the period 1963-1970.8
The Ankara Agreement envisaged the free circulation of goods, natural persons,
services and capital between the Parties. But it excluded Turkey from the EEC
decision making mechanisms. The Customs Union that was to be established
between the Parties included the abolition of tariff and quantitative barriers to trade
between the Parties and the application of a Common External Tariff to imports from
third countries. It envisaged harmonization with EEC policies in every field relating
                                                
7 John Redmond, Mediterranean Enlargement, pp.23-31; for an in-depth assessment of Turkish-
European relations, see also Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “The Never Ending Story: Turkey and the
European Union,” in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.34 (4), October 1998, pp.240-259; for an interesting
analysis of the various aspects of the Turkish-EU relations by Turkish Professors, see Canan Balkır
and Allan M. Williams, Turkey and Europe, England: Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1993; for a brief
chronology of the events effecting the development of Turkey-EU relations, see Mehmet Ali Birand,
Türkiye’nin Avrupa Macerası 1959-1999  (Turkey’s European Adventure 1959-1999), 10th edition,
İstanbul: Doğan, 2000, pp.11-39 and for detailed account of the conclusion of the Ankara Agreement,
see pp. 49-159 of the same book; Barry Buzan, and Thomas Diez, “The European Union and Turkey,”
in Survival, Vol.41 (1), Spring 1999, pp. 41-57; Michael Cendrowicz, “The EC and Turkey Looking
Backwards, Looking Forwards,” in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy New Prospects,
Great Britain: The Eothen Press, 1992, pp.9-27; see Arthur Cyr, “Turkey and the West,” in
Perceptions, Vol.I (3), September/November 1996; Şaban Çalış, “Turkey’s Integration with Europe:
Initial Phases Reconsidered,” in Perceptions, Vol.V(2), June/August 2000; Dietrich Jung, “Turkey and
Europe or Turkey in Europe,” in Mustafa Aydın (ed.), Turkey at the Threshold  of the 21st Century -
Global Encounters and/or Regional Alternatives, Ankara: International Relations Foundation, 1998,
pp.159-163; see also Erol Manisalı, Türkiye Avrupa İlişkileri (Turkey-European Relations), İstanbul:
Çağdaş Yayınları, 1998; see, for example, Erol Manisalı, Bıçak Sır tındaki Dünya ve Türkiye  (Turkey
and World on the Back of a Knife), İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitap Kulübü, 1998, pp.35-73; for the
historical background of the relations between Turkey and the ECC/EC/EU, see, for example, S.
Rıdvan Saduk, Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye (The European Union and Turkey), İstanbul Menkul
Kıymetler Borsası, İstanbul, 1996, pp.404-410; for the application of the neo-Functionalist theory to
the Turkey-EU case in an attempt to explain the development of the relations between the two, see
Çınar Özen, “Neo-Functionalism and the Change in the Dynamics of Turkey-EU Relations,” in
Perceptions, Vol.III (3), September/November 1998; Jesus A. Nunez Villaverde, “Turkey and the EU:
An Endless Hurdle-Race,” in Perceptions, Vol.III (3), September/November 1998; Pia Christina
Wood, “Europe and Turkey: A Relationship Under Fire,” in Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 10 (1),
Winter 1999, pp. 94-115.
8 Ibid.
8to the internal market.9 The Ankara Agreement 10 still constitutes the legal basis of
the association between Turkey and the EU.
1.2  The Additional Protocol
The Additional Protocol of 13 November 1970,11 which became effective on 1
January 1973, set out the details of how the Customs Union would be established as
follows:
i. The gradual creation of a customs union;
ii. For industrial goods the EC was to abolish all duties on imports from
Turkey with the exceptions of refined petroleum goods which were to be
subject to a tariff quota and various restrictions for textiles whilst Turkey
was to divide its imports into two lists and then to reduce tariffs in stages
over 12 years for one list (55 per cent of imports) and over 22 years for
the other (45 per cent); similarly Turkish quantitative restrictions were to
be phased out;
iii. For agricultural goods some 80 per cent of EC imports from Turkey
received preferential treatment whilst Turkey was to adjust its agricultural
sector gradually to the EC’s common agricultural policy over a 22-year
period;
iv. The EC’s common external tariff was to be adopted by Turkey over
22 years;
v. Free movement of labor (and capital) between the EC and Turkey was
to be phased in between the 12th and 22nd year;
vi. There was to be ‘closer alignment of economic policies’; the treaty
specifically refers to competitive policy, taxation, economic (presumably
principally macroeconomic) policy in general and commercial policy, in
relation to third countries (Articles 43-56);
vii. A second financial protocol provided loans of up to ECU 300 million
over a five and a half-year period to assist with Turkish development.12
                                                
9 Ibid.
10İlkin Tekeli and Selim İlkin, Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu  I (Turkey and the European Community
I), Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993, pp.121-122; for details of the negotiations ending with the
conclusion of the Ankara Agreement and for details of the Treaty itself, see Mehmet Ali Birand,
Avrupa Macerası, pp.49-173.
11Additional Protocol of the Agreement Establishing an Association Between Turkey and The
European Economic Community, 23 November 1970, can be found at web sites of the Representation
of the European Commission to Turkey and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
9This was an extensive agreement but the provisions relating to the creation of a
Customs Union were relatively clearer, much of the rest were relatively vague, such
as, the precise timing of the introduction of free labor movement and the exact nature
of economic policy coordination.13 The Additional Protocol brought significant
advantages to Turkey’s agricultural exports to the EEC.14
However, things began to change in early 1970s. Turkey faced enormous balance of
payments problems which resulted in slowing down of Turkey’s wishes for the
movement towards a Customs Union. Problems related to the industrial products
especially in textile exports that had been far more restricted in the Additional
Protocol threatened Turkish textile industry in the 1970s. The EC responded to this
situation by imposing quotas on Turkish textile imports. From the Turkish point of
view, the EC attitude seemed hypocritical since it only allowed import of those
industrial goods that were less competitive and imposed quotas on those that were
highly competitive on the European market.15 Therefore, the Additional Protocol
could not be implemented in full. Eventually, the free circulation of goods and
services and the harmonization of Turkish legislation with that of the EEC in a
multitude of areas could not be achieved at the end of the 22-year timetable.
                                                                                                                                         
12 John Redmond, Mediterranean Enlargement, pp.27-28.
13 For details, see Ibid.
14For more details, see for example, web site of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(http://www.mfa.gov.tr/) and Mehmet Ali Birand, Avrupa Macerası, pp. 173-309.
15 John Redmond, Mediterranean Enlargement, p.29.
10
1.3 Turkey’s Application for Full Membership in 1987
In 1980s Turkey shifted its economic policy of autarchic import-substitution to open
market economy. Accordingly, the relations between Turkey and the Community 16
that had been frozen following the military intervention of 12 September 1980 17
began returning to normality as a result of the developments in the field of economy
and with the reintroduction of the multiparty elections in 1983. Eventually, Turkey
applied for full membership in 1987 18 on the basis of the EEC Treaty’s Article 237,
which gave Ankara the right to do so. Turkey’s request for accession was filed under
the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Rome (instead of the Ankara Agreement) and
                                                
16 For Turkey-EU relations, see, for example, Nihat Akyol, “Turkey is an Equal Partner in Europe,” in
Insight Turkey, Vol.1, January/March 1999, pp.17-23; Lionel Barber, “A Vital Interest for the EU,” in
Europe, Issue 367, Jun 1997, pp.25-28; David Barchard, Turkey and the West, Chatham House Papers
27, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Boston & Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1986, pp.58-69; İsmail Cem, “Turkey and Europe: Looking to the Future from a Historical
Perspective” from web site (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/); in an exclusive article, the former Turkish
President assesses the current state of relations and the history of EU-Turkish links, see Süleyman
Demirel, “Introduction,” in Insight Turkey, Vol.1, January/March 1999, pp.3-7; Cem Duna, “Turkey
and the European Union: How Do They Stand at the Close of the Century?” in Ibid., pp.35-41; an
interview with Karen Fogg, Head of the Representation of the European Commission to Turkey, in
Ibid., pp.7-17; Hakan Hanlı, “EU-Turkish Relations,” in Ibid., pp. 45-49; İlhan Kesici, “Turkey’s
Political, Economic and International Aspirations,” in Ibid., pp.23-31; Sami Kohen, “Turkey and
Europe Set to Bury the Scimitar as EU Votes on Pact,” in  Christian Science Monitor, Vol.88 (12),
12/12/95, p.1; Sami Kohen, “Turkey Push to Join  Europe Now Tests Key US Alliance,” in  Christian
Science Monitor, Vol.90(13), 12/12/97, p.6; Dick Leonard, “Eye on the EU,” in Europe, Issue 366,
May 1997, pp.4-6;  Dominique Moisi, “Dreaming of Europe,” in Foreign Policy, Issue 115, Summer
1999, pp.44-60; Nilüfer Narlı, “Turkey and the European Union: A Turkish Point of View,” in Insight
Turkey, Vol.1, January/March 1999, pp.41-45; Jay Stewart, “Turkey Looks Westward - But Obstacles
Stand in the Way of EC Acceptance,” in Harvard International Review, Vol.14 (3), Spring 1992,
pp.42-45; Seyfi Taşhan, “A Turkish Perspective on Europe-Turkey Relations on the Eve of the IGC”
from (http://www.fpi.hacettepe.edu.tr/); Ali Tigrel, “The Current Status of EU-Turkish Relations:
February 1999,” in Insight Turkey, Vol.1, January/March 1999, pp.53-63; Ruth Walker, “A Small
Step for Europe, A Giant Leap for Turkey,” in Christian Science Monitor, Vol.89 (249), 11/20/97,
p.7;  for discussions about Turkey’s prospects for membership in the EU, see also  “The Matter of
Europe,” in Economist, Vol.321(7737), 12/14/91, pp.17-19; “Turkey Can Be Part of Europe,” in
Economist, Vol.335(7908), 4/1/95, pp.13-15;“Progress At Last,” in Economist, Vol.336(7925),
7/29/95, p.37; “Turkey Facing Europe,” in Economist, Vol.337 (7937), 10/21/95, pp.20-25; “Turkey’s
Place in Europe,” in Economist, Vol.354 (8038), 10/11/97, pp.19-21; “How To Say No,” in
Economist, Vol.345 (8041), 11/01/97, pp.51-53; “Turkey’s Long Haul,” in Economist,
Vol.354(8153), 01/15/2000, pp.18-21.
17 For the European view of the 1980 coup in Turkey, see Turgut Özal, Turkey in Europe and Europe
in Turkey, UK: K. Rüstem & Brother, 1991, pp. 299-305.
11
underwent the normal procedures. The Council forwarded Turkey’s application to
the Commission for the preparation of an opinion. The Commission’s opinion19
declared by the Council on 5 February 199020 basically underlined Turkey’s
eligibility for membership yet deferred the in-depth analysis of Turkey’s application
until the emergence of a more favorable environment.21
Even though it did not attain its basic objective, Turkey’s application revived
Turkey-EC relations: efforts to develop relations intensified on both sides and to
complete the Customs Union started again.22 In addition, the Commission promised a
cooperation package, known as the ‘Matutes Package’ of 1990, which could not be
adopted by the Council due to Greece’s objection.23
1.4   The Customs Union
Under these circumstances, Turkey chose to complete the envisaged Customs Union
with the EU. Talks began in 1994 and were finalized on 6 March 1995 at the Turkey-
EU Association Council.24 On that day, the Association Council adopted its decision
                                                                                                                                         
18 See Ibid., pp.312-316.
19 See the Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the Community, 20 December
1989, from (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adab/opinion.htm)
20 For detailed discussion of the Commission’s report and the following period, see John Redmond,
Mediterranean Enlargement, pp.47-53.
21See Bestami Sadi Bilgiç, Turkey-EU Relations and the Cyprus Question, M.A. Thesis, Bilkent
University, Ankara, August 1999, pp.4-27.
22See Tayyar Arı, “Full Membership - Utopia? Problems and Prosperity in Turco-European
Relations,” in Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi, Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Topluluğu Enstitütüsü,
Vol. 5 (1-2), 1997, pp. 211-225; Birol Ali Yeşilada, “Prospects for Turkey’s Membership in the EU,”
in Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy:  Recent Developments, Madison, Wisconsin, 1996,
pp.37-61.
23 See web site of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
24 The Association is the highest-ranking organ composed of the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and the
fifteen EU member states.
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1/95 for the completion of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU 25 in
industrial and processed agricultural goods by 31 December 1995. The EU made a
declaration on financial cooperation with Turkey as part of the Customs Union
‘package’.26
With the entry into force of the Customs Union, Turkey abolished all duties and
equivalent charges on imports of industrial goods from the EU. It has started
harmonizing its tariffs and equivalent charges on the importation of industrial goods
from third countries with the EU’s Common External Tariff. Turkey tried to adapt to
the EU’s commercial policy and preferential trade arrangements with specific third
countries. This process is to be completed in 5 years. 27
Although basic agricultural products have been excluded from the initial package, a
preferential trade regime for these products was adopted on 1 January 1998. Further
efforts are expected in the same direction. Moreover, Turkey is progressively
adopting many aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Accordingly the
EU is expected to take account of Turkey’s agricultural interests when developing its
agricultural policy. 28
                                                
25 For the text of the Customs Union Agreement between Turkey and the EU, see web sites of the
Representation of the European Commission to Turkey and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
26 See Altay Cengizer, “Turkey and the EC at the Threshold of Customs Union,” in Foreign Policy/Dış
Politika, Vol. XVII (3-4), pp.65-73; Tuğrul Çubukçu, “Gümrük Birliğinin İki Yılı ve Sonrası” from
web site, (http://www.fpi.hacettepe.edu.tr/); Mehmet Gönlübol, Oral Sander, Duygu Sezer and et al.,
Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995) (Turkish Foreign Policy with Events 1919–1995), 9th
edition, Ankara Cem Ofset, 1996, pp.715-726; Erol Manisalı, “Turkey and the European Community -
Problems and Prospects,” in Erol Manisalı (ed.), Turkey’s Place in Europe - Economic, Political, and
Cultural Dimensions, İstanbul: The Middle East Business and Banking Magazine Publications, 1988,
pp.64-69; see also Wilhelm Hummen, “The Economic Future of the EC and Turkey’s Membership” in
Ibid., pp 69-77; for more details of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU, see,  for example,
Erol Manisalı, Gümrük Birliğinin Siyasal ve Ekonomik Bedeli  (The Political and Economic Costs of
the Customs Union), İstanbul: Bağlam, 1996, pp. 57-67.
27For more details, see web site of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
28 Ibid.
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Turkey’s efforts towards harmonizing its legislation with that of the EU are under
way including commercial, monitoring and safeguarding measures on imports from
both the EU and third countries, the management of quantitative restrictions and
tariff quotas and the prevention of dumped and subsidized imports. A special
Competition Authority has been set up for this purpose. Assistance to promote
economic development in Turkey’s less developed regions and assistance intended to
promote cultural heritage conservation will be allowed. Turkey is adjusting its
legislation regarding state monopolies of a commercial nature in order to ensure that
no discrimination exists in the conditions under which goods are produced and
marketed between nationals of Turkey and the EU member states. 29
Indeed, the application of the EU’s ‘Common External Tariff’, as stated above,
implies that Turkey is obliged to provide preferential access to its markets to all
countries to whom the EU grants preferential access, including, for instance, all the
Eastern European countries with whom the EU has ‘Association Agreements’, and
the countries in the Mediterranean that are subject to the EU’s Mediterranean policy.
Accordingly, by the year 2001, Turkey is expected to negotiate preferential trade
agreements with all these countries. Moreover, as Turkey is complementing its tariff
elimination on EU imports with tariff reductions on imports from third countries, it
will become an open economy in the agricultural sectors.30
                                                
29 Ibid.
30 For details of the economic implications of the Customs Union, see Glenn W. Harrison, Thomas F.
Ruherford and David G. Tarr, Economic Implications for Turkey of a Customs Union with the
European Union, Policy Research Working Paper, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, International
Economics Department, International Trade Division, May 1996; see also S. Rıdvan Karluk, Avrupa
Birliği, pp.602-634; and, Erol Manisalı, Siyasal ve Ekonomik Bedeli, pp.65-67 and 72-78.
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In macro-terms, the Customs Union will help automatically for the establishment of a
better discipline in Turkey which will in the long-term help build macroeconomic
stability if the state subsides of various types and reduction of the role of the state in
production can be achieved. To this end, Turkey rapidly increased its efforts to
privatize the state owned enterprises. In summary, the Customs Union is likely to
constitute an important cornerstone in Turkey’s accession to EU.31 So, one can say
that Turkey stood at historical crossroads in 1995.
1.4.1. Financial Cooperation
One element of the Customs Union package was the financial package for Turkey
which amounted to 2.22 billion ECU over a five-year period between the EU and
Turkey. This financial package aimed at decreasing the burden that might come
about as a result of opening the Turkish economy to EU competition. It also aimed at
protecting Turkish economic operators and improving Turkey’s infrastructure and
reducing the economic disparities between the Parties.32 However, the transfers have
                                                
31 However, today after six years have passed since the completion of the Customs Union due to the
reluctance on the part of the EU in allocating promised funds to Turkey and in fulfilling its contractual
obligations vis á vis Turkey, the Customs Union did not bring the expected macro-economic
development and stability to the country. The EU gives some political circumstances as a pretext for
not pursuing of financial cooperation and political dialogue with Turkey, as agreed in the Customs
Union. This attitude of the EU brought huge economic and political costs to Turkey. The Customs
Union became an agreement unilaterally tying Turkey to the EU without actual benefits to the Turkish
economy up until now. Still it can be argued that, it was an important step in Turkey’s relations with
the Union in the 1990s. However, if the EU changes its attitude and decides to help Turkey in its
efforts for reaching the EU economic standards, this agreement is likely to constitute an important
cornerstone in Turkey’s further integration to the EU.
32For details of the financial cooperation between the EU and Turkey, see Declaration of the European
Union on Financial Cooperation, 6 March 1995, can be obtained from web page
(http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adab/financial.htm); see also S. Rıdvan Karluk, Avrupa Birliği,
p.550.
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not been materialized due to Greece’s veto and the lack of collective political will on
the part of the EU governments to force Greece to change its stance over the matter.
1.5   The European Union’s Enlargement Process and Turkey
Turkey attaches particular importance to the EU’s current enlargement process
because after the demise of the Soviet Union, it wishes to play a pivotal role in the
new European political and security environment and therefore aims at full
integration to EU. This is why Turkey kept the question of inclusion in the ‘EU’s
enlargement process’33 on the agenda of Turkey-EU relations. In the last Association
Council of 29 April 1997, the EU reconfirmed Turkey’s eligibility for membership
and asked the Commission to prepare recommendations to deepen Turkey-EU
relations. However, the development of this relationship was made conditional on a
number of factors relating to Greece, Cyprus and human rights.34
The Commission excluded Turkey from the enlargement process in its report entitled
‘Agenda 2000’ (16 July 1997).35 The report repeated the same political and economic
                                                
33 For detailed analysis of the enlargement process and changes within the EU in the following
decade, see Pal Dunay, “How Will the European Union Meet the 21st Century or In What Shape Will
the 21st Century Find the European Union,” 3rd International Security Forum and 1st Conference of the
PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, Networking the Security
Community in the Information Age, Workshop 4 - Toward the 21st Century: Trends in Post-Cold War
International Security Policy, Kongresshaus, Zurich, Switzerland, 19/21 October 1998.
34 For more details, see, for example, web site of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; see also
Andrew Mango, “Turkey and the Enlargement of the European Mind,” in Middle Eastern Studies,
Vol.34 (2), April 1998, pp.171-193.
35 The report titled ‘Agenda 2000’ provided a single framework in which the Commission outlined its
policies for the development of the EU, mainly focusing on the enlargement process. The report
acknowledged that the Customs Union with Turkey was functioning satisfactorily, it repeated the
same political and economic arguments vis á vis Turkey, without making any reference to full
membership of Turkey to the Union. In relation to the development of the relations with Turkey, the
Commission brought up a number of political preconditions. The report stated that: “The Association
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arguments against Turkey and made no reference to Turkey’s full membership
objective. From the Turkish point of view, the EU confirmation of Turkey’s
eligibility for membership but its exclusion from the enlargement process was a
contradiction. Even though the EU claimed that all candidates would be judged
according to the same objective criteria and that there would be no prejudice in their
evaluation, Turkey found the Commission’s approach unjust and discriminatory. 36
1.6  The Luxembourg European Council and the Following Period
The decisions of the Luxembourg Summit reflected by and large the contents of the
Commission’s  ‘Agenda 2000’, however, “Turkey’s eligibility was reconfirmed; the
EU decided to set up a strategy to prepare Turkey for accession and to create a
special procedure to review the developments to be made; Turkey was invited to the
European Conference, but a number of unacceptable preconditions were put forward;
the development of Turkey-EU relations was made conditional on certain economic,
political and foreign policy questions; the Commission was asked to submit suitable
proposals to enhance Turkey-EU relations.”37
                                                                                                                                         
Agreement and the customs union provide the foundations for building an increasingly close political
and economic relationship. In this process the EU attaches particular importance to Turkey’s progress
in pursuing democratisation and the protection of human rights; the establishment of good
neighbourly relations between Greece and Turkey; respect for the principles of international law; and
the achievement of a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus.” A special attention is also paid to the role
of the Turkish military and the National Security Council in the political life of Turkey as well as to
the requirements for liberalization of trade in Turkey. (For more details, see European Commission,
Agenda 2000, For a Stronger and Wider Union, Bulletin of the European Union, Supplement 5/97;
and, pp.76-77 below).
36 See web page (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adab/relations.htm).
37 Ibid.
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The Turkish reaction was one of frustration and resentment. Even the most pro-
Western circles of the society believed that they were deceived and isolated. The
Turks in general could not understand why the EU could not dole out even a
symbolic indication that Turkey’s membership was not completely ruled out. The
decisions taken at the Luxembourg Summit were interpreted as being racist and
discriminatory towards the Turks.38
In a statement issued the day after the Summit, the Turkish Government 39 criticized
the EU’s attitude, saying that “...Turkey’s goal of full membership and association
would nevertheless be maintained, but that the development of bilateral relations
depended on the EU’s honoring its commitments, and that it would not discuss with
the EU issues remaining outside the contractual context of the bilateral relations as
long as the EU did not change its attitude.”40 Accordingly, Turkey did not participate
in the inaugural meeting of the European Conference held in London on 12 March
1998. Ankara made it clear that this situation could only be reversed depending on
the political will of the EU.
                                                
38See Katherine A. Wilkins, Turkey Today Troubled Ally’s Search for Identity, Foreign Policy
Association, No.317, Fall 1998, pp.3-33; see also Ege Erkoçak, An Ever Enlarging Europe:
Enlargement of the EU 1990s and Turkey, M.A. Thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara, September 2000,
pp. 138-181; and,  “The Luxemburg Rebuff,” in Economist, Vol.345 (8048), 12/20/97-01/02/98,
pp.17-19.
39See the excerpt from the original statement of the Turkish Government following the declaration of
the Conclusions of the Luxembourg Summit on 14 December 1997, pp.77-78 below.
40See, Statement of the Turkish Government Regarding the Conclusions of the Luxembourg European
Council, Ankara, 14 December 1997; and Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding the
Conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council, Ankara, 14 December 1997; and, for more
information about the Turkish position, see the Turkish Foreign Minister, İsmail Cem’s article
published in International Herald Tribune a few days before the Luxembourg Summit, İsmail Cem,
“Isn’t Europe Ambitious Enough to Admit   Turkey? ” in International Herald Tribune, 10 December
1997.
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In response, the Commission published its recommendations for ‘European
Strategy’,41 contents of which were more or less similar to former packages, which
the EU had promised but failed to deliver in the past. The summit meeting held in
Cardiff on 15-16 June 1998 fell far short of satisfying Turkey42 but it asked the
Commission to find solutions with a view to making available financial resources43
required for the implementation of the ‘European Strategy’ for Turkey.
At the Cologne European Council held on 3-4 June 1999 the initiative was taken by
the German Presidency with a view to ensuring the recognition of Turkey’s
candidate status on equal footing with others. However, the objections of some EU
member states forestalled it. As a result, the EU refrained from taking a decision to
include Turkey in the accession process.44 This constituted yet another failure of the
                                                
41The European Council during its Luxembourg Summit meeting considered that it was important for
a strategy to be drawn up to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the Union in every
filed. It was decided that the strategy should consist in: “development of the possibilities afforded by
the Ankara Agreement; intensification of the customs union; implementation of financial cooperation;
approximation of laws and adoption of the Union acquis; participation, to be decided case by case, in
certain programmes and in certain agencies, as provided for in paragraphs 19 and 21 of the
conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council.” (For details, see European Strategy for Turkey –
The Commission’s Initial Operational Proposals, Brussels, 4 March 1998).
42 “…the relatively positive developments [of the Cardiff Summit meeting] …are not sufficient. In
this context, the discrimination towards Turkey continues with the Cardiff Conclusions and, while
pre-accession strategies are foreseen for the other countries, a European Strategy,…consisting  of a
series of ideas with ambiguous financing methods is being put forward for Turkey.”(Statement of the
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding the Conclusions of the Cardiff European Council,
Ankara, 17 June 1998).
43 “…Recalling the need for financial support for the European Strategy, the European Council notes
the Commission’s intention to reflect on ways and means for underpinning the implementation of the
European Strategy, and to table appropriate proposals to this effect.”(The Conclusions of the Cardiff
European Council, 15-16 June 1998). This paragraph of the conclusions was defined as a ‘relatively
positive development’ in the statement of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey issued on 17 June 1998,
which stated: “… The need for additional financial support for the ‘European Strategy’ is reiterated in
the Conclusions. Even though with this statement, which entails no concrete result, it is accepted that
the obstacles which are preventing the allocation of funds to Turkey could not be lifted at Cardiff, the
15’s depiction in the Presidency Conclusions that the Commission is to find appropriate means and
ways to financially underpin the Strategy is at least meaningful, since this shows that the EU is at last
conscious of the necessity to fulfill its contractual obligations.”(Ibid.).
44 In the part entitled ‘The Enlargement Process’ of the Conclusions of the Cologne Summit, pp.21-22,
no reference was made to Turkey. (The Conclusions of the Cologne European Council, 3-4 June
1999).
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EU to recognize Turkey’s candidate status clearly. Since the discriminatory approach
towards Turkey remained unchanged at the Cologne Summit concerning the
recognition of its candidate status, the decision adopted by the Turkish Government
on 14 December 1997 following the Luxembourg Summit remained unchanged. 45
The deadlock in relations was to be broken at Helsinki. In preparation for the
European Council to be held in Helsinki on 10-11 December 1999 the Commission
issued its second regular report on the progress,46 which Turkey was supposed to
make towards accession, on 13 October 1999. In the Composite Paper which was
presented together with the Progress Report, the Commission took important steps by
proposing that Turkey be considered as a candidate. Ankara welcomed these
proposals that would prepare itself for full membership. In the statement made by the
Foreign Ministry of Turkey, it was said that the endorsement of all these EU
Commission proposals at the Helsinki European Council, in other words, Turkey’s
recognition as an official candidate with all its inherent modalities, would initiate a
new phase in Turkey-EU relations. 47
The Helsinki European Council held on 10-11 December 1999 produced a
breakthrough in Turkey-EU relations. Turkey was officially recognized as a
candidate state on equal footing with others. It would benefit from the pre-accession
strategy in order to stimulate and support its reforms. This would include an
Accession Partnership, which would be drawn up accordingly, combined with a
                                                
45See Statement of the Deputy Spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey Regarding the
Conclusions of the Cologne European Council, Ankara, 4 June 1999.
46 See 1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession.
47 See Press Release of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey Regarding the Progress Report of the European
Commission, Ankara, 13 October 1999.
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National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis. Turkey would participate in some
of the Community programs open to other candidate countries and agencies. It would
be invited to the meetings between candidate states and the EU in the context of the
accession process. A single framework for coordinating all sources of the EU
financial assistance for pre-accession would be set up. 48
At that juncture, it looked as if Turkey was about to join the EU, at least, this was the
view some people in Turkey appeared to project. But this euphoria was to be short-
lived. A few months after Helsinki, a realization that it was not to be an easy process,
and that  not much had changed in Greece’s policy towards Turkey began to sink all
over the society. When the EU started asking Turkey to comply with its
‘instructions’ over a number of issues, of which the Turkish public had all along been
quite suspicious, larger sections of the society expressed second thoughts about the
EU’s intentions.
                                                
48See Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, from
(http://www.europa.eu.int/); Mehmet Ali Birand, Avrupa Macerası, pp. 519-548; see Yasemin Çelik,
Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, Westport - London: Praeger, 1999, pp.96-119; see also Ege
Erkoçak, Ever Enlarging, pp. 173-179.
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CHAPTER 2
CONFLICTUAL ISSUES IN TURKEY-EU RELATIONS
2.1 Human Rights
The Turkish Constitution of 1982 recognizes all basic rights1commonly found in
liberal democratic societies including freedom of speech, press, religion, association,
assembly, travel and communications, right to privacy, freedom from arbitrary
arrests and property rights.
                                                
1 “The secrecy of private life is basic, and everyone has the right to request that respect is shown for
his/her private and family life. Besides these, in the context of fundamental rights and freedoms, the
following have been regulated and guaranteed with the Constitution: the inviolability of the home, the
freedom of communications, the freedom of travel, the freedom of religion and conscience, the
freedom of thought and opinion, the freedom of expression and dissemination of thoughts, the
freedom of science and arts, the freedom of the press, the freedom of making a group with an
organized structure, the right to hold meetings and demonstration marches and the right of property
(Articles 17-40).The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey also includes social and economic rights
as well as the political rights and obligations, such as the right to vote and be elected (Articles 41-74).
The Constitution makes everyone equal before the law (Article 10). The abuse of fundamental rights
and freedoms has also been prohibited. It has been stated in the Constitution that fundamental rights
and freedoms cannot be used with the objective of violating the integrity of the country and nation, of
endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, of destroying the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others, of placing the government of the State under the control of an individual or a
group of people, or of establishing the hegemony of one social class over others, or of creating
discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect, or of establishing by any other means a
system of government based on these concepts and ideas.” (For more details on the fundamental rights
of the individuals, see Chapter Two, Articles 12-40 in The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey,
Ankara: Kurtuluş Ofset, 1995, English version, pp.10-22; and, Facts About Turkey, Directorate
General Press and Information of the Prime Ministry Ankara, Turkey, 1999, pp.143-150).
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The Constitution also states that restrictions on basic rights and freedoms shall not
conflict with the requirements of democratic social order (Article 13).2 This criterion
is inspired by the European Convention of Human Rights. Similarly, Article 15 of
the Constitution parallels Article 15 of the Convention by establishing a core area of
basic rights and freedoms that cannot be interfered with even in emergency and
martial law situations.3 Under Article 10 of the Constitution, all individuals are equal
without any discrimination before the law, irrespective of language, race, color, sex,
political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such consideration.4
But Turkey’s domestic situation has been complicated by the violent attacks of a
Marxist - Leninist terrorist organization,5 ‘Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’6
especially on Turkey’s civilian population and security forces. Some 30,000 people
have been killed as a result of this PKK terrorism, including many innocent villagers,
mostly of Kurdish origin.7
                                                                                                                                         
2 Indeed, “the fundamental rights and freedoms are protected, against the illegal interventions of the
State (Articles 13-14). Every Turkish citizen has the right to open a lawsuit at the judicial courts in
case his/her fundamental rights and freedoms are violated; however, they do not have the right to
apply directly to the Constitutional Court. Turkey accepted the United Nations Universal Charter of
Human Rights in 1949, and ratified the European Agreement Concerning the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1954. The right for individual applications from Turkish
citizens to the European Commission of Human Rights was recognized in 1987; the compulsory
judicial power of the European Court of Human Rights was recognized in 1989. Thus, international
control on the subject of human rights was adopted. Some of the regulations in the Charter and
Agreement were reflected in the Constitution; and this Charter and Agreement were sources for the
justifications for some of the regulations.” (Facts About Turkey, pp.147-148; and, The Constitution of
the Republic of Turkey, p.9).
3 For more details, see web sites of both the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish
Directorate General Press and Information of the Prime Ministry  (http://www.bygem.gov.tr/).
4 See Article 10 - titled ‘Equality before the Law’ in Chapter 1 of The Constitution of the Republic of
Turkey, p.8.
5 For human rights and Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, see Facts About Turkey, pp.194-196.
6 The Kurdish name of PKK is ‘Partia Karkaren Kurdistan’.
7 Ibid.; for PKK Terrorism, see PKK Terrorism I and II, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Publications,
Ankara, 1998 and 1999; and, “Situation in the Southeast Turkey and Problems Stemming from
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Under these circumstances, as in other Western nations that have faced domestic
terrorist campaigns though on a much smaller scale, Turkey enacted special anti-
terrorism laws in 1990s. This issue has attracted attention and criticisms of some
circles in Europe. They have argued that Turkey is acting against democratic and
human rights principles. Above all, human rights8 have been shown as an obstacle to
Turkey’s integration to the EU. Arguments over human rights are intertwined with
PKK terrorism in Southeast Anatolia.
2.2 Respect for, and Protection of, Minorities
The Turkish Constitution provides that the State with its territory and the nation is
indivisible and that all citizens are equal before law. Persons belonging to three
specific non-Muslim minorities, namely, the Armenians, the Jews and the Greek
Orthodox, are subject to the protections guaranteed by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty
(Articles 37-45) and the Turkish Constitution (Articles 10-26).9 According to
Articles 38 and 39, the non-Muslims under the Turkish citizenship are equal before
law. The personal and family rights recognized to these people under the Article 42
                                                                                                                                         
Terrorism,”  all of these documents can be found at web site of the Turkish Ministry of  Foreign
Affairs.
8 For more discussions on the developments in the area of human rights in Turkey, see Joanne
Leedom-Ackerman, “New Hope in Turkey?” in Christian Science Monitor, Vol.91(247), 11/18/99,
p.9; İhsan D. Dağı, “İnsan Hakları ve Demokratikleşme: Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkilerinde Siyasal
Boyut,” in Atila Eralp (ed.), in Türkiye ve Avrupa (Turkey and Europe), Ankara: İmge Kitabevi,
1997, pp.122-179; Çiğdem Nas, “The Enlargement Policy of the EU and Its Link with the External
Dimension of Human Rights Policy: Turkish Case,” in Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi, Marmara
Üniversitesi Avrupa Topluluğu Enstitütüsü, Vol 5(1-2), 1997, pp.179-199; Mesut Şenol, “Latest
Developments Regarding Human Rights in Turkey,” in Perceptions, Vol.III.(4), December
1998/February 1999; see also “Change in the Turkish Anti-Terror Law, Article 8 of the Anti-Terror
Lax (Lax No: 3713) Has Been Amended,” and “Human Rights in Turkey,” from web site
(http://www.mfa.gov.tr/).
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of the Lausanne Treaty have lost its essence with the entrance into force of the
Turkish Civil Code.
Accordingly the Patriachate, no longer deals with the personal and world affairs of
the minorities.10 As stated in the Article 39 of the Treaty of Lausanne, the minorities
in Turkey are treated equally like all Turkish citizens in all aspects of their lives.
However, according to the EU Commission, “as far as freedom of religion is
concerned, there still exists a difference of treatment between those religious
minorities recognized by the Lausanne Treaty and other religious minorities.”11 In
the analysis of the EU Commission, the fact that Turkey only recognizes non-
Muslims as religious minorities, and the reality that these religious minorities live in
peace and harmony is overlooked.
Turkish society is an amalgam of various peoples of varying origins. Turkey does not
recognize ethnic or linguistic minorities as proposed by the EU especially in the case
of the Kurds. Otherwise, Turkey would have to recognize an incredible amount of
small communities of people as minorities with different rights, all subject to a
special treatment. Indeed, the new Turkish Republic followed the Ottoman legacy of
tolerance towards its citizens belonging to different ethnic, race, and religious
                                                                                                                                         
9 See Lausanne Treaty Text and Minutes of the Treaty, especially for Lord Curzon’s speech on
protection of minorities in Turkey and İsmet Pasha’s response to Lord Curzon and the following
debates. See also The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, for Articles 10-26.
10 In the Ottoman Empire people were separated according to their religious affiliations with
administrative formations called ‘millets’. In a way it can even be said that ‘religious communities’
formed the Ottoman community. The non-Muslims were also able to govern most of the vital aspects
of their civil life such as education, family law including marriage, divorce and inheritance through
their own schools, and religious leaders. Each community was in a way autonomous in its internal
affairs. The Article 42 of the Lausanne Treaty was inspired by this Ottoman tradition. With the
introduction of the Turkish Civil Code, the minorities became totally equal before the law like all
Turkish citizens. They are not subject to a special treatment regarding their personal and world affairs.
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origins. Peoples with many divergent roots have been mixed together and now share
a common national identity. But all this falls on deaf ears within the EU, which
wants Turkey to recognize minorities beyond the Lausanne definition on the basis of
ethnic, linguistic and other differences.
2.3 “Kurdish Issue”
Despite the history of national unity, some in EU circles argue that Turkey’s citizens
of Kurdish origin are a ‘minority’ and should be offered some form of special
treatment.12 The PKK terrorist organization, which claims to speak for these citizens,
and which advocates a separatist state through the use of force and violence have
been trying to internationalize this issue. This issue represents another controversial
aspect of Turkish-EU relations.13
Although the EU is often critical of Turkey for not allowing minority status for the
Kurds, the situation in the country is not as black as the EU paints it. For instance,
political parties which speak for voters of Kurdish origin are fully legal, as seen in
the case of ‘pro-Kurdish Democracy Party of the People (HADEP)’14 in the 1995 and
                                                                                                                                         
11 See 1999 and 2000 Regular Reports from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards
Accession.
12 For a counter argument, see the Chapter on “The Myth of National Homogeneity and the ‘Kurdish
Reality’,” in Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the US, Washington,
D.C: Brookings, 2000, pp.37-55.
13 For more details about the Kurds in Turkey, see, for example, Micheal Gunter, The Kurds in
Turkey: A Political Dilemma, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1990; see also Chapter on the ‘Kurds
in Turkey’ in Andrew Mango, Turkey - The Challenge of a New Role, The Washington Papers 163,
The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C: Praeger, 1994.
14 The first Kurdish political party was established on 7 June 1990 with the name ‘pro-Kurdish
People’s Labor Party (HEP)’, which became ‘Democracy Party (DEP)’ in 1993 and finally the
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1999 national elections. There are local newspapers published and local television
stations currently broadcast programs in Kurdish15 although there is no single
‘Kurdish’ language, but at least three distinct dialects,16 which are not mutually
comprehensible. Therefore citizens, who choose to speak and write in Kurdish,
prefer to communicate almost always in Turkish. Citizens of Kurdish origin can
participate fully at all levels of government, including service as members of
Parliament and in high ministerial posts (even presidential positions).17 There are no
obstacles to their advancement to any level of society.
At the same time, one must know that there are several factors that have fostered
misunderstanding about this issue. The violent terrorist attacks by the PKK, largely
concentrated in the southeastern region of the country, and heavily inflicted on those
of Kurdish origin,18 has necessitated a forceful response from the government. To
counteract these terrorists and to restore order, the government has imposed
Emergency Rule on several provinces, which involves military supervision of the
local government, some restrictions on rights, and the heavy presence of military
                                                                                                                                         
successor of this party was established in May 1994 took the name ‘ pro-Kurdish Democracy Party of
the People (HADEP)’.
15 According to the information obtained from the Directorate General of Press and Information of the
Prime Ministry of the Turkish Republic, there are newspapers and broadcasts in Kurdish, however,
according to the 1999 and 2000 Regular Reports for Turkey issued by the EU Commission, there is no
such thing. These sources are in contradiction, but in today’s Turkey people can speak in different
dialects of Kurdish in the streets and in their homes. They are not being accused of communicating in
Kurdish or taken to the police custody for this. There are some newsmagazines or newsletters such as
‘Pine, Welat and Azadiye’ published in Kurdish and sold all over Turkey. Moreover, there are some
music cassettes in Kurdish recorded by Kurdish origin singers in Turkey.
16 For differences in dialect and kinship among various Kurdish tribes, see C. J. Edmond, Kurds,
Turks and Arabs: Politics, Travel and Research in North-Eastern Iraq 1919-1925, London: Oxford
University Press, 1957; and, Lale Yalçın-Heckmann, Tribe and Kinship Among the Kurds, Frankfurt
am Main: Peter Lang, 1991.
17 Even some Greeks and Greek-Cypriots against the support of their governments of the PKK
terrorism targeting Turkey, accept the fact that a considerable amount of Kurds have reached
important positions in politics in Turkey and argue that PKK cannot be accepted as a representative of
the Kurds in Turkey. (Greek Cypriot daily ‘Haravgi’, 7 March 1999). For more details, see p.86,
footnote 70 below.
18 Facts About Turkey, pp.192-196.
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counter-terrorist forces. The pursuit of terrorists on mountains made security efforts
difficult and risky and heightened tensions and anxieties. Undoubtedly, all these
factors have brought some discomfort to the residents of the region who are largely
of Kurdish origin.19 There is now strong evidence that this painful period is largely
left behind, several provinces that were once under Emergency Rule have now been
returned to normal political life as the security threat has eased especially with the
capture of Abdullah Öcalan.
Though Turkey’s arguments are quite forceful and more representative of the
problem in Turkey, many EU institutions have demonstrated an attitude to Ankara’s
dismay.20 For example, the support of the European Parliament (EP) of PKK
claims21 and its pressure over Turkey are not only damaging to the EU-Turkey
relations but also the image of Europeans in general. Most of the European
Parliament resolutions referring to the Kurdish issue imply that lack of democracy22
                                                
19 Ibid.
20 For different views about the ‘Kurdish issue’, see Gündüz Aktan, “The European Parliament and
Turkey,” in Perceptions, Vol. III (4), December 1998/February 1999; Henri Barkey, “Under the Gun:
Turkish Foreign Policy and the Kurdish Question,” in Robert Olson (ed.), The Kurdish Nationalist
Movement in the 1990s - Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East, Kentucky: The University Press
of Kentucky, 1996, pp. 65-84; see also Hamit Bozarslan, “Political Crisis and the Kurdish Issue in
Turkey,” in Ibid., pp.135-154; and Micheal Gunter, “Kurdish Infighting: The PKK-KDP Conflict” in
Ibid., pp.50-65.
21 The EP’s recognition of PKK as a representative of Kurds in Turkey and support of its claims is a
truly biased attitude if the counter-arguments of some Greeks and Greek Cypriots (who are held
responsible for supporting PKK terrorism targeting Turkey for long) are taken into account. See p. 86,
footnote 70 below.
22 For a counter argument about the development of the ‘Kurdish problem’ in Turkey, see Gülistan
Gürbey “The Development of the Kurdish Nationalism Movement in Turkey Since the 1980s” in
Robert Olson (ed.) Nationalist Movement, pp. 9-50; for counter views about the rule of law and the
Kurds in Turkey, see Mark Muller, “Nationalism and the Rule of Law in Turkey: The Elimination of
Kurdish Representation During the 1990s,” in Ibid., pp.173-200; and, Aram Nigogosian, “Turkey’s
Kurdish Problem in the 1990s Recent Trends,” in Ibid., pp.38-50; for more counter arguments on the
‘Kurdish issue’ and democratization process in Turkey, see Robert Olson and Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu,
“The New Democracy Movement in Turkey: A Response to Liberal Capitalism and Kurdish
Ethnonationalism,” in Ibid., pp.154-173; for the impact of this issue in Turkish foreign policy, see
Robert Olson, “The Kurdish Question and Turkey’s Foreign Policy Toward Syria, Iran, Russia and
Iraq Since the Gulf War,” in Ibid., pp.84-114; for the role of ‘Kurdish issue’ in Turkey–EU relations,
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and human rights principles in Turkey created this problem; but this view denies the
truth  that  Turkey  is  a  democratic state with  its  well-established   and  functioning
democratic institutions albeit certain flaws.23
2.4 Economic Matters
Over the last two decades the Turkish economy has dramatically shifted its
orientation with the structural adjustment program launched in 1980. This program,
which was supported with liberalization reforms, remodeled Turkey’s economic
system24 and made it more outward looking. As a result, free market mechanisms and
principles began to play the key role and replaced the command economy.
All of these reforms caused the shrinking of the public sector and led to the
fluorishing of the private sector. Reforms resulted in a change in philosophy by
gradually concentrating more on the market mechanisms instead of the central
administration. In fact, according to a report by the World Trade Organization
(WTO) published in 1997 on ‘Developments in World Trade’, Turkey was among 21
countries with the most rapidly increasing volume of foreign trade and having the
greatest foreign trade dynamism.25
Turkey has achieved some progress in line with its commitments under the Customs
                                                                                                                                         
see  Philip Robins, “More Apparent than Real? The Impact of the Kurdish Issue on Euro-Turkish
Relations,” in Ibid.,  pp.117-135.
23 See Gündüz Aktan, “The European Parliament”.
24 Turkey and European Integration, A Publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), İstanbul:
Intermedia, 1997, pp.25-35; Facts About Turkey, pp.243-269.
25 Ibid. pp. 21-25; for a recent analysis of the Turkish economy, see 1999 and 2000 Regular Reports
from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession.
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Union;26 however, some necessary reforms in social security, health care and
education that have all been formulated such as the unification of the social security
services, massive privatization programs in health care and the restructuring of the
education system, need to be implemented.27
2.5 Security and Strategic Dimensions
Turkey’s approach to the EU enlargements, to Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) and institutional arrangements is governed primarily by its place and role in
Europe and in its institutions as much as the compatibility of its own security
interests with that of Europe and meeting of these security challenges. 28
Over the last five decades Turkey’s security interests have become inextricably
linked to Europe. It has been part of European security setting since the beginning of
the new epoch. Turkey was declared as the new ‘central front’ by NATO with
respect to its exposition to the new dangers and risks in the post-Cold War security
environment. The restoration of peace and stability in Europe is an important security
interest for Turkey. Naturally, Turkey has sought full membership in the European
                                                
26 See Wilhelm Hummen, “The Economic Future of the EC and Turkey’s Membership” in Erol
Manisalı (ed.), Turkey’s Place in Europe, pp. 69-77.
27 MFA, Turkey and European Integration; for more details, see web sites of the Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Directorate General Press and Information of the Prime Ministry.
28 Stephen J. Blank, Stephen C. Pelletiere and William T. Johnsen, Turkey’s Strategic Position at the
Crossroads of  World  Affairs, US Army War College: SSI (Strategic Studies Institute), 3 December
1993; see also Esra Çayhan, and Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney, Avrupa’da Yeni Güvenlik Arayışları NATO
- AB - Türkiye (New Security Search in Europe, NATO - EU - Turkey), İstanbul: AFA, Tüses Vakfı,
1996; Şadi Ergüvenç, “Turkey; Strategic Partner of the European Union,” (www.fpi.hacettepe.edu.tr/);
Graham E. Fuller, and et al., Turkey’s New Geopolitics - From the Balkans to Western China, A Rand
Study, Boulder, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993; Kenneth Mackenzie, Turkey in Transition: The
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Defence and Security Identity (ESDI). Also, Turkey shares with Europe the same
interests in promoting democratic values, human rights, peace and international order
and the rule of law. The so-called ‘new risks’; potential armed conflicts, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and delivery means, international terrorism,
organized crime, drug trafficking and uncontrolled and illegal immigration,
environmental risks are also important for Turkey.
Indeed, there is an unrecognized compatibility of security concerns between Turkey,
Europe and the US in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Black Sea. For instance,
“if an enlarged NATO or an expanded Europe wished to project influence into the
Black Sea in the pursuit of strategic aims there, this would have to be undertaken
with Turkey’s tacit consent at least. Without Turkish cooperation, there could be no
effective power projection into the strategic center of the region and no visible
presence to contribute to events... Europe ought to be more aware of the importance
of the geo-political and geo-economic changes that are taking place on its doorstep in
the southeast...”29
Ankara takes the view that it could play an important role as an equalizer in the new
US-European partnership. Turkish and US security interests in Europe correspond
over their mutual concern for peace and security of Europe. Both agree on the need
to strengthen the ESDI.30 Turkey believes that NATO should be the indispensable
                                                                                                                                         
West’s Neglected Ally, Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, London: Alliance
Publishers, 1984.
29 Commander Micheal C. Evans, “Turkey and the European Union: A Strategic Discontinuity,” in
Defense and International Security (obtained through proquest search program); see also Alfred
Tovias, “Integrating Turkey into the European Community - A Stabilizing Factor for the Middle
East,” in Futures, November 1993, pp.948-962.
30 See Şadi Ergüvenç, “Turkey in the New European Security Context: Turkey’s Role and
Expectations in the Transatlantic Partnership,” from web site (http:www.fpi.hacettepe.edu.tr/).
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part of the European security framework and should take a more pivotal role, as it
cannot be full member of the ESDI.
2.6 Cultural Dimension
The relations between Turkey and European Union have a hidden but a very deep
cultural dimension on the EU side. These are related to the cultural differences
between Turkey and Europe. Cultural issues create confusion and obstacles in the
Turkey–EU relations to such an extend that the basis of some of the arguments
brought forward by the EU member states as political issues such as human rights
and the status of the Kurds can also be traced in these cultural differences. This is
very much related to the fact that the question of cultural compatibility is open to
speculation. There are conflicting views between Turkey and Europe as well as
between different groups on each side as to what extend Turkey fits to the Western
World.31
Turkey’s culture is quite diversified: it is culturally a very western country and shares
western values of democracy, rule of law and tries to reach the European standards in
terms of its human rights. None of the countries in the EU share the same culture,
each has its own traditions formed by their language and religion. No one unique
                                                
31 Ahmet Evin, “Turkey-EU Relations on the Eve of IGC the Social and Cultural Dimension,”
(www.fpi.hacettepe.edu.tr); Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “The Never Ending Story: Turkey and The
European Union,” in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 34 (4), October 1998, pp.240-258; see also Nilüfer
Narlı, “The Turkey’s Cultural Identity and Its Integration with the European Community: Common
and Divergent Dimensions,” in Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, İstanbul: ISIS/OBİV, Annual
1996/97-3, pp.47-59; see Mehmet Öğütçü, “Religious Bias in the West Against Islam Turkey As a
Bridge in Between?” (www.fpi.hacettepe.edu.tr); see Turgut Özal, Turkey in Europe, pp.316-332;
Rıza Türmen, “On Multiculturalism,” in Perceptions, Vol.III (4), December 1998/February 1999.
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European culture dominates Europe. But it must be borne in mind that “the
perception of Turks as the Other of Europe is deeply embedded in the European
collective memory, and despite many internal hostilities among the Europeans
themselves, they can find Turkey a common other.” 32
2.7 Turco-Greek Dispute
The problems of Greece with Turkey are of a long standing nature.33  There are a
number of problems in the Aegean Sea34 which may be listed as follows: continental
                                                
32 Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “Never Ending Story,” pp. 240-258; Günter Endruweit, “Turkey and the
European Union: A Question of Cultural Difference?” in Perceptions, Vol.III (2), June/August 1998.
33 For details about Turco-Greek bilateral conflicts, see Jonathan Alford (ed.), Greece and Turkey -
Adversity in Alliance, Adelphi Library 12, Great Britain: Gower for IISS (International Institute for
Strategic Studies), 1984; Tozun Bacheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955, San Francisco,
Boulder, London: Westview Press, 1990; see Süha Bölükbaşı, “Türkiye’nin Yakınındaki Avrupa ile
İlişkileri: Türk-Yunan Sorunları,” in Atilla Eralp (ed.), Türkiye ve Avrupa ; Dimitri Constas, (ed.),
The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991; for a general overview
of the historical background of the Turco-Greek relations, see, for example, Şükrü Sina Gürel,
Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1993) (Turco-Greek Relations in a Historical
Context 1821-1993), Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993; INAF (International Affairs Agency), The
Aegean Problem in Turkish-Greek Relations, İstanbul: Aslı Kitapçılık, 1991; for more details on
Turkish-Greek relations, see, for example, Cosmas Megolommatis, Turkish-Greek Relations and the
Balkans: A Historian’s Evaluation of Today’s Problems, Cyprus Foundation, 1955; Charalambos
Papasotiriou, “The Dynamics of Greek-Turkish Strategic Interaction,” in Hellenic Studies, Vol.5(2),
1997, pp.183-199; see also Harry J. Psomiades, The Eastern Question Last Phase: A Study in Turkish-
Greek Diplomacy, USA: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1968; Günaltay Şıbay, “Turkish-Greek
Relations,” in Foreign Policy/Dış Politika, Vol. IX (1-2), 1981 pp.23-27.
34 “The first issue is seabed rights. Greece contends that every island of the Aegean archipelago has its
own continental shelf. Turkey says that there is a natural prolongation of the continental shelf off its
western coast, which takes precedence. The second issue is territorial waters. Greece claims under the
Law of the Sea 12-mile territorial waters. Turkey says that if this were implemented it would mean
that Greece would control all high seas access to Izmir and the Dardenelles. The Turkish parliament
has passed a resolution saying that, if Greece were to extend from its present six-mile limit, this would
constitute an act of war. The third issue is air space. Greece unilaterally declared, in 1931, a 10-mile
airspace, at a time when the international norm for territorial waters was only three miles. Now the
ten-mile limit falls within the 12-mile zone. The 10-mile limit was acknowledged by an international
convention in the 1940s but it is not recognised by Turkey nor, for that matter, by the US. Turkish
warplanes and American carrier-based aircraft regularly ignore the limit and fly in the four miles
beyond the 6-mile zone. Because of the configuration of the archipelago, the civilian flight
information region in the Aegean comes under Athens air traffic control ending only three miles off
the Turkish coast. Turkey believes that the ATC should be divided down a median line. Greece says
this is unthinkable because it would give Turkey authority over skies to the west of Greek islands in
the eastern Aegean. The most recent issue to emerge regards the sovereignty of uninhabited islets in
33
shelf, territorial waters, air space, air traffic control (Flight Information Region, FIR),
problems related to the implementation of Rogers Plan, the militarization of the
Aegean islands which have demilitarized status,35 the Kardak/Imia36 and other islets
status in the Aegean Sea, the rights of the Turks living in Western Thrace,37 and the
Cyprus question.
The balance in the Aegean, reflected in the status quo, presents a unique situation not
to be seen anywhere else in the world. The characteristics of the status quo may be
                                                                                                                                         
the Aegean such as Imia (Kardak to the Turks). Greece says that the boundaries of the country were
fixed by the Treaties of Lausanne in 1923,…and the Treaty of Paris of 1947, under which Italy ceded
the Dodecannese to Greece as WW II reparations. The treaties left Greece with all the islands of the
Aegean save for Imbros and Tenedos in the mouth of the Dardenelles. The islands were, however, to
remain unfortified so as not to present a threat to Turkey. The colonels’ junta began to fortify the
islands after 1967…Turkey says that this means Greece is in violation of its Treaty obligations. The
most recent development in this issue has been that a number of senior Turkish political figures have
questioned the sovereignty of uninhabited islets not explicitly mentioned in the Treaties of Lausanne
and Paris. There are, they say, extensive grey areas as regards sovereignty in the Aegean. This, of
course, feeds into the whole issue of territorial waters and continental shelf.” (Robert McDonald,
“The Prospects for Relations Between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus,” obtained from web site of
ACGTA).
35 Natalino Ronzitti, “The Aegean Demilitarization, Greek-Turkish Relations and Mediterranean
Security,” in Foreign Policy/Dış Politika, Vol. XIV (1-2), 1990, pp.60-77.
36 See Krateros Ioannou, “A Tale of Two Islets,” in THESIS, Vol.I.(1), Spring 1997, pp.33-43; see
also Yüksel İnan and Sertaç H. Başeren, Status of Kardak Rocks, Ankara, 1997; and, “Report on the
‘Limnia-Imia’ Islets,” by National Hellenic Foundation Institute of Neo-Hellenic Research, Athens,
February 1996.
37 For detailed research and analysis of the situation of the Turks of Western Thrace and the role of
this minority in Turco-Greek relations, see, for example, Türkkaya Ataöv, “The Ethnic Turkish
Minority in Western Thrace, Greece,” in Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Vol.22, 1992,
pp.89-99; Tözün Bahçeli, “The Grievances of the Turkish Community in Western Thrace and Greek-
Turkish Relations,” in Erol Manisalı (ed.), Turkey and the Balkans, İstanbul: Middle East Business
and Banking, 1990, pp. 59-69; Soner Çağatay, Balkan Minorities, pp.27-28 and 65-66; H. Bülent
Demirbaş, Batı Trakya Sorunu (Western Thrace Problem), İstanbul: ARBA, 1996; see, for example,
INAF (International Affairs Agency), The Western  Thrace Turks Issue in Turkish-Greek Relations,
İstanbul: Promat, 1992; Yüksel İnan, “Aren’t There Any Turks in Western Thrace?” in Foreign
Policy/Dış Politika, Vol. XIV (1-2), 1990, pp. 77-89; Baskın Oran, Türk Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı
Trakya Sorunu (Western Thrace Problem in Turco-Greek Relations), İstanbul: Bilgi, 1991; see also
Hugh Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, Great Britain: MRG (Minority Rights
Group), 1991, pp.87-99 and 173-193; Michael Stephen, “The Human Rights of the Turkish Minority
in Western Thrace,” in Perceptions, Vol.III(4), December/February 1999; see Lois Whitman,
Destroying Ethnic Identity - The Turks of Greece, A Helsinki Watch Report, USA, 1990; see “Greek
Violations of Human Rights in Western Thrace, A Most Recent Case Study,” in  Turkish Review of
Balkan Studies, İstanbul: ISIS/OBİV (Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies), Annual
1994/95-2, pp.73-79; “A Seminar on the Problems that Turks of Western Thrace Face,” in Ibid.,
pp.79-89;“The Turks of Western Thrace-Greece,” from web page (http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/);
see also “Human Rights in Greece: Joint Concise Annual Report for 1999” from web site
(http://www.greekhelsinki.gr); Minorities, Facts and Figures, Institute for Political Studies, Athens.
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summarized as follows:
i. The demilitarized status of the Western Anatolian islands,
ii.Territorial waters of 6 miles and air space of corresponding dimensions,
iii. A continental shelf that has to be limited through negotiations in an
equitable manner,
iv. Free use of the international sea and air space of the Aegean.38
Turkey’s conflict with Greece in the Aegean stems from non-recognition by Greece
of the characteristics of the Aegean mentioned above.39 According to Greece in the
Aegean the one and the only problem is the ‘continental shelf’ issue. Greece argues
that Turkey creates other disputes like the territorial waters and the status of islets -
rocks in the Aegean. Greece accuses Turkey of being revisionist in relation to these
issues. There is a disagreement between two states about the resolution of the
Aegean conflict. Greece proposes to take the case to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, while Turkey prefers bilateral negotiations. Indeed, there
are two main disagreements between Greece and Turkey about the Aegean; first is
over the definition of issues, and the second is about the resolution of the conflict.40
                                                
38 For details of the very special characteristics unique to the Aegean Sea, see Tozun Bahceli,
Relations Since 1955, pp.129-130 and for an in-depth account of the major differences between
Turkey and Greece over the Aegean pp.130-159 of the same book. For more information about the
problems in the Aegean Sea, see Suat Bilge, “The Situation in the Aegean Sea,” in Foreign Policy/Dış
Politika, Vol. XIV (1-2), 1990, pp.3-5; and, Andrew Wilson, “The Aegean Dispute,” in Jonathan
Alford (ed.), Adversity in Alliance, pp. 90-131.
39 Vamık D. Volkan and Norman Itkowitz, Turks and Greeks: Neighbors in Conflict, Cambridgeshire:
The Eothen Press, 1994, p.194.
40 For detailed analysis of how to resolve Turkish-Greek conflicts and different views about the ways
for resolving Turco-Greek dispute in general, see Marcia Christoff Kurop, “Greece and Turkey - Can
They Mend Fences?” in Foreign Affairs, Vol.77(1), January/February 1998, pp.7-12; Panayotis J.
Tsakonas and Thanos P. Dokos, “Greek-Turkish Relations Towards the Twenty-First Century: A
View From Athens,” Global Action To Prevent War from (http://www.globalactionpw.org/); see
Hasan Ünal, “How to Tackle the Turco-Greek Dispute in the Post-Dayton Era? An Analysis of the
Dispute and a Solution Proposal,” A Paper presented to the Conference on ‘Post-Dayton Balkans in
Europe: Political Security and Economic Aspects of an Emerging Relationship’ Corfu, 30-31 August
1996; see also James Wilkinson, Moving Beyond Conflict Prevention to Reconciliation - Tackling
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Today’s Turco-Greek conflicts are both ancient history and highly contemporary.
The Ottoman rule over Greeks for nearly four centuries seem to affect the Greek
mind. For instance, Greece’s independence struggle is often portrayed with the
picture of an ancestral enemy against whom one must be on one’s guard.41 “For
Greeks the Fall of Constantinople is recent history, the Ottoman Occupation was the
day before yesterday, the War of Independence yesterday, whilst the Greek initiative
of 1921-3 which ended in the Asia Minor Catastrophe and the expulsion of the
Greeks of Asia Minor is still the living present.”42
Therefore, one can say that Greece remains integrally tied to certain historical
memories. The Greeks still view the Turks as a threat to their sovereignty. Even the
Greek opposition to the full integration of Turkey into the present day Europe43
reflects the same concern; if Turkey becomes a full-fledged part of European
civilization, then Greece’s strength and the EU leverage against Turkey will diminish
and indeed, both will become equals. That is why Greece has obstructed Turkey’s
integration to the EC/EU vehemently and its persistence in this policy poisons a
relationship which maybe mutually profitable.
2.8 Cyprus Problem
                                                                                                                                         
Greek-Turkish Hostility, New York: The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, June
1999.
41 Vamık D. Volkan and Norman Itkowitz, Neighbors in Conflict, p.194.
42 Heinz Richter, “The Greek-Turkish Conflict,” in Marion Safaris and Martin Eve (eds.), Background
to Contemporary Greece, London: Merlin Press, 1990, p.317.
43 For detailed analysis of the Greek policy to isolate Turkey from Europe, see Cosmas
Megolommatis, A Historian’s Evaluation, pp.14-18.
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Cyprus is a difficult and complex issue. It has a long history and remains unresolved
today. But the issue ultimately revolves around one central fact: the existence of two
distinct peoples on the island, the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. Their
language, culture, national origin and religion, as well as their aspirations are
different. They are equal to one another in determining the destiny of the island. 44
Hence, the story of Cyprus is essentially the story of the relationship between these
two peoples.45 The Cyprus issue cannot be contained within the island. Each side is
supported by its mother country. Cyprus has to be added to the other conflictual
issues between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea. Animosities are historical and
psychological in origin and are more pronounced among the Greeks than Turks.46
The Ottomans conquered Cyprus in 1571. In 1878 Britain was given the
administration of the island with the conclusion of a defense alliance between the
Ottoman Empire and Britain. The Ottomans obtained British support for Ottoman
                                                
44 “Indeed, the UN Secretary General has made it clear that the relationship between the Greek and
Turkish Cypriots is not one of majority and minority, but of political equals. Even Mr. Vassiliou
himself accepted at the Council of Europe, on 30 January 1990, while replying a question for Sir
Keith Speed [Member of the UK Parliament] that the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities
are political equals, [however this fact was ignored in the Southern Cyprus Greek Administration’s
(SCGA) application for membership to the EC/EU].” (For views of Mr. Michael Stephen, of the Inner
Temple, Barrister and Member of the UK Parliament 1992-1997, see Micheal Stephen,
“Greek Cypriot Application For Membership of the European Union,” from web page,
(http://kktc.pubinfo.gov.nc.tr/eu/h171198b.htm).
45 For more details on the Cyprus question between Turkey and Greece, see, for example, Clement H.
Dodd, The Cyprus Issue:  A Current Perspective, UK: The Eothen Press, 1995; Ahmet C. Gazioğlu,
Two Equal and Sovereign Peoples, Nicosia: Cyrep, 1997 and Kıbrıs Sorunu ve Bağımsızlık (Cyprus
Problem and Independence), Lefkoşa: Cyrep Yayınları, 1986; see also N. M. Ertekün, The Cyprus
Dispute and the Rebirth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,  Lefkoşa: K. Rüstem & Brother,
1981; see also Turhan Fevzioğlu and Necati M. Ertekün, The Crux of the Cyprus Question, Lefkoşa,
1987; Christian Heinze, Cyprus Conflict 1964-1985, Lefkoşa: K. Rüstem & Brother, 1986; INAF
(International Affairs Agency), Unknown Aspects of the Cyprus Reality, İstanbul, 1992; Erol
Manisalı, Cyprus - Yesterday and Today, İstanbul: DER Publications, 2000; Pierre Oberling, The
Cyprus Tragedy, Lefkoşa: K. Rüstem & Brother, 1989; for a psychoanalytic history of the two ethnic
groups in Cyprus, see Vamık D. Volkan, Cyprus-War and Adaptation, Charlottesville: University
Press of Virginia, 1979.
46 Clement H. Dodd, A Current Perspective, p.21 and, see also the same author’s book, The Cyprus
Imbroglio, Cambridge: The Eothen Press, 1998;and, C.H. Dodd (ed.), Cyprus: The Need for New
Perspectives, Cambridge: The Eothen Press, 1999.
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territorial integrity47 against the Russian threat at that time. The island remained
under official British occupation until 1923 when at Lausanne the newly established
Turkish Republic ceded it to Britain.
The roots of the Cyprus problem can be traced back to the 1950’s48 when Greek
Cypriot and Greek aspirations to achieve Enosis49 (the island’s union with Greece)
took the form of a violent terrorist campaign against the Turkish Cypriots as well as
the British colonial rule. Britain gave Cyprus independence in 1960, through the
international Treaties of 1960.50 These treaties were based on political and sovereign
equality, and the equal constituent status of the two peoples. The bicommunal
Republic of Cyprus51 was established in 1960.52 Under the 1960 Treaties of
                                                
47 For an in-depth analysis of the British policy of keeping the Ottoman territorial integrity, see Ayşe
Kılıç Yılmaz, An Analysis of British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire: Keeping the Ottoman
Territorial Integrity and Political Independence 1870-1878, M.A. Thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara,
1998.
48 For Greece and Turkey’s involvement in the Cyprus struggle of the 1950’s, see Tozun Bacheli,
Relations Since 1955, pp.31-47.
49 The Greek Cypriots in coordination with the mainland Greece established a secret organization for
achieving Enosis in Cyprus and they draw the ‘Akritas Plan’ for annihilation of the Cyprus Turks. In
reality ‘Akritas’ was a nickname given to the leader of this organization. After the Zurich Agreement
these people promulgated an underground newspaper called ‘Patris Daily’ through which they sent
messages and the plans that would be put into action by the local organizations in Cyprus from their
headquarter in Athens. For the Greek Cypriot attempts for ‘Enosis’ and the ‘Akritas Plan’ which
constitutes the basis for annihilation of the Turks of Cyprus in order to advance Greek Cypriot
unification with mainland Greece, see N. M. Ertekün, Cyprus Dispute, pp 9-19; see the text of the
‘Akritas Plan’ in Alper Faik Genç, Cyprus Report - 1974 My Diary, The Turkish Federated State of
Cyprus, 1978, pp.20-36; for more details about the ‘Akritas Plan’ from original Greek sources like the
issues of the ‘Patris Daily’ of 1966, see INAF, Unknown Aspects, pp.60-73.
50 For the text of the Zurich and London Agreements of 11 and 19 February 1959, see N. M. Ertekün,
The Cyprus Dispute, pp.145-160; see also web sites of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
Public Relations Department of the of the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Defense, (http://kktc.pubinfo.gov.nc.tr/).
51 For details of the Cyprus Constitution of 1960 and the position of the Greek and Turkish
communities in this Constitution, see Christian Heinze, Cyprus Conflict 1964-1985, pp.19-27.
52 For more details about the background of the Cyprus issue, see Dimitri S. Bitsios, Cyprus - The
Vulnerable Republic, Institute for Balkan Studies 152, Thessaloniki, 1975; Andrew Borowiec, The
Mediterranean Feud, New York: Praeger, 1983; Theodore Couloumbis and Constantine
Lyderopoulos, “The Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece, Turkey,” Occasional Paper, OP.98.06,
ELIAMEP, Athens, 1998; for historical background of the Cyprus conflict till 1974 Turkish Peace
Operation, see N. M. Ertekün, The Cyprus Dispute, pp. 1-37; Hugo J. Gobbi, Rethinking Cyprus,
Israel - Tel Aviv: Ha’dfus Hejadah, 1993; Sabahattin İsmail, 150 Soruda Kıbrıs Sorunu (Cyprus
Problem in 150 Questions), İstanbul: Kastaş, 1998; for a brief account of the events  from 1960 to
1974, see Erol Manisalı, Yesterday and Today, pp.33-57; Micheal Moran, Sovereignty Divided -
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Guarantee and of Alliance, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Greece became
guarantors of the new republic.
However, the Greek Cypriots resorted to violence in December 1963 and expelled
their Turkish Cypriot partners from all the government organs by force of arms.
During the 1963-1974 period, hundreds of Turkish Cypriots were murdered by
armed Greek Cypriot paramilitaries.53 The UN peacekeeping force sent to the
island54 in 1964 proved ineffective. Greece acted in violation of its Treaty obligations
as a guarantor power, while  Britain remained indifferent. After the Greeks had made
a bloody attempt at the final takeover of Cyprus by Greece through a coup d’etat
organized by the junta in Athens and its collaborators in Cyprus,55 Turkey undertook
a peace operation in accordance with its Treaty rights and obligations in 1974.56
The Greek Cypriots claim that the Cyprus problem was caused by Turkish operation
in 1974, and that, if the Turkish troops landed on the island in 1974 were to
withdraw, the problem would be solved. The UN peace keeping force, United
Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is stationed on both sides of the island. In
                                                                                                                                         
Essays on the International Dimensions of the Cyprus Problem, Nicosia: Cyrep, 1998; Ioannis D.
Stefanidis, Isle of Discord, Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem, London:
Hurst & Company, 1999.
53 For the historical background of the Greek Cypriot coup d’etat of 1963-64, see Tozun Bacheli,
Relations Since 1955, pp.51-91; and, Christian Heinze, Cyprus Conflict 1964-1985, pp.4-1. This
attempt by the Greek Cypriots led to the flight of the Turkish Cypriot population, for details of the
Turkish Cypriot exodus, see Pierre Oberling, The Road to Bellapais, New York: Columbia University
Press, 1982; for the sufferings of the Turkish Cypriots between 1963-1974, see Polyvios G. Polyviou,
Cyprus  Conflict and Negotiation, 1960-1980, New York: Holmes  and Meier Publishers , 1980, p.26.
54 See S. Bölükbaşı, “The Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations: Peaceful Non-Settlement Between
1954-1996,” in International Journal – Middle East Studies, Issue.30, 1998.
55 For the ‘Ioannidis Coup’ initiated by the Greek Junta leader Ioannidis against Makarios, see Tozun
Bacheli, Relations Since 1955, pp.95-103.
56 For the background of the Turkish intervention of 1974, see Tozun Bacheli, Relations Since 1955,
pp.95-103; and for Turkish prevention of Enosis in 1974 and the beginning of a new period in Cyprus,
see, Erol Manisalı, Yesterday and Today, pp57-148; for a different analysis of the 1974 Turkish Peace
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1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared independence57 and establised their own state
the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)’. But the international
community only recognizes the Greek Cypriot Administration in the south of the
island.58 The UN Secretary General’s efforts to resolve the conflict between the two
sides through proximity talks have not produced a solution. Lately, because of
Greece’s efforts within the EU, the Cyprus question has become a matter between
Turkey and the EU.
Indeed, Cyprus-EC/EU relations have had a long history. The Cyprus Government
representing both the Greeks and the Turks applied for association with the EC in
1962. The reason behind the Cypriot application was simple; it was “an economically
rational step to ensure continued access for her traditional exports to her main trading
partner, the United Kingdom.”59 So, it can be said that Cyprus approached
association as a means of gaining advantage from preferential access to the UK. On
the EC side, the main driving force was the strategic importance of the island in the
Eastern Mediterranean region and the need to accommodate a former colony of a
member state. The EC-Cyprus Association Agreement which aimed at creating a
Customs Union in a ten-year transitional period, was signed in 1972.60 By that stage,
the Greek Cypriots had seized the government and expelled the Turks from the
                                                                                                                                         
Operation, see James H. Meyer, “Policy Watershed: Turkey’s Cyprus Policy and the Interventions of
1974,” WWS Case Study 3/00, Princeton University on-line.
57Necati Münir Ertekün, “The Historical Background of the Cypriot Turkish Declaration of
Independence, 15 November 1983,” in Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy: Recent
Developments, Madison Wisconsin, 1996, pp.189-213; for the text of the Declaration of
Independence of the TRNC, see Appendix I in Christian Heinze, Cyprus Conflict 1964-1985, pp.37-
56; see also web site of the Public Relations Department of the TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Defense.
58 Dr. Christian Heinze argues that for a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus conflict, the
international community must recognize the TRNC. For more details about his views on this issue, see
Christian Heinze, Cyprus Conflict 1964-1985, pp.29-35.
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administration by force of arms. However, as the international community continued
to recognize the Greek Cypriot Administration as the Government of Cyprus, all
these negotiations with the EC had been concluded by the Greeks with no regard to
the Turks who had been subjected to a violent ethnic cleansing campaign between
1963 and 1974.
The ultimate objective of the Greek Cypriot Administration at the time was a
Customs Union rather than full accession. Three years later with Cyprus War of 1974
and the division of the island into two separate parts; the substantial development of
EC-Cypriot relations could not be achieved. Neither the EC nor the Greek Cypriots
felt able to proceed to the second stage. Therefore, they decided to extend the first
stage with an additional document signed in 1978. 61
As a result of Greece’s efforts and support inside the EC against the opposition of
France and Italy, the Greek Cypriot Administration passed to the second stage of
association with a protocol signed in Luxembourg in 1987, which became effective
at the beginning of 1988. The second stage was decided to end with the
accomplishment of a Customs Union. Finally, the Greek Cypriot Administration
decided to apply for full membership in July 1990.62 In fact, this was an inevitable
                                                                                                                                         
59 H. Gsänger, “The EEC and Cyprus and Turkey,” in D. Seers and C. Vaitsos (eds.), Integration and
Uneven Development, London: Macmillan, 1980.
60 John Redmond, Mediterranean Enlargement, pp. 62-98.
61 Ibid.
62 As Ambassador Nelson Ledsky, former US Special Coordinator for Cyprus put it in 1990, “If there
is going to be an application for the EC this must be a joint application of both communities.”
(Ambassador Nelson Ledsky, US Special Coordinator for Cyprus, Cyprus Times, 8 June 1990).
However, the Greek Cypriot Government ignored this fact in its application to the EC/EU in 1990.
They applied as if they were the only government on the island. Both the international community and
the EC/EU accepted them as the sole arbitrator of the island by overlooking this fact and the EC/EU
negotiations concluded with the Greek Cypriots. For more details about the Greek Cypriot application,
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step by the Greek Cypriot Government,63 given the accession of Greece to the EC in
1981.  The Greek Cypriot Government has almost achieved what it wanted from the
very beginning, full membership in the EU on behalf of the whole island. 64
Greece supports the full  accession of the Southern Cypriot Government to the Union
on behalf of ‘Cyprus’. By the accomplishment of the full membership of Cyprus,
Greece and Greek Cypriots would rule out most of the Turkish claims on the island
such as bizonality, bicommunality, and confederation. Moreover, by this way the
Turks in Cyprus would be reduced to a minority status.
Should the EU accepts Greek Cypriot Administration,65 Turkey would lose its rights
emanating from the Guaranty Agreement signed in 1960. Indeed, Turkey faces a
serious threat in Cyprus and over the Aegean Sea. This may explain Greece’s taking
the lead to lobby on behalf of Southern Cyprus’ Government while trying to halt full
membership for Turkey.
Greece has blocked the payment of the Customs Union funds to Turkey after the
Turkish-Greek dispute over an Aegean islet.66 It has managed to incorporate
                                                                                                                                         
see Haluk Kabaalioğlu, “Greek Cypriot Application for European Union Membership,” in
Perceptions, Vol.IV(3), September/November 1999.
63For Greek Cypriot foreign policy, see Charalambos Tsardanidis and Yannis Nicolou, “Cyprus
Foreign and Security Policy Options and Challenges,” in  Stelios Stavridis, Thanos Veremis and et al.,
(eds.),  The Foreign Policies of the European Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries
in the 1990s, New York: St. Martin’s 1999, pp.171-195.
64Ibid.
65 For more details on the role of the Cyprus question in Turco-Greek and Turkey-EU relations, see,
for example, Andrew Apostolou, “Turkey, the European Union, and Cyprus,” in Mediterranenan
Quarterly, Vol.10 (4), Fall 1999, pp.104-121; Pierre H. Kramer, “The Cyprus Problem and European
Security,” in Survival, Vol.39 (3), Autumn 1997; F. S. Larrabee, “The EU Needs to Rethink its
Cyprus Policy,” in  Survival, Vol.40 (3), Autumn 1998; Salahi R. Sonyel, “The European Union and
the Cyprus Imbroglio,” in Perceptions, Vol.III(2), June/August 1998.
66 “The referred dispute is called ‘Kardak-Imia Islet Issue’. A Turkish bulk carrier called ‘Figen Akat’
ran a ground near the Kardak Rocks in the Aegean Sea, on 25 December 1995. As the maritime
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impositions on Turkey regarding the resolution of the Cyprus problem and of the
Aegean continental shelf issue, both in the Helsinki conclusions and in the Accession
Partnership document declared on 8 November 2000. Indeed, Greece has achieved its
goal of direct linking of Cyprus question to the accession of Turkey to the EU with
the Accession Partnership document. So, Turkey’s road to the EU is once again
blocked by Greece, while Greece and the EU have opened the way for the Greek
Cypriot admission to the EU.
Such moves by Greece deteriorates the EU’s relations with Turkey, which in turn
affects the relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots on the island. There are
major obstacles67 on the road to a negotiated settlement to the Cyprus problem. One
is the Greek Cypriots’ insistence on their version of the history of the conflict that the
Cyprus problem started with the Turkish intervention of 1974. They totally overlook
the attacks against the Turkish Cypriot community that were launched in 1963. The
second is that, taking into consideration the history of the Turkish-Greek relationship
and the shared mental representations attached to it, a political solution should be
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67 For more about the Turkish Cypriot view of the non-resolution of the Cyprus issue, see TRNC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Cyprus Problem Why No Solution - The Obsession That
Prevents A Peaceful Settlement in Cyprus, Nicosia, 1997; Erol Manisalı, Yesterday and Today,
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psychologically sound. These people not only need physical security but also a
psychological one as well. For example, the Turkish Cypriots feel more secure as a
result of the presence of the Turkish Armed Forces on the lands of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus. Therefore, a forced togetherness may again lead to
bloodshed. Both sides should have a border in order to deal with their anxiety about
identity and physical and psychological security.
The EU’s involvement in Cyprus has made the problem more complicated.68 For
instance, it is now quite difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate a federation: if
Cyprus as a whole becomes a member of the EU, the bizonality and bicommunality
would come to an end, since, according to the acquis communautaire, freedom of
movement, the right to settlement and the right to buy property in any one of the EU
member states would be guaranteed to the member states’ citizens. All that means
that the Greek Cypriots would have the right to move and settle in the northern part
of the island, which in the end would destroy bicommunality and bizonality.69 These
freedoms are the essential parts of the EU spirit, which are non-negotiable.  Indeed,
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this is the reason that lies behind Turkish proposal for a confederation.70 Until the EU
involvement in the Cyprus issue, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots were favoring the
formation of a federation for the resolution of the Cyprus issue. However, Turkey
and especially Turkish Cypriots now press for a confederation.
                                                
70 See Call for Peace from the Turkish side: Rauf Denktas Proposes for Confederation in Cyprus, 31
August 1998, from web sites of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Public Relations
Department of the TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
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CHAPTER 3
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RELATIONS
BETWEEN GREECE AND THE EEC/EC/EU
3.1 Reasons Behind the Greek Application
The 1974 Cyprus crisis was an important blow to the Greek security, and Greece’s
fears about Turkey have increased ever since. Eventually, after 1974, Greece started
searching for new mechanisms within which it can feel secure and safeguard its
interests against any move from the Turkish side. Moreover, Greece wanted to check
and contain Turkey through these mechanisms. Therefore, the EC membership is
seen by Greece as a “framework more likely to shield Greece from Turkey’s military
superiority.”1
So, Greek decision to apply to the EC was mainly driven by political factors as well
as economic ones. Main reason was to enhance Greece’s external and internal
security. The Greeks believed that  membership would not only protect them against
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any ‘aggression’ from the Turkish side but would also secure their country
international support in its relations with Turkey. Greece right after the Cyprus War
felt isolated and neglected by its Western allies within NATO, some of which did not
give the kind of support Greece expected from them versus Turkey. Eventually, anti-
NATO and anti-American feelings2 have arisen in Greek society especially with the
provocation of the socialist and neo-Orthodox3 groups. The Greeks no longer wanted
to entrust their national security to NATO. Most of the problems have arisen because
American and NATO officials denied the threat to Greece’s interests from Turkey.
Instead, they concentrated on the Warsaw Pact threat. To put it more starkly, the
Greek Ambassador to the EC in 1978 said that, “in the event of a conflict between
our two countries the Community would intervene.”4 In a way, membership to the
EC was and still is seen as a way of putting an end to Greek isolation that is
‘monaxia’ as coined by the Greek Prime Minister of the time, Georges Rallis.5
However, from the Community point of view, this attitude of the Greek Government
seemed rather doubtful, because of the fact that the EC and its member states did not
want to be involved in Turco-Greek disputes initially. The US position was and has
been almost the same.  Indeed, the US non-interference in the Cyprus crisis against
                                                                                                                                         
1 Panos Tsakaloyannis, “The Greco-Turkish Dispute in the Light of Enlargement,” in G. Minet et.al.,
(ed.), Mediterrannean Challenge IV: Spain, Greece and Community Policies, Sussex: University of
Sussex, 1981, p.44.
2 For the development of anti-American and anti-NATO feelings inside Greece in relation to the
Cyprus crisis of 1974, see F. Stephen Larrabee, “Greece, Turkey and Security in the Eastern
Mediterranean,” Adelphi Papers, No.135, Summer 1977, pp.16-25 and especially pp.17-20.
3 For detailed information about the role of neo-Orthodox groups in Greek foreign policy, see pp.55-
56 below.
4 Aurel Braun, Small-State Security in the Balkans, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble Books, 1983,
p.162, original quotation is from New York Times, 6 November 1962.
5  See Ibid.
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the Turks had angered the Greeks at the time. From then onwards, the Greeks no
longer trusted the US as a reliable ally.6
Accordingly, the Community’s approach to Turkish-Greek bilateral conflicts in those
days, unlike today, followed the same line as the US approach. The EC tried to urge
Greece to resolve all of its conflicts with Turkey before being fully integrated to the
Community. In response, Greece tried to convince the EC by saying that it was
trying to secure its democracy, which had been restored only after the end of the
Colonels dictatorship thanks to Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974.
Although, the EC reaction to the Greek application at first was not so sympathetic,
Greece managed to become part of the EC, since it had already established close ties
with the EEC as defined in the Association Agreement dating 1962, which aimed at
harmonizing the trade policy, agricultural, technical - financial assistance and other
issues that were considered vital for Greece’s integration to the EEC/EC.7 The
association agreement was a prototype of the EEC Treaty which tried to coordinate
economic policies of both sides. Obviously, the aim was the achievement of a full
Customs Union through a transition period of 22 years.8 But, as a result of the 1967
military coup d’etat the agricultural harmonization between Greece and the EC as
                                                
6 For more details about the US involvement in the beginning of the Cyprus crisis and for the US
efforts to contain the conflict after Turkish Peace Operation in 1974, see Süha Bölükbaşı, in Kenneth
W. Thompson, (ed.), The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus,
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Press of America, 1988, pp.197-212.
7 For more details, see Serhat Güvenç, “Turkey’s Changing Perception of Greece’s Membership in the
European Union: 1981-1998,” in Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, Annual 1998/1999-4, İstanbul:
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well as the financial assistance to be given by the EC to Greece had been frozen. This
had caused non-realization of full integration of Greece to the EC. However, shortly
after the end of the military dictatorship,9 Greece became a full member of the EC in
1981.
3.2   From Association to Membership
In 1975, Greece decided to make an application for full integration to the EC, 10 even
without waiting for the full implementation of the Association Agreement.11 During
those days Turkey considered the Greek move  “as a political act aimed at getting a
new international platform against Turkey.”12 In 24 June 1975 the EC assured
Ankara that “examination of the Greek application for membership will not affect the
relations between the Community and Turkey and the rights guaranteed by
Association Agreement with Turkey would not be affected thereby.”13 Ankara, being
anxious about the Greek application demanded equal representation in the European
                                                                                                                                         
8 See Panos Kazakos, “Greece and the EC: Historical Review,” in Panos Kazakos and P.C. Ioakimidis
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11 See Panos Kazakos, “Historical Review,” pp.1-11; see also Kostas A. Lavdos, Europeanization,
pp.28-47; and, Iacovos S. Tsalicoglou, Negotiating for Entry, pp.1-29.
12 See Serhat Güvenç, “Changing Perception,” pp.103-139.
13 Bulletin of the European Communities, February 1976, p.8. (Emphasis mine).
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Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanism but the Community did not accept this. In
response, the Community proposed Ankara improved political dialogue with the EC
members under the EPC.14
Though the Commission had seen the economic costs of accepting Greece within the
EC, favored its application, as it would in its view be a very good signal and an
example for other new democracies of Europe like, Spain and Portugal.15 The
Commission was aware of the fact that the support Greece needed for necessary
structural and institutional changes was a complex and a demanding task for the EC.
At that time, Ankara became more annoyed by the possible Greek influence inside
the EC on Turkey’s accession to the Community. Ankara believed that Greece’s
membership in the EC would negatively affect Turkey’s position inside the Western
Alliance. In order to respond to Turkish fears, the Commission once again assured
Turkey that the Greek membership would not affect the Community’s relations with
Ankara. Accordingly, the Commission advised Greece to pass through a transitional
period until it became ready for full membership.16
However, Greece in need of strong security support wanted immediate full
membership and pressured the Community. Eventually, in 1976 the foreign ministers
of the EC overruled the Commission. The Greek Accession Treaty was signed in
1979 and entered into force on 1 January 1981.17
                                                
14 See Serhat Güvenç, “Changing Perception,” pp.103-139.
15 Both countries have also restored their democracies after the military juntas, just like Greece.
16 For more, see Panos Kazakos, “Historical Review,” pp.1-11; and, Serhat Güvenç, “Changing
Perception,” pp.103-139.
17 For more detailed analysis of this negotiation process between Greece and the EC, see Iacovos S.
Tsalicoglou, Negotiating for Entry.
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Gradually the EC/EU has become a third party to the Turkish-Greek conflicts, and
the EPC18 mechanism became the forum where Greece began to bring up Turkish-
Greek conflicts. Greece used its position within the EC/EU as a leverage against
Turkey and has been able to internationalize especially the Cyprus and the Aegean
issues through use of the EC/EU mechanisms. The point to be stressed at this point is
that the EC, which, at the beginning, did not want to become involved in the Turkish-
Greek problems, has now become fully involved in the Turkish-Greek disputes.
Today, there are circles within the EU opposing Turkey’s full integration, on the
basis that, if Turkey becomes a member of the EU, then the EU will become
involved in Turkey’s problems with its neighbors and even with the conflicts in the
Middle East and the Caucasus. This pretext is double-sided because the EU has
already become involved in the Turkish-Greek conflicts as a result of Greece’s
membership in the EU. Moreover, it has become part of the major disputes in the
Balkans and in the Eastern Mediterranean region, again, as a natural result of the
Greece’s geographical position.
3.3  Greece within the EC/EU After Accession
Shortly after Greece’s accession to the Community, ‘The Panhellenic Socialist
Movement (PASOK)’ came to power. This party during its opposition had been very
                                                
18 For the movement from EPC to CFSP, see Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union? – An Introduction
to the European Community, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, pp.467-473; for
changes in the EPC, see also Juliet Lodge “European Political Cooperation Towards the 1990s,” in
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51
much against further integration with the West19 and had followed an anti-Western
stance in its international relations. Especially through 1980s, PASOK caused Greece
to follow distant foreign policy attitudes and moves, which strained the relations
between Greece and its European partners on common foreign policy.20
PASOK diverged on international issues21 like Poland and the Falkland Islands.
Moreover, as they could not get NATO and the US support against Turkey, they
concluded a non-aggression pact with Bulgaria and tried to establish good relations
with a Warsaw Pact country against a NATO member, Turkey. Actually this new
security policy of Andreas Papandreou, leader of PASOK and Prime Minister, vis á
vis ‘Turkish threat’ created strains in Greece’s relations with its EC partners. The
underlying aim behind this new policy of the PASOK Government against Turkey
was to internationalize the Cyprus and the Aegean disputes. However, it is
interesting to note that in those days in PASOK’s view, the EC was not seen as a
strong institutional framework,22 rather, it was perceived as a loose organization
without any capacity to impose sanctions on Turkey. Accordingly they did not think
that the EC could provide the security assurances they needed against Turkey.
                                                
19 PASOK from the very beginning opposed membership in the EC. Before coming to power it had
declared that EC membership “will consolidate the peripheral role of the country as a satellite in the
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20 See Panayiotis Ioakimidis, “Contradictions in the Europeanization Process,” in Kevin Featherstone
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Disintegration? Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996, pp.31-49; see also P.C. Ioakimidis,
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in Richard Clogg (ed.), The Populist Decade, pp. 131-154.
22 Kostas A. Lavdos, Negotiating for Entry, pp.28-47.
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In 1982 the Greek Government presented a memorandum to the EC Commission,
which indicated that Greece wished to join the EC, but with certain conditions such
as certain exceptions from the common market arrangements.23 This memorandum
became the basis of cooperation and integration between Greece and the EC.24
From then onward, the Greek Government having seen the net advantages of
membership economically and politically, changed its policy radically. In addition,
Greece found out that it could use its position in the EC against Turkey by way of
conditionality. Greece started using its membership in the EC as a lever to convince
Turkey that Turkish-EC relations could not improve and Turkey’s membership
would not be realized without Greece’s approval which was tied to the resolution of
the Cyprus and Aegean issues in line with Greece’s interests. Therefore, Greece
favored supranational elements in the Community system and became a real
supporter of the European integration to the extend that they even asked for
developing  Community–wide foreign and defense policies.25
Greece began to use its power and prestige within the EC/EU against Turkey in the
late 1980s and 1990s, in particular. Indeed, it reached a point in the 1990s where
Greece managed to manipulate its EC/EU partners against Turkey. Initially, the EU
members, many of whom did not wish to see Turkey within the EU, did not seem
disturbed by the fact that Greece endeavored to keep Ankara out of the EC/EU. But
                                                
23 See the Text of Memorandum, in Journal of European Communities, Athens, 1982, 3(2), pp. 187-
93.
24 See Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis, (eds.), Greece in a Changing Europe; and, see Panos
Kazakos, “Historical Review,” pp.1-11.
25 For more details, see Prodromos Yannas, “The Greek Factor in EC-Turkey Relations,” in Panos
Kazakos and P.C. Ioakimidis, (eds.), Membership Evaluated, pp.215-223; see also Theodore A.
Couloumbis, “Introduction: The Impact of EC (EU) Membership on Greece’s Foreign Policy Profile,”
in Ibid., pp.187-189.
53
when Greece started what the EC/EU saw as the hijacking of its policies regarding
the Balkans in the 1990s, the EC/EU began to criticize Athens.
At some point, the EC/EU criticism of Greece gathered momentum in early 1990s
when Greece found itself embroiled in a bitter fight against the newly independent
Macedonia. Greece has been criticized a lot on two main dimensions:
i. Greece’s position in the EU,
ii. Greece’s position in the Balkans.
Brussels, London and Paris started questioning; “What kind of an EC member is
Greece?” All these criticisms brought forward the reorientation of Greece’s policy
objectives especially of the foreign policy ones. In those days majority of the Greek
public favored ‘deeper’ integration with the EC while the political leaders were
acting vice versa. Eventually, the ruling elite had to divert its policy in line with the
public demand towards further integration with the EC although most of the
divisions remained unresolved.26
Today, Greece has no other choice than further deepening its integration with the EU
because it has both political-security and economic gains.  Up until today, the Union
satisfied majority of the Greek security perceptions and hence continues to satisfy
Greece’s political needs as well. Though Greece is unprepared to cope with the
requirements of the Maastricht Treaty especially on economic terms such as the
European Monetary Union (EMU), it is very determined to further integrate into the
EU. Greece is aimed at achieving its integration to the EMU by the end of 2001.
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CHAPTER 4
GREEK SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY
PRIORITIES IN THE 1990S
Greece is a typical nation-state that acts in line with its own national interests and
goals since its formation in 1830. Accordingly, the Greek foreign policy is designed
according to pre-determined Greek national interests. Greece acts in a way to
strengthen its position and independence among the world states in general and
within the Western World in particular. This is true for Greece’s relations with the
other regional states in the Balkans like Macedonia, Albania and Former
Yugoslavia,1 its eastern neighbor Turkey and its European partners in the EU.
                                                                                                                                         
26 See Panayiotis Ioakimidis, “Contradictions in the Europeanization Process,” in Kevin Featherstone
and Kostas Ifantis, (eds.), Greece in a Changing Europe, pp.31-49.
1 For Greek foreign policy in the Balkans of 1990s, see Richard Clogg, “Greece and the Balkans in the
1990s,” in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds.), Greece and the New
Balkans, Challenges and Opportunities, New York: PELLA, 1999; Misha Glenny, “The Temptation
of Purgatory,” in Graham T. Allison and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (eds.), The Greek Paradox: Promise vs.
Performance, Cambridge, Massachussetts, London: The MIT Press, 1997, pp.73-85; see also F.
Stephen Larrabee, “Greece and the Balkans Implications for Policy,” in Ibid., pp.107-113; for more,
see Joseph Nye Jr., “Greece and the Balkans: A Moment of Opportunity,” in Ibid., pp.145-151; see
also Thanos Veremis, Greece’s Balkan Entanglement,  ELIAMEP, Athens, 1995.
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Greece’s foreign policy can be said to be basically shaped by the country’s history,
geographic position, values and concepts like Megali Idea.2 Three opposing
ideological - political patterns do influence the way the Greek foreign policy is
designed. These patterns are called ‘(neo)–Orthodox’, ‘Nationalist’ and
‘Europeanist’.3 The Orthodox groups defended the traditional values and were
mostly in favor of the status quo within the Ottoman Empire. These people were
happy with their position under the Ottomans. The sacking of Constantinople and
Byzantine lands by the crusaders in 1204 also influenced this anti-European attitude
of the Greeks. During those years, the people in Constantinople suffered a lot by the
ill-treatment of the Catholic crusaders who had supposedly come over to protect
these people against Turkish attacks. Today in Greece, there is a strong group of elite
who are known as the ‘neo-Orthodox’, still supporting an anti-Western attitude, in a
way wanting to return to their Hellenic roots. On the other hand, Europeanists (or
transnationalists) prefer a more modern stance in their international relations and thus
try to insert the Greek identity into a European one. They are in favor of a united
Europe and are mostly critical of the notion of the nation-state and nationalism. The
nationalist stance which has quite a number of similarities with the neo-Orthodox
vision, seems to be very influential in the formulation of Greece’s external policies.
                                                
2 Megali Idea is a Greek national ideology created by the  Greek political leaders  for preserving the
unity and existence of their country. Indeed, today, Megali Idea forms the essence of Greek domestic
and foreign policy and aimes reestablishing ‘Great-Ancient Greece’ on the lost lands of the Byzantine
and Hellenic Empires. Today, Greeks claim to be descendants of the Ancient Greeks, as well as of the
Byzantine and the Hellenic Empire of the Alexander the Great. Therefore, they dream of
reestablishing ‘Bigger Greece’ by taking back the Asia Minor, Cyprus and Macedonian lands. This
ideology creates conflict between Turkey and Greece as well as between Greece and Macedonia.
Greece attacks Turkey for being revisionist and victimizer, while it refuses to recognize the seperate
Macedonian identity and state with the claim that anything about  ‘Macedonia’ belongs to Greece
even including the term itself.
3 For detailed discussion of the role of theories and ideologies on the formation of the Greek foreign
policy, see Stephanos  Constantinides, “Greek Foreign Policy: Theoretical Orientations and Praxis,” in
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Nationalist vision (or realist) is a combination of the Megali Idea with Orthodoxy but
unlike neo-Orthodoxy does not rule out the Europeanization of the Greek foreign
policy.
All these factors, including political ideologies and theories and the influence of the
Greek Orthodox Church in internal and external politics of Greece do play important
roles in the formulation of the Greek foreign policy.4 However, above all these, one
reality lies in the heart of the Greek foreign and security policies in Cyprus, in the
Balkans, in NATO, and in the EU, that is, the Greek perception of its neighbor
Turkey, especially the Greek ruling elites’ interpretation of Turkey’s foreign and
security polices5 as well as of Turkey’s external moves in the international arena.
Therefore, while analyzing Greece’s relations with Turkey and with the West, in
general, and the EU, in particular, this point should be taken into account.
Unfortunately, the anti-Turkish establishment both within the Greek State and Greek
society does have important influence on the formation of the Greek foreign and
security policy objectives6 and decisions. Accordingly, the negative enemy
perception of the Turks in the minds of the Greek statesmen is one of the causes of
the problems concerning the two countries. Furthermore, the Greek national
                                                                                                                                         
Hellenic Studies, Vol.5(2), Autumn 1997, pp.199-205; and, Theodore A. Couloumbis, “Theory and
Praxis,” in Ibid., pp.49-65.
4 For the formulation of the Greek foreign policy, see P.C. Ioakimidis, “The Model of Foreign Policy
Making in Greece: Personalities versus Institutions,” in Stelios Stavridis, Thanos Veremis and et al.,
(eds.), The European Union’s  Mediterranean States, pp.140-171.
5 For an in-depth analysis of the Greek perception of the Turkish threat, see, for example, Theodore A.
Couloumbis, “Turkish Challenge and European Opportunity: Greek Foreign Policy Priorities in a
Post-Cold War Setting,” in Stephen J. Blank (ed.), Mediterranean Security, pp.249-261.
6 See Yannis G. Valinakis, “Security Policy,” in Panos Kazakos and P.C. Ioakimidis (eds.), EC
Membership Evaluated,  pp.199-215.
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ideology, Megali Idea,7 that aimed at reestablishing Byzantine Empire created most
of the problems between two neighbors in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus.
Greece now has the idea of being encircled by Turkey, and it has tried to establish a
ring of security through alliances with its neighbors around itself. During the Cold
War, Greek external and internal security policies were directed against a possible
Communist threat, and eventually Greece took its place in NATO’s southern flank
together with Turkey. However, the end of Cold War era and the disappearance of a
Communist threat have required rethinking and adaptation of the Greece’s foreign
policy8 together with its security concerns to the changing world system.
Indeed, as one expert put it Greece could have been described as a semi-peripherial
state during the Cold War years:
When international relations are viewed from a world system perspective
that defines the present capitalist system as one in which peripheral 9 and
semi-peripheral countries are dependent on and dominated by core
countries, Greece is typically classified as being in the semi-periphery.
Since Greece is not economically autarkic, an independent posture in
international politics is difficult. Given its semi-peripheral position,
Greece’s identity is problematic it identifies fully with neither the
                                                
7 For details of nationalism in Greece and national ideology of Greece, Megali Idea, see Thanos
Veremis and Martin Blinkhorn, Modern Greece Nationalism and Nationality, ELIAMEP, Athens,
1990.
8 For detailed analysis of the Greek foreign policy, see Theodore A. Couloumbis, “Greek Foreign
Policy Since 1974: Theory and Praxis,” in Hellenic Studies, Vol.5 (2), 1997, pp.49-65; for more, see
articles by Van Coufoudakis, “Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Issues and
Challenges,” in Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol.7(3), Summer 1996, pp.27-41 and “Greek Foreign
Policy Since 1974: Intellectual Debates and Policy Responses” in Hellenic Studies, Vol.5 (2), 1997,
pp.199-207; Robert J. Guttman, “Greek Foreign Policy - Positive Player in a Troubled Region,” in
Europe, Issue 370, Oct.1997, pp.16-20; see Theodoros Pangalos, “Principles of Greek Foreign
Policy,” in Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol.9 (2), Spring 1998, pp.1-9; see also Fanny Palli-Petralia,
“Greek Foreign Policy: Facing New Problems,” in Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol.9(4), Fall 1998,
pp.14-51; Thanos Veremis, “Post-1974 Greek Foreign Policy,” in  Hellenic Studies, Vol.5(2), 1997,
pp. 95-109.
9 See PASOK statement on the EC accession and its argument on how Greece will become a
peripheral state in the Western capitalist system by being tied to the Community, p.50, and footnote
19 above.
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Western capitalist democracies nor the countries of the Third World;
rather it has characteristics of both.10
Today, Greece no longer wants to be a semi-periphery for the West: it wants to be an
actual part of the Western European political and security framework by improving
its position as a small - regional - superpower state.
Greece believes that the immediate and long-term threat to its national security
comes from Turkey and from the instability in its region. Therefore, as the President
of the Hellenic Republic, Stephanos Constantinides, argues, beyond the formulation
of any conceptual ideological - political constructs, the Greek foreign policy, as a
country facing a major security problem and a continued challenge to its sovereignty
by the revisionist and expansionist policies of its eastern neighbor Turkey, must take
this reality into account.11
Indeed, there is a consensus among major political parties and forces in Greece about
the source of the major security threat to their country’s well-being, that is, Turkey.
For example, according to a Eurodim poll taken in April 1984 out of six countries
Turkey was perceived as threat to Greece with 91 percent.12
At present Greece follows a multidimensional foreign policy including full EU
membership, Balkan cooperation with all the successor states in Southeast Europe
                                                
10 George A. Kourvetaris, Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics, East European Monographs,
New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, pp.391-392.
11 Stephanos Constantinides, “Theoretical Orientations,” pp.199-205; for an in-depth analysis of the
role of prejudice in Greek foreign policy, see Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, “Pride, Prejudice and Myopia
Greek Foreign Policy in a Time Wrap,” in World Policy Journal, Vol X(3), Fall 1992, pp.17-29;
Constantine Stephanopoulos, “Issues of Greek Foreign Policy,” in Graham T. Allison and Kalypso
Nicolaïdis (eds.), The Greek Paradox, pp.135-145.
12 George A. Kourvetaris, Modern Greek Society, pp.391-392.
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and Eastern Europe. This is the essence of the Greek foreign policy in the post-Cold
War era13 and very much in line with the changes in the international order.
The concept of security in a bipolar world is no longer present but rather a
multidirectional security that extended the concept of security to non-military aspects
of security such as the demands and conflicts related to human rights. The
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of conventional ones, rise of
terrorism of all types (politically motivated, premeditated, and those attacking
governments or civilian targets), economic differences between countries especially
between the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and Western European
states, ethnic tensions, minority problems, aggressive nationalism (irredentist type of
nationalism like the Serb nationalism experienced in former Yugoslavia) leading
towards micronationalism and disintegration, mass migration, illicit drugs and arms
trafficking and deepening of the differences in terms of economy between the North
and South, are just some of the threats menacing the Eurasian continent in the new
security framework.
In this new European order, Greece is trying to find a proper place and role for itself
inside the existing institutions like NATO, the EU, and the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Indeed, Greece is trying to become “the EU’s
                                                
13 For Athenian question in the new security framework of the Balkans, see  Daniel N. Nelson, Balkan
Imbroglio: Politics and Security in Southeastern Europe, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview
Press, 1991, pp.109-119; Elizabeth Prodromou, “The Perception Paradox of Post-Cold War Security
in Greece,” in Graham T. Allison and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (eds.), The Greek Paradox, pp.123-135;
Monteagle Stearns, “Greek Security Issues,” in Ibid., pp.61-73; see  also, Yanni Valinakis (ext.),
Greece’s Security in the Post-Cold War Era, SWP-S394, Ebenhausen, Isartal, April 1994; Thanos
Veremis, “Greece: the Dilemmas of Change” in F. Stephen Larrabee (ed.), The Volatile Powder Keg -
Balkan Security After the Cold War, Washington: RAND, 1994, pp.119-135; Susan L. Woodward,
“Rethinking Security in the Post-Yugoslav Era,” in Graham T. Allison and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (eds.),
The Greek Paradox, pp.113-123.
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anchor of stability”14 in a troubled region. In other words, Greece can be said to be
following a very rational and realistic foreign policy which aimed at taking
advantage of the new opportunities in the newly emerged political and security
framework of Europe.
More specifically, the Greek Prime Minister, Costas Simitis, has outlined two
strategic targets that Greece must pursue in the formulation and execution of its
foreign policy:
i. Equal participation with the European Union,15
ii. Advancing Greece’s new role in the ‘geopolitical environment’ in the
Balkans and the Mediterranean.16
Greece has targeted a higher role to be a small - superpower state, which according
to the Greeks, has a pivotal and strategic role with an important policy influence
inside the EU and NATO. Greece no longer wants to be seen as a  semi-peripheral
state by its NATO and the EU allies. One of Greece’s chief priorities is to seek
further integration within the EU by entering into the Economic and Monetary Union
                                                
14 See Kostas Karamanlis, “Greece: the EU’s Anchor of Stability in a Troubled Region,” in The
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23 (2), (The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Spring 2000, pp.7-11.
15 Two main issues for Greek foreign policy in the EU are the enlargement of the EU and the EMU
(European Monetary Union). For details of the Greek view, see George S. Alogoskoufis, “Greece and
European Monetary Unification,” in Harry J. Psomiades and Stravros B. Thomadakis (eds.), The New
Europe, pp.163-179; P.C. Ioakimidis, “Greece in the European Community: Policies, Experiences and
Prospects,” in Ibid., pp.405-421; Yannos Kranidiotis, “The Enlargement of the European Union:
Prospects and Problems,” A Speech delivered  by Dr. Yannos Kranidiotis- the Alternate Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, at the Conference on “ The Enlargement of the European
Union,” organized by the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and the
Embassy of Austria in Athens, Greece, 6-7 November 1998, (Occassional Paper 99.08); Panagiotis
Liargovas (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union: Prospects and Problems, ELIAMEP,
Athens, 1999; see also Lucas Papademos, “European Monetary Union and Greek Economic Policy,”
in H. J. Psomiades and S. B. Thomadakis (eds), The New Europe, pp. 125-163; Constantine A.
Papadopoulos, “Greece and the European Agenda: EU Enlargement and European Monetary Union,”
Center for European Studies, Greek Study Group, Harvard University, February 1998; and, Stravros
B. Thomadakis, “European Economic Integration, the Greek State, and the Challenges of the 1990s,”
in Ibid., pp.351-379.
16 George A. Kourvetaris, Modern Greek Society, pp.394.
61
a process which has now become completed. What actually Greece wants is to
become ‘an anchor of stability in the Balkans’17 by actively contributing to the
rebuilding, prosperity and security of Southeast Europe especially through promotion
of regional cooperation in reconstruction and development. By this role, Greece will
be a strategic ally of the West and even be in a better position than Turkey as it is a
member of the EU.  It will become non-sacrificial for the West. So, Greece, as being
a reliable and a non-sacrificial ally of the West, fully integrated to Europe can sort
out its problems with Turkey through the EU mechanisms to its own advantage with
the full support of its allies. Indeed, it has already has gone a long way on its road to
reach these goals. It can even be argued that Greece has achieved most of its goals in
the Helsinki Summit meeting.
Therefore, in the following decade Greece’s top priorities in its foreign policy agenda
will be:
i. Greece and the EU (further integration and EMU),
ii. Greek-Turkish relations (mainly Cyprus and Aegean) within the EU,
iii. Greece and the Balkans together with Turkey18 and the EU.
                                                
17 For more details about the Greek foreign policy in the new Balkans after the Yugoslav wars, see
Van Coufoudakis, H. J. Psomiades, A. Gerolymatos, “Greece as a Factor of Stability in the Post-Cold
War Balkans,” in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds.), Greece and
the New Balkans, pp.423-433; P.C. Iokamidis, “Greece, the European Union and Southeastern
Europe: Past Failures and Future Prospects,” in Ibid., pp.169-193; F. Stephen Larrabee, “Greek
Security Concerns in the Balkans,” in Ibid., pp.313-337; and, Thanos Veremis, “Greece and the
Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era,” in Ibid.,  pp.29-47.
18 Greece is aware of the fact that to some extend it has to cooperate with Turkey in the Balkans to
become ‘an anchor of stability in a troubled region’. The furthering of problems with Turkey would
create more instability and problems in the region both of which are against the Greek wishes and
interests.
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CHAPTER 5
GREECE INSIDE THE EC/EU VERSUS TURKEY
5.1 Greece’s Policies Against Turkey Between 1981 and 1999
In the EC-Turkey Association Council meeting of 5 February 1980 the Community
assured Turkey that the accession of Greece to the EC would not affect the future
relations between the EC and Turkey. Indeed this was the basic position of the EC.1
However, Greece has used its position to avoid Turkey’s full integration to the
EC/EU from the day it joined the Community. Greek objectives are well-known,
according to one source: “The Greeks are cheerfully using their position inside the
EEC2 to blackmail the Turks over Cyprus.” 3
                                                
1 Constantine A. Stephanou and Charalampos Tsardanidis, “EC Attitudes and Policies Towards the
Greek-Turkish Conflict and the Cyprus Problem,” A paper presented to the “International Conference
on Greek-Turkish Relations,”Athens, 3-5 March, 1989, pp.1-12; see the same authors’ article “The EC
Factor in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle,” in Dimitri Constas (ed.), Conflict in the 1990s, pp.
207-231.
2 For details about the establishment of the EEC/EC and the transformation of the Community to a
Union (EU) with the Maastricht Treaty, see Desmond Dinan, An Ever Closer Union, pp.30-69 and
129-199; see also Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb (eds.), The European Union – Readings
on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, Boulder – London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1994, pp. 45-69.
3 Economist, 1988, p.4.
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In 1981, five months after Greece’s accession as a full member to the Community the
EC Council approved a new financial protocol amounting for 600 million ECU’s
with Turkey. This decision was taken with unanimity, which meant that Greece was
checked in the Community and indeed could not resort to any act of blocking.4 This
assured the Turkish side that the EC had the capacity to keep Greece in check and to
avoid any act against Turkey’s advantage by Greece. Even before Greece’s accession
to the Community, Ankara had reasons to believe that Turkey could secure its
membership in the EC. This was probably related to the Greek desire to secure its
place again within NATO, from whose military wing Athens had withdrawn angrily
when Turkey intervened in Cyprus in 1974. This gave Ankara a bargaining chip in
return for Turkey’s membership in the EC.5 Turkey was, after all, the second biggest
force within NATO.
In the first years of Greek membership to the EC due to the domestic political
turmoil which led to the 1980 military coup, the relations between the EC and
Turkey deteriorated.6  They came to a freezing point, especially, when the military
government decided to close all the political parties: the EC responded by
suspending all financial aid of the Fourth Financial Protocol amounting to 600
million ECU’s to be given for the period from 1982 to 1987, and a consensus within
the EC for freezing relations with Turkey developed.7
                                                
4 See also  Serhat Güvenç, “Changing Perception,” pp. 103-139.
5 Ibid.
6 Constantine A. Stephanou and Charalampos Tsardanidis, “EC Attitudes and Policies,” pp. 1-12.
7 Ibid.; for more details, see  Mehmet Ali Birand, Avrupa Macerası, pp.389-425; Serhat Güvenç,
“Changing Perception,” pp.103-139; John Redmond, Mediterranean Enlargement, pp.17-61.
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The New Greek Government saw all this as an opportunity: it introduced its policy of
antagonism towards Turkey and Turkish-Greek problems in the EC. From the
beginning of the 1980s to the second half of the 1980s, Greece designed its policy
inside the EC radically against Turkey whose relations with the Community at that
time was totally cut off due to the presence of the military rule. Greece tried to use
this opportunity to its advantage.
It also used the existence of the military government in Turkey as a pretext for not
commencing bilateral negotiations with Turkey over Cyprus and Aegean problems.
Between 1981 and 1985 the PASOK Government8 tried to increase the institutional
assurances from the EC against a possible Turkish threat; it had also tried to secure
similar assurances against Turkey from NATO. However, this proposal of a NATO
member, Greece, against another, Turkey, ended with the disruption of the defense
ministers meeting.9
Such a radicalized policy caused uncontrolled escalation in Turco-Greek relations
especially in the Aegean. Every minor incident resulted in escalated crises that could
have turned into a war if third parties like the US had not intervened to bring down
the tensions on both sides of the Aegean.
In the second half of the 1980s especially after the restoration of democracy with the
end of the military rule, Turkey became more and more interested in the EC
                                                
8 See Richard Clogg (ed.), The Populist Decade; for more details about the PASOK’s policy versus
Turkey in the EC/EU, see Van Coufoudakis, “PASOK and Greek-Turkish Relations,” in Ibid., pp.167-
181; Theodore A. Couloumbis, “PASOK’s Foreign  Policies, 1981-89: Continuity or Change?” in
Ibid., pp.113-131.
9 “Greek Demand Distrups Brussels Talks,” Facts on File, 31 December 1981.
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membership. In 1983 Turkey held free elections and on 6 November 1983 free
elections brought back democracy to the country. After that, Turkey embarked on an
extensive military modernization program together with the economic liberalization,
all of which brought Turkey and the EC closer.
Ankara wished to secure its fragile democracy, economy and internal security
through the EC mechanisms, just like Greece did. Moreover, Turkey, having seen the
net benefits of the EC funds in other democracies of the Mediterranean, Greece,
Portugal and Spain (which all restored their democracies after military coups like
Turkey), wished to become full member of the EC.
Therefore, Turkey initiated a new economic liberalization program, which aimed to
bring Turkish economy to the EC levels. The Turkish economy dramatically shifted
its orientation and foreign trade started to play a more effective role.10
Despite these positive developments inside Turkey, the relations between Turkey and
the Community did not develop as expected. The Unilateral Declaration of
Independence by the Turkish Cypriots on 15 November 1983 and the recognition of
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) by Turkey once again caused
strains in Turkey’s relations both with the EC and Greece. The EPC ministers issued
two strong condemnations regarding this. The first statement of the EPC on 16
November 1983 declared that the recognition of TRNC ‘secessionist’ state by the
international community as illegal and tried to prevent any attempt for
                                                
10 Ibid.; see “Turkey’s Economic Relations with the European Union - 1999, Yearly Programme of the
State Planning Organisation,” in Insight Turkey, Vol.1, January/March 1999, pp.63-71; see also
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recognition. The second statement dating 27 March 1984 called upon Turkey to
change its policy and declare its recognition of TRNC as an independent state as null
and void.11 However, Turkey continued with its policy and established diplomatic
ties with the new republic in Northern Cyprus by opening its Embassy in Lefkoşa.12
Despite the initial strains, the EC Commission decided in 1986 to reactivate its
relations with Turkey in order to bring it closer to Europe. The Community decided
to resume its financial aid to Turkey, which had been withheld temporarily due to the
military coup in Turkey. Greece objected to that. Denmark, and Luxembourg
opposed the defreezing of the relations between Turkey and the EC by using the
Turkish policy of Cyprus as a pretext. The first Greek veto on Turkish-EC relations
came out on this issue.13
Papandreou Government as explained above had initiated a more radicalized stance
towards Turkey, and unlike the Karamanlis Government, did not feel bound by the
their promise of not using their position in the EC against Turkey. Nevertheless, the
EC managed to release a 10 million ECU aid to Turkey.14 This act angered the Greek
Government and they brought this case before the European Court of Justice, which
                                                                                                                                         
Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “Turkish Economic Liberalization and European Integration,” in Middle
Eastern Studies, Vol.31., January 1998, pp.86-96.
11 See  Constantine A. Stephanou and Charalampos Tsardanidis, “EC Attitudes and Policies,” pp.1-12.
12 Lefkoşa/e is the Turkish name for ‘Nicosia’, the capital city of the 1960 Cyprus Republic. Today as
Cyprus is divided into two zones, the city is also divided into two sections. The South of the city
belongs to Greek Cypriots while North belongs to the Turkish Cypriots. Today Lefkoşa is the capital
of the TRNC.
13 Ibid.
14 For more details, see Ibid., pp.1-12; Mehmet Ali Birand, Avrupa Macerası, pp.425-453; Serhat
Güvenç, “Changing Perception,”  pp.103-139; John Redmond, Mediterranean Enlargement,  pp.17-61.
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at once dismissed it.15 Greece was, at this stage, the only EC member state that
objected to the Council’s decision to reactivate the meetings of the EEC-Turkey
Association Council.
The Council’s disregard of the Greek objections led the Turkish Government to be
optimistic about its future integration to the Community. Turkish ruling elite at the
time believed that Greece by way of its veto would eventually ruin its own reputation
and reliability as a member state within the Community, which in the end would lead
to Greece’s isolation inside the Community. However, the opposite prevailed: the
Greek veto and opposition against Turkey increased. Under these circumstances, the
Community decided to offer Turkey an enhanced relationship instead of full
integration.16 Greece became successful in using its position in the EC as lever
against Turkey, due to the unwillingness of the other EC members about exerting
pressure on a member state for facilitating relations and integration with Turkey.
After all, according to many within the EC, the Greek vetoes17 were legal under the
EC system.
In 1987, Turkey and Greece once more came to the brink of war in the Aegean
because of the continental shelf.18 A clash was avoided thanks to the US intervention,
                                                
15 For more details, see Case 204/86 Hellenic Republic v. The Council of the European Communities,
(ECR 19888):5323; Case 30/86 Hellenic Republic v. The Commission of the European Communities,
(ECR 1989):3711.
16 Serhat Güvenç, “Changing Perception,” pp.103-139.
17 “Veto-Mania,” Economist, Vol. 334 (7902), 02/18/1995, pp.48-50, from on-line.
18 “There was the 1987 incident over the issue of territorial waters. The Greek socialist government of
the day was trying to nationalise the North Aegean Petroleum Corporation by claiming that it was not
fulfilling its drilling programme. The drilling programme related to probably, but not proven, large
crude resources in its concession area that fell within the 12-mile limit. When the government insisted
that Greece reserved the right to drill in the region, Turkey sent its own exploration ship to sea. It was
shadowed by Greek naval vessels, which in turn were shadowed by Turkish warships. It was only
through high level NATO intervention that a military clash was averted.”(For more details, see
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and Turkey applied for full membership the same year. On the basis of the EEC
Treaty’s Article 237, which gave Ankara the right to do so. Turkey’s request for
accession was filed under the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Rome (instead of
the Ankara Agreement) and underwent the normal procedures. The Council
forwarded Turkey’s application to the Commission for the preparation of an
opinion.19
In those days while the Commission was preparing its opinion, Greece applied for
full membership in the Western European Union (WEU). This move of Greece was
interpreted by Ankara as another Greek attempt to shield Greece against Turkey, as
the application was made a month after the crisis. This was, in a sense, a sign that
Greece did not still feel secure enough under the EC umbrella.20
In 1988, Greece in its second term in Presidency became more active in its policy in
Greece’s foreign affairs in general and in Turkish-Greek relations in particular.
During this term, Turkey’s application for full membership in the Community
brought the Cyprus issue to the top of the agenda of the EPC. Athens requested the
inclusion of a statement on Cyprus into the agenda of the Association Council
meeting, saying that the situation in Cyprus “affects the relations between the
Community and Turkey.”21 This frustrated the Turkish Government and led to the
canceling of the EC-Turkey Association Council meeting scheduled for 25 April
1988, since the Turkish Prime Minister refused to attend the meeting unless the EC
                                                                                                                                         
Robert McDonald, “The Prospects for Relations Between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus” obtained from
web site of ACGTA).
19 See web site of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
20 Serhat Güvenç, “Changing Perception,”p.116.
21 Ibid.
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changed its stance.22 Since then the Cyprus problem has gradually become a matter
in EC–Turkey relations directly.
Soon after this event on 20 May 1988 the European Parliament (EP) adopted a
resolution on Cyprus against Turkey. This resolution strongly condemned Turkey
because of its Cyprus policy; 23 the Strasbourg Chamber noted inter alia that: “…the
unlawful occupation of part of the territory of a country associated with the
Community (i.e. the Republic of Cyprus) by the military forces of another country,
also associated with the Community (i.e. Turkey), presents a major stumbling block
to the normalization of relations with the latter, viz. Turkey.”24
The declarations of the EC ministers and the EP resolution on Cyprus were important
‘diplomatic victories’ by Greece.25 For Athens, the EC and the EPC had now became
two major forums for bringing up Turco-Greek problems, and the Greek Government
in those days made it clear that its vote and position in the EC was a very precious
leverage in its relations with its eastern neighbor. Not only did the Greek
Government show that its approval was necessary for the development of the EC-
Turkey relations but it also demonstrated that this approval was dependent on
Turkish concessions in bilateral conflicts between the two.26
                                                
22 Ibid.; Prodromos Yannas, “The Greek Factor,” pp.215-220.
23 Ronald Meinardus,“Third-Party Involvement in Greek-Turkish Disputes,” A draft prepared for the
presentation at the “International Conference on Greek-Turkish Relations,” sponsored by the Center
for International Affairs, Panteios University, Athens, 3–5 March 1989, p.10; see the same author’s
article with the same title in Dimitri Constas (ed.), Conflict in the 1990s, pp.157-164.
24 European Parliament, Resolution on the Situation in Cyprus, Doc. A2-317/87, cited in Ronald
Meinardus, “Third Party Involvement,” p.10.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
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In the spring of 1988, Greece became a party to the Association Agreement between
Turkey and the EC by signing a protocol with Turkey. But to sign this document,
Athens forced Ankara to repatriate the property rights of Greeks residing in Turkey
as agreed in 1930, which had been revoked by the Turkish Government in 1964 in
response to the events then going on in Cyprus.27 This was again a clear example of
the Greek strategy to ‘Europeanize’28 Turco-Greek differences especially within the
EC/EU.
This should be interpreted as one of the successes of the Greek Government on
‘conditionality or issue linkage policy’,29 which, emboldened Greece in its policy
against Turkey within the EC.
Accordingly the Commission’s opinion declared by the Council on 5 February 1990,
basically underlined Turkey’s eligibility for membership yet deferred the in-depth
analysis of Turkey’s application until the emergence of a more favorable
environment. Turkey’s accession was prevented due to the EC’s own situation on the
eve of the Single Market’s completion which prevented the consideration of further
enlargement. However, the opinion added that the Customs Union should be
completed in 1995 as envisaged.30
                                                
27 Prodromos Yannas, “ The Greek Factor,” pp.215-220.
28 Ronald Meinardus, “Third Party Involvement,” p.11.
29 For details of the linkage policy of Greece against Turkey inside the EU organs, see Geoffrey
Pridham, “Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement,” in Dimitri Constas (ed.),
Conflict in the 1990s, pp.73-91; for more about the linkage policy, see J. Rosenau, Linkage Politics,
New York: Free Press, 1969.
30 For more details, see, for example, web site of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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Papandreou’s replacement by Mitsotakis Government did not change Greece’s
opposition to Turkey’s further integration to the Community without making any
concession. “On July 1990, Mitsokatis made it publicly known that the improvement
in Turkish-Community relations was closely tied to the situation in Cyprus.”31 “On
29 June 1990, during the Dublin Summit, the European Council endorsed Greece’s
policy of linking the Cyprus question to the Turkish-Community relations by
‘reiterating that the Cyprus problem affects EC-Turkey relations’.”32
The EU policy on Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots application for membership to the
Community on 3 July 1990, and the non-realization of a cooperation package, known
as the ‘Matutes Package’ of 1990 promised by the Commission due to Greece’s
objection,33 led Turkey to harden its position in Cyprus in early 1990s. Turkey and
the Turkish Cypriot Government declared that this move by the Greek Cypriots was
unconstitutional and illegal according to the Zurich and London Agreements.34 These
agreements restricted union of Cyprus with another state or its membership in any
organization without the consent and presence of Turkey or Greece.35
                                                
31 Prodromos Yannas, “The Greek Factor,” p.117.
32 Ibid.
33 See web site of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
34 “Cyprus membership of the European Union would be illegal, since it would violate Article 1 of the
1960 Treaty of Guarantee, by virtue of which the Republic of Cyprus bound itself ‘not to participate,
in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever.’ It is sometimes
argued that the EU is not a state, but when an applicant joins the EU it does not enter into a union with
the EU itself, but with each of the member states which constitute the European Union. Clearly if
Cyprus were to join the EU she would be participating in both political and an economic union not
only with one state, but with each of the fifteen member states. It is also argued that the purpose of
this article was solely to prevent union with Greece or Turkey. The article is not drawn as narrowly as
that, and in fact refers to any state whatsoever, but even if it were, Greece is one of those fifteen
states.” (Michael Stephen, “Greek Cypriot Application for Membership of the European Union,” from
http://kktc.pubinfo.gov.nc.tr/eu/h171198b.htm/).
35 Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey – The Challenge to Europe and the United States, Washington,
D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, pp.176-177; see also Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), The
Cyprus  Question within the Context of Membership to the EU, Ankara, 1997; Salahi Sonyel,
“Reactions  in the Turkish  Republic of  Northern Cyprus to the Application  by the Greek  Cypriot
Administration of South Cyprus for Membership of the European Union,” in Heinz-Jürgen Axt and
Hansjörg Brey, (eds.), Solving an Old Conflict , pp.151-58.
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Turkey’s relations with the EC became more and more problematic during the
Luxembourg Presidency because Luxembourg followed a policy, which was more in
line with the Greek position on Cyprus, while Britain and Netherlands tried to
separate Cyprus and Turkey’s membership from each other. The Dutch after the
Dublin declaration tried to reconvene Turkish Association Council. This caused
somehow a warming up in the EC-Turkey relations. In addition, the following
European Council’s meeting in Lisbon became a decisive step in Turkey–EC
relations. Moreover, the Hurd Report, prepared after the Britain’s assumption of the
Presidency of the EC in July 1992 prepared the ground for further warming up of the
relations. 36
Under these circumstances, Turkey chose to complete the envisaged Customs Union
with the Community. So, it can be said that even though it did not attain its basic
objective, Turkey’s application revived Turkey-EC relations: efforts to develop
relations intensified on both sides and efforts to complete the Customs Union were
reinvigorated.
Turkey repeated its opposition in 1993 as the Commission declared a positive
opinion on ‘Cyprus’s’ eligibility for membership; however, the definite answer to
Greek Cypriot application of 1990 was left to 1995. This was partly due to Turkish
objection and partly to the Brussels’ wish to further the attempts for the resolution of
the Cyprus issue under the auspices of the UN Secretary General.37 Turkish Foreign
                                                
36 Prodromos Yannas, “The Greek Factor,” pp. 215-220; see also Christopher Brewin, “Turkey,
Greece and the European Union,” in Clement H. Dodd, New Perspectives, pp.148-174.
37 Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey, p.177.
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Minister, Hikmet Çetin, declared in a letter the position of Turkish Government to
the President of the Council of the EU, Belgian Prime Minister Willy Claes, “The
Commission’s opinion on the Greek Cypriot application for membership in the
European Communities contravenes both international law concerning ‘Cyprus’ as a
whole, and the basis of the efforts to reach a settlement of the Cyprus problem.”38
Talks for the conclusion of a Customs Union between Turkey and the EU began in
1994 and were finalized on 6 March 1995 at the Turkey-EU Association Council. On
that day, the Association Council adopted its decision 1/95 for the completion of the
Customs Union between Turkey and the EU in industrial and processed agricultural
goods by 31 December 1995. The EU also made a declaration on financial
cooperation with Turkey as part of the Customs Union  ‘package’. 39
In June 1994 as a result of the pressure of the Greek officials in the European
Council’s Corfu meeting, Cyprus and Malta were involved in the next phase of
enlargement of the EU.  Since the decision for conclusion of the Customs Union with
Turkey required Greek approval, Turkey refrained from ruining its ties both with the
EU and Greece.40 Therefore, the Turkish reaction became apparent in March 1995,
                                                
38 MFA, The Cyprus Question within the Context of Membership to the EU, p.6; see also
“Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership Conclusions,”
in Heinz-Jürgen Axt and Hansjörg Brey, (eds.), Solving an Old Conflict, pp.244-46.
39 See Tuğrul Çubukçu, “Gümrük Birliğinin İki Yılı ve Sonrası,” (www.fpi.hacettepe.edu.tr); Wilhelm
Hummen, “The Economic Future of the EC and Turkey’s Membership” in Erol Manisalı (ed.),
Turkey’s Place in Europe, pp.69-77; Erol Manisalı, “Turkey and the European Community - Problems
and Prospects,” in Erol Manisalı (ed.), Ibid., pp. 64-69; for more details of the Customs Union
between Turkey and the EU, see, for example, S. Rıdvan Karluk, Avrupa Birliği, and  Erol Manisalı,
Siyasal ve Ekonomik Bedeli.
40 According to Prof. Dr. Erol Manisalı, Turkey before the conclusion of  the Customs Union refrained
from taking action with regard to the EU acceptance of the Greek Cypriots in the next phase of the EU
enlargement. As Prof. Dr. Manisalı argues, “… the government in Ankara presented this document
[Customs Agreement] to the public as if Turkey had been made a full member of the EU. With
considerable support from some circles inside Turkey, the Turkish public was deliberately misled. In
such an atmosphere the government ‘turned a blind eye’ to the beginning of full membership
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when Turkish Foreign Minister Murat Karayalçın made a declaration stating:
“Turkey for her part is determined to see to it that her rights and obligations
emanating from the 1960 treaties are kept intact. Turkey will continue to be
politically and legally opposed to the membership of Cyprus, in whole or in part,
before her own accession to the EU as a full member like the other guarantor power
(Greece). Turkey disagrees with the decision taken by the Council on the
membership negotiations of Cyprus…. In such an undesirable eventuality, Turkey
will be left with no option but to take steps towards achieving a similar integration
with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.”41
A month after the start of the Customs Union, the Kardak-Imia crisis erupted and the
relations between Turkey and Greece became extremely tense. Greece hardened its
policy toward EU-Turkey relations. As a result, Athens vetoed the conclusion of the
financial protocol foreseen in the context of the Customs Union Agreement. The EU
made a declaration on 15 July 1996 that pressured Turkey to agree to international
legal arbitration of the ICJ in the Aegean issue. This further strained Turkey-EU and
Turkish-Greek relations. In August 1996, the situation in Cyprus deteriorated due to
Greek Cypriot riots on the Green Line which ended with the death of two Greek
                                                                                                                                         
negotiations between the Greek Cypriots (as the Cyprus Republic) and the EU in return for lifting of
Greek veto. In any case, in the Appendix to Article 16 of the Customs Union Agreement signed by
Turkey the situation was clearly stated, using the name of Cyprus… On 6 March 1995 just a couple of
days before the signing of the Customs Union Agreement, the head of the Commission in Brussels
declared that full membership negotiations with the Greek Cypriots would begin. There was no
‘official reaction’ from Ankara because Athens had lifted its veto in return for Ankara’s acceptance of
the situation.” (Erol Manisalı, Yesterday and Today, pp.94-95). However, after the conclusion of the
Customs Union, Turkey has registered its legal and political objections vis á vis the EU Council
decision of 6 March 1995 and declared that it did not accept this decision in the words of the Turkish
Foreign Minister at that time, Mr. Murat Karayalçın in March 1995. But it was too late both to react
and change things. Turkish Government should have reacted in June 1994, right after the European
Council’s Corfu meeting and should have taken necessary behind-the-scenes diplomatic moves at that
time in order to avoid the inclusion of Cyprus in the next round of the EU enlargement.
41 MFA, The Cyprus  Question within the Context of Membership to the EU, p. 10, also cited in Heinz
Kramer, A Changing Turkey, p.177.
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Cypriots while they were attempting to trespass the TRNC territories. All of these
had negative effects on the Turkey–EU relations and the relations could not develop
even after the Customs Union as hoped.42
The EU believed that the accession of Cyprus to the Union would bring a political
solution to the island and continued with its policy. Upon this the Turkish Prime
Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, in December 1996 reiterated the Turkish position that
in case the Southern Greek Cypriot Administration joined the EU against the consent
of Turkey and TRNC, Turkey would increase its integration with TRNC.43
In the second half of 1996, Turkey tried to convince the EU of its inclusion in the
next phase of enlargement. Ankara believed that its aspirations towards the EU were
supported by the US Administration, and publicly pressured the EU. Turkish
Government showed the Greek Cypriot deal with Russia for purchasing S-300
missiles, the decreasing security in the Eastern Mediterranean and rising
fundamentalism inside Turkey as reasons why the EU should include Turkey in its
next round of enlargement.44
On 20 January 1997, President of Turkey (Süleyman Demirel) and TRNC (Rauf R.
Denktaş) issued a joint declaration45 for the establishment of stronger links between
                                                
42 Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey, p.192.
43 MFA, The Cyprus  Question within the Context of Membership to the EU, p.13.
44 See F. Stephen Larrabee, “U.S. and European Policy Toward Turkey and the Caspin Basin,” in
Robert D. Blackwill and Micheal Stürmer, (eds.), Allies Divided: Trans-atlantic Policies for the
Greater Middle East, MIT Press, 1997, pp.151-61; see also Alan Makovsky, “Turkey’s Faded
European Dream,” in Parameters for Partnership: Germany, the US and Turkey, Washington:
American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1998, pp. 60-63.
45 For the text and details of the joint declaration of President Demirel and President Denktaş, see web
site of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (www.mfa.gov.tr). Apart from the Turkey-TRNC Joint
Declaration of 20 January 1997, there are five more joint declarations (28 December 1995, 4 July
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Turkey and TRNC. In the Association Council of 29 April 1997, the EU reconfirmed
Turkey’s eligibility for membership and asked the Commission to prepare
recommendations to deepen Turkey-EU relations. However, the development of this
relationship was based on a number of factors relating to Greece, Cyprus and human
rights.46
Though the EU confirmed Turkey’s eligibility for membership, the Commission,
excluded Ankara from the enlargement process in its report entitled ‘Agenda 2000’
(16 July 1997). The Commission noted that Turkey suffered from certain
weaknesses:
The entry into force of the customs union on 31 December 1995 marked a
major step forward in relations between the EU and Turkey. The customs
union is working satisfactorily and...has demonstrated the Turkish
economy’s ability to cope with the competitive challenge of free trade in
manufactured goods,....[h]owever, macroeconomic instability continues
to give cause for concern. Over the past decade, Turkey has been unable
to break the cycle of inflation, public spending deficits and currency
depreciation.[The] political circumstances have not so far allowed for the
pursuit of financial co-operation and political dialogue, as agreed when
the customs union decision was taken on 5 March 1995;
In political terms Turkey has a government and parliament resulting from
multi-party,...[but] Turkey’s record on upholding the rights of the
individual and freedom of expression falls well short of standards in the
EU. In combating terrorism in the south east, Turkey needs to exercise
restraint, to make greater efforts to uphold the rule of law and human
rights and to find a civil and not a military solution.47 There are
                                                                                                                                         
1997, 20 July 1997, 23 April 1998 and 20 July 1999) on Turkey-TRNC relations and cooperation in
areas of mutual concern. The texts of these declarations can be found from web site of the Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
46 For more details, see also Andrew Mango, “The European Mind,” pp.171-193; see, for example,
web site of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
47 Turkey is not trying to solve a social problem by military means. Turkey is aimed at ending the
terrorism targetting the unity of the Turkish State with its territory and nation. Turkey has to use
military means since a political solution to terrorism does not exist. There is an important confusion
over the relationship between terrorism and group grievances by the EU and its organs. Violence,
(whether terrorist or not) cannot be considered a legitimate or valid means to promote human or ethnic
rights. The failure of the EU in seeing and understanding this reality creates problems in Turkey’s
relations with the EU. For more, see Gündüz Aktan, “The European Parliament”.
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ambiguities in the Turkish legal system with regard to civilian political
control of the military. 48
The Commission stated that:
The further pursuit of democratization in Turkey should be accompanied
by a firm commitment to resolve a number of problems in the region (...)
[T]ensions in the Aegean can be overcome only through the settlement of
the issues between Greece and Turkey in accordance with international
law, including means such as the International Court of Justice, as well as
through good neighbourly relations and the rejection of the threat or use
of force in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Moreover,
Turkey should contribute actively to a just and lasting settlement of the
Cyprus question in accordance with the relevant United Nations
resolutions.49
The conclusions of the Luxembourg Summit50 reflected by and large the contents of
the Commission’s ‘Agenda 2000’. The Turkish reaction was one of anger and
resentment. The decisions taken at the Luxembourg were interpreted as racist and
discriminatory towards the Turks.51 In an official statement on 14 December Turkish
Government declared that: “Turkey has not been evaluated within the same
framework, the same well–intentioned approach, and objective criteria as the other
candidate countries; most of the points that had been put forward as new and positive
steps for Turkey were in fact commitments undertaken and not implemented for
many years by the EU; partial, prejudiced, and exaggerated assessments were made
about Turkey’s internal structure and its foreign policy, including Cyprus; with these
                                                
48 European Commission, Agenda 2000, For a Stronger and Wider Union, Bulletin of the European
Union, Supplement 5/97, p.57.
49 Ibid.
50 For Conclusions of the Luxembourg Summit, see Chapter 1, p. 16 above.
51 See Katherine A. Wilkins, Troubled Ally’s Search for Identity, pp.3-33; see also “The Luxemburg
Rebuff,” in Economist, Vol.345 (8048), 12/20/97-01/02/98, pp.17-19; for detailed analysis of Turkey-
EU relations in general, see also Andrea K. Reimer, “Turkey and the European Union: A Never
Ending Story?” in The Southeast European Yearbook 1998-1999, ELIAMEP, Athens, 1999, pp.269-
311.
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erroneous approaches, attempts had been made to impose unacceptable political
conditions that had concealed intentions.”52
In response, the Commission published its recommendations for ‘European
Strategy’.53 The Commission decided to organize a European Conference which
would bring together the EU’s member states and all the European countries sharing
its values and objectives while wishing to join the Union. It was agreed that the
members of the Conference were to be committed to peace, security, good
neighborliness, and respect for other countries’ sovereignty, the principles which
formed the essence of the European Union spirit. Moreover, the members were also
expected to respect the integrity and inviolability of external borders and the
principles of international law as well as to the settlement of territorial disputes by
peaceful means, specifically through the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice in The Hague.54
The European Conference would be a multilateral forum of political consultations for
strengthening cooperation in the fields of foreign and security policy, and other areas
which would meet once a year at the level of Heads of State and Government. The
first meeting took place in London, on 12 March 1998.
The main objective of this Conference was to include Turkey in Europe without
actually committing the Union to any obligation. Turkey rejected the invitation
                                                
52 Statement of the Turkish Government Regarding the Conclusions of the Luxembourg Summit
(unofficial translation), Ankara, 14 December 1997.
53 European Strategy for Turkey - Commissions’s Initial Operational Proposals, Brussels, 4 March
1998.
54 Constantine A. Papadopoulos, “Greece and the European Agenda.”
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because Ankara considered it as a tricky device to make it accept Greece’s position
concerning bilateral disputes as well as the candidacy of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’.55
Turkey rejected the EU’s invitation to participate in the European Conference due to
the paragraph which stipulated that:
The European Council recalls that strengthening Turkey’s links with the
European Union also depends on that country’s pursuit of the political
and economic reforms on which it has embarked, including the alignment
of human rights standards and practices on those in force in the European
Union; respect for and protection of minorities; the establishment of
satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey; the
settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the
International Court of Justice; and support for negotiations under the
aegis of the UN on a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the
relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.56
Being unable to accept these, Ankara decided to withhold its political dialogue with
the EU: the meetings of ‘experts’ for settling disputes between Greece and Turkey,
which the EU had initiated earlier, were also withheld. Turkey proposed to resolve
differences directly between Greece and Turkey through official diplomatic
contacts.57 This reaction on the Turkish side proved that the EU could no longer be a
reliable ‘honest broker’ between Greece and Turkey, since Greece as a member of
the EU influenced the latter’s positions with regard to Turkey.
The summit meeting held in Cardiff on 15-16 June 1998 initially seemed to offer a
good opportunity to change this difficult situation. Certain positive developments
were achieved with regard to the language used for Turkey in the Presidency
Conclusions of the Summit, but they were not sufficient and satisfactory for Turkey
                                                
55 Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey, p.196; and see Constantine A. Papadopoulos, Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 See Ibid.; and, Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey, pp.196-199.
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to modify its policy outlined after the Luxembourg Summit.58 “An important
outcome of the Cardiff Summit for Turkey-EU relations was the EU leaders’
endorsement of the Commission’s ‘European Strategy’ for Turkey and the request
made to the Commission to find solutions with a view to making available the
financial resources required for the implementation of the ‘European Strategy’.”59
The Commission was aware of the fact that without money the implementation of the
‘European Strategy’ would be impossible. The Council of Ministers asked the
Commission to find new ways of overcoming the Greek veto. The Commission
decided to release some amount of money without requiring Greek agreement.
However, Athens notified the Commission that it would appeal to the European
Court of Justice.60 Once again an attempt to improve Turkey-EU relations was
overshadowed by Greek veto and Turco-Greek differences.
At the Cologne European Council held on 3-4 June 1999 the initiative was taken by
the German Presidency with a view to ensuring the recognition of Turkey’s
candidate status on equal footing with others. As a result of Greek and Scandinavian
resistance this initiative could not be realized either. The EU refrained from
including Turkey in the enlargement process. Since the discriminatory approach
towards Turkey remained unchanged at the Cologne Summit, the decision adopted
by the Turkish Government on 14 December 1997 following the Luxembourg
Summit remained.61
                                                
58 For more details, see, for example, web site of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
59 See Ibid.
60 Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey, p.199; see also Nazlan Ertan, “EU Move to Improve Ties
Angers Greece,” Turkish Probe Electronic Edition, 1 November 1998; N. Ertan, “Greece Launches
Offensive Against Overtures Between Turkey and EU,” Turkish Daily News Electronic Edition, 28
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Finally, the Helsinki European Council held on 10-11 December 1999 seemed to
produce a breakthrough in Turkey-EU relations. At Helsinki, Turkey was officially
recognized without any precondition as a candidate on equal footing with other
candidate states. Turkey, like other candidate states, would benefit from the pre-
accession strategy in order to stimulate and support its reforms.
It is important to note that, despite all, the Cyprus question has not been dropped
from the EC/EU agenda starting from early 1990s till today. Moreover, with the
Greek Cypriot application for membership in the EC on 4 July 1990 things got worse
between Turkey, Greece and the EC. From the Turkish point of view the Council’s
consideration of the Greek Cypriot application for full membership proved the pro-
Greek inclination of the EC in Turkish-Greek relations and Turkey has lost its
confidence in the EC decisions.
Indeed, starting from 1990s onwards the Community’s views on majority of the
issues relating to Turkey including the Greek-Turkish conflicts in general and Cyprus
and human rights issues especially concerning Kurds living in Turkey were similar.
Furthermore, the Community became more and more interested in Turkish–Greek
relations as a result of the Greek conditionality (linkage) policy starting from its
membership to the Community in 1981.
Actually, Greece used two main instruments to implement its policy of conditionality
between 1981 and 1999. The first was the freezing of the Fourth Financial Protocol
and declarations on Cyprus problem issued by the Council of Ministers, the EC-
Turkey Association Council and the European Parliament. The Fourth Financial
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Protocol, amounting to 600 million ECU, has remained frozen since 1980, because of
the fact that the approval for releasing funds to Turkey, required a unanimous
decision by the Council of Ministers to which the European Parliament must also
give its consent. Greece has consistently opposed this and Athens made it clear that
there would not be any unfreezing of the Protocol unless “Turkey withdraws its
occupation troops from Cyprus, works constructively towards the resolution of the
Cyprus problem and respects human rights at home.” 62 Secondly, the inclusion of
references regarding the Cyprus problem in statements and declarations of the
EC/EU organs compromised the other operational arm of Greece’s conditionality
policy towards Turkey.63
As a result the Community started pressuring Turkey 64 on every aspect of its
relations with Greece by way of carrots and sticks policy. This term explains the
EC/EU policy towards Turkey especially starting from mid-1990s till today, because
while offering one thing to Turkey, the EC/EU demanded a concession from Turkey
in favor of Greece. The Community played a double-sided game, because it gave
green light to Greece in its demands against Turkey and then turned around and said
to Turkey “We are sorry but Greece is blocking your way to full membership, we
have nothing to do...” It can be very well argued that the EC/EU used Greece as a
scapegoat in its relations with Turkey. According to a poll made in the EU member
states few weeks before the declaration of Turkey’s Accession Partnership document,
70 - 80 percent of the EU population does not want Turkey to be member of the EU,
                                                
62 Prodromos Yannas, “The Greek Factor,” pp.215-220.
63 Ibid.
64 As Prodromos Yannas argues Greece has received the full support of its partners in the EC/EU for
her position on Cyprus issue. (Prodromos Yannas, “The Greek Factor,” p.220). See footnote 65,
pp.83-84 below.
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even after the Helsinki Summit conclusions, which seemed to open the EU’s door to
Turkey.
Actually it is not just Greece that does not want Turkey in the EU, majority of the
members of the EU do not want Turkey inside the Union. However, they prefer to
give mixed signals to Turkey by hiding behind Greece’s vetoes, instead of rejecting
Turkey altogether. This has been more practical for them because by this way they
managed to get what they wanted from Turkey without giving anything in return,
except the colorful dream of becoming a member of the most desirable
Community/Union of the world today in some 20 or 30 years time.
On the other hand, Greece, knowing this great desire of Turkey, has played its chess
game very well. Up until now including the Helsinki conclusions, Greece has
achieved all of its goals with respect to Turkey through the EU mechanisms. What
should not be forgotten here is the fact that Turkey’s active policy of seeking entry
into the EC/EU has given Greece a diplomatic and political leverage. So, it can be
argued that Greece has been pretty successful in achieving its goals while Turkey has
not.65 In the past Greece used every opportunity to achieve its goals. At present, it
                                                
65 As Prodromos Yannas puts it, “Needless to say, Greece has been more successful in receiving the
Community’s solid support for her position on Cyprus issue than in bringing about a modification of
Turkey’s stance on this issue. Turkey’s own response to Greece’s conditionality policy has been the
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that Greece transformed most of its bilateral differences with Turkey into a problem of Turkey-EU
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as it can be seen in the government declarations and statements. However, the Turkish acceptance of
the Customs Union (Article 16 with its appendix), Helsinki conclusions (Article 9 paragraphs (a) and
(b) and Article 12), and very recently the Accession Partnership document (with Cyprus and the
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EU. For example, Prof. Dr. Mümtaz Soysal said that by accepting the Accession Partnership
document Turkey has entered in a major crisis and it is obliged to confirm this document. (Avrupa,
7/12/2000). On the other hand, Turkish policy of pursuing close bilateral ties with the core members
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continues to do the same and in the future it looks as if it will continue to follow the
same policy vis á vis Turkey. This is not because that Greece is an old enemy of
Turkey or Greeks hate the Turks, in fact, it is the natural consequence of real-politik.
In this world, each state follows its own national interests which may be in conflict
with other states’ national interests. Naturally, Greece as a nation state follows its
own interests, which are indeed in conflict with the interests of Turkey. Therefore,
frictions and highly escalated crises are inevitable and non-avoidable in the relations
between the two countries.
                                                                                                                                         
of the EU against the Greek lobby could not achieved its goals. The EU and its member states against
Turkey’s wishes, included the Cyprus and the Aegean issues in the Accession Partnership document
for Turkey. (For a more detailed discussion, see pp. 85-99 below). The European Parliament report on
Turkey’s progress towards accession named “Morillon Report” issued on 19 October 2000 called on
the Turkish Government and the Turkish Grand National Assembly “in accordance with Resolution
1250 of the UN Security Council, to contribute, without preliminary conditions being set, towards the
creation of a climate conducive to negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities,
with a view to reaching a negotiated, comprehensive, just and lasting settlement which complies with
the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the recommendations of the UN General Assembly,
as reaffirmed by the European Council; to withdraw its occupation forces from northern Cyprus; to
give fresh support to the Armenian minority, as an important part of Turkish society, because of the
tragedy that befell them before the establishment of the modern state of Turkey.” (See Report on the
1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession (COM(1999)513–
C5-0036/2000–2000/2014 (COS)) - Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security
and Defence Policy - Reporter: Philippe Morillon). Added to these, the adoption of the resolution on
the so-called Armenian Genocide in the parliament of France against Turkey provoked a serious crisis
between the two countries. Added to these, the relations between Turkey and Britain are also strained
by the efforts of the Armenian lobby in the UK to include the so-called Genocide in the ‘Genocide
Day’ organized by the British Government to commemorate the Jewish Holocaust during WW II.
Some academicians argue that there is a likelihood that the other member states will also pass
resolutions and decisions on the Armenian allegations of  ‘Genocide’ vis á vis Turkey. In case this
happens, Turkey will face with extra problems in its relations both with the EU and its members. All
of these have clearly shown the negative EU attitude against Turkey. Above all, these developments
have also demonstrated that Turkey has to rethink and modify its EU policy.
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5.2 Helsinki and After
5.2.1. Greece and the Discussion of Turkey’s EU Candidacy for Membership
The Greek Foreign Minister, George Papandreou’s widely acknowledged speech at
the 54th UNO General Assembly on 22 September 1999 reflects the atmospheric
change in the Greek-Turkish relationship. Without ignoring the existing divergent
positions on Cyprus and the Aegean, he used encouraging words when referring to
the current state of the Greek-Turkish relationship:
If the road to peace is indeed made up of ‘a collection of moments’ then I
also dare hope for our relations with Turkey. My Turkish counterpart,
Ismael Cem, and I have been engaged in careful diplomacy for many
months. We recently inaugurated discussion committees to address a
number of bilateral concerns, including trade, tourism and the
environment, where we feel our two countries have much to gain from
mutual Cupertino. Peoples’ aspirations for the principles of democracy,
security and prosperity can overcome historical strife. In this democratic
spirit, we believe that our security is bound by the stability in the region;
that our neighbors’ strength is our own strength.66
George Papandreou has followed a very ‘new’ policy in Greece’s relations with
Turkey since he replaced Theodoros Pangalos as the Foreign Minister of Greece. He
came to this position right after one of the biggest crises in Turkey-Greece relations,
‘Abdullah Öcalan case’.
In the third week of February 1999, relations between Turkey and Greece were
plunged into a bitter crisis. The reason was the Greek protection of the leader of the
                                                
66 Jürgen Reuter, “Reshaping Greek-Turkish Relations: Developments Before and After the EU-
summit in Helsinki,” Occasional Papers, OP.00.01, ELIAMEP, Athens, 1999.
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PKK terrorist organization, Abdullah Öcalan.67 Turkey accused Greece of giving
support to terrorists targeting Turkey 68 for a long period of time. When Öcalan flew
out of Syria as a result of the Turkish threat of retaliation with war in case Syria did
not cease its support for terrorism targeting Turkey. Ankara asked Syria to hand over
the terrorist leader to Turkey but Öcalan flew out to another country, Russia. In the
following six months, Öcalan wandered the globe seeking any country that would
grant him asylum. This story ended with the apprehension of Öcalan in the Greek
Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, by the Turkish Special Forces.
Within a very short period of time, the Greek involvement at the government level
became to be known to the whole world.69 Turkey, though being very frustrated by
the event, preferred not to severely antagonize Greece70 which could work against
Turkey’s goal of achieving EU membership. It in a way appeased Greece. Indeed,
the domestic reaction inside Greece was more severe71 than the one by Turkey.
                                                
67 For details of the Greek involvement in the Öcalan case and for the story of Öcalan’s capture, see
Konstantinos  Kotzias, “Greek-Turkish Relations,” in Contemporary Review, Vol.276(1611), April
2000, p.190 ff.
68 See Cem Başar, The Terror Dossier I and II, İstanbul: INAF, 1993 and 1996; The Terrorist Base in
Europe: Greece, Turkish Democracy Foundation, Ankara, 1995; Ali Güler, Dünden Bugüne  Yunan –
Rum Terörü,  (The Greek and Rum Terror from Yesterday to Today), Ankara: Ocak Yayınları, 1999;
for the publications of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Greek support of  PKK
terrorism, see “Note on Relations Between Greece and PKK” and Greece – PKK Terrorism  I and II,
from web site of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; see also web site of the Office of the
Turkish  Military - Chief of Staff on terrorism, (http://www.teror.gen.tr/english/).
69 “Our position on the harboring of terrorists is well-known. There’s no question that Greece
provided haven to Öcalan in recent weeks and we made our position very clear on that … I have made
clear to you our difference of opinion on the question of harboring Öcalan.” (US State Department
spokesman, 23 February 1999).
70 “The early accounts of Mr. Öcalan in captivity have turned up the heat under Greek-Turkish
relations. And for reason. The Turks are angry but not of line in demanding that Athens answer to the
European Union for any violation of Greece’s counter-terrorist obligations. It would be good to know
the citizens of Greece were making a similar demand on their government.” (The Washington Post, 26
February 1999).
71 “Many Greeks and Greek Cypriots support the PKK, without paying attention to whether the PKK
really represents the Kurds. A considerable number of Kurds, however, have reached important
positions in the Turkish political life and see their future lying in this direction. All this trouble
resulted from the mistakes of those Greeks and Greek Cypriots who think that the PKK represents
Kurds.” (Greek Cypriot daily ‘Haravgi’, 7 March 1999).
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George Papanderou, taking over the Foreign Ministry at that time, took a friendly
stance towards Turkey. Perhaps he had no other choice: Greece had been caught up
red-handed in the Öcalan capture. So, Mr. Papanderou wanted to show to the
Greece’s EU partners that Greece could establish good dialogue with Turkey even
assist Turkey on its European vocation. In a way the Greek Government tried to
repair its reputation and image which had been ruined by the Öcalan affair both in
the domestic and external arena. Greece tried to ensure that it did no longer want to
be used as a convenient scapegoat to justify EU’s unsympathetic policy towards
Turkey.
In his interviews to international newspapers as well as to Turkish and Greek ones,
Mr. Papandreou pointed out that, “the EU must now address this issue as a whole,
with greater openness and honesty. All the member states must now take a clear
position about whether or not they want Turkey in Europe.” 72 And he added that,
“Greece supports the acceptance of Turkey as a real, rather than a ‘virtual’ EU
candidate at Helsinki.”73
Eventually, on 29 November 1999 the Government of Greece presented the Finnish
Presidency with a memorandum outlining the Greek position on Turkish candidacy
for membership. The memorandum suggested that the conclusions of the Finnish
Presidency at the Helsinki Summit should contain the following:
                                                
72 Jürgen Reuter, “Reshaping Greek-Turkish Relations”; see also “Interview with Foreign Minister
Papandreou,” by Nuri Çolakoğlu and Alkis Kourkoulas, broadcast on NTV, 21st January 2000; see
also George Papandreou, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, recently spoke with Europe’s Editor in
Chief, Robert J. Guttman.
73 Ibid.
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i. The unsolved problem of Cyprus should not prevent the accession of
the Republic of Cyprus (at least the de facto accession of the unoccupied
part - JR).
ii. Any candidate for membership must be willing to recognise the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, within a
certain time-frame (approximately until the end of 2000). Although this
demand could be already found in the Agenda 2000, it, at the time, was
not legally binding. Clearly, Greece demands greater clarity of terms
defined by the European Council.
iii. The Greek government also wants the Turkish candidacy to be seen as
a real and not just a ‘virtual’ option. In other words, there should be a
realistic road-map for Turkey, where the rights as well as the duties of the
candidate are enacted.74
The Presidency Conclusions in Helsinki commented on the Copenhagen criteria,75
the International Court of Justice; Cyprus’ accession to the EU as well as on the issue
over Turkey’s candidacy in line with the Greece’s view. Though it appeared to
satisfy Turkey at the beginning, it is obvious Greece has achieved its strategic goal at
Helsinki, that is, the transformation of the Greek-Turkish dispute into a problem of
EU-Turkish relations.
The EU now accepts that a solution of the Cyprus issue is desirable, but not a
prerequisite for the accession of ‘Cyprus’ to the EU in line with the Greek view.
When it comes to the resolution of continental shelf issue and other border issues in
the Aegean, the EU sets 2004 as the deadline for referring these disputes to the
International Court of Justice. Indeed, it looks as if the European Council has
undertaken  responsibility for  this, which  gives Ankara less room  to maneuver. The
                                                
74 Jürgen Reuter, “Reshaping Greek-Turkish Relations.”
75 “ Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and, protection of minorities, the existence of
a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market
forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of
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EU directly urges the two sides into bilateral negotiation, and only if there is no
result, will the European Council look into the matter. 76
Though the Helsinki Summit declaration has been applauded as a victory for Turkey
among various circles, there are other ways of looking at it. Rather than opening the
EU doors to Turkey, the Helsinki conclusions look more like putting Turkey in a
‘cage’. Greece and the EU got what they want from Turkey without giving anything
in return. This brings up the question “How will the EU-Turkey relations develop
after Helsinki?” There seems to be no real reason for the EU to offer full membership
to Turkey. The EU has already concluded the Customs Union in 1995 without
offering the financial aid it had promised to Turkey. There are no trade barriers for
the EU products to get into the Turkish market. The EU has satisfied Greece by tying
Turkey’s membership to the resolution of Cyprus and the Aegean issues in the way
Athens wishes for. Moreover, it has accepted Cyprus’s accession to the Union
without necessarily a prior solution of the conflict. The EU reserves its right to revise
its policy towards Turkey, which means that any time the EU member states can
change their commitments in the future summit meetings of the European Council
and decide not to grant membership to Turkey even if Turkey fulfills all the
requirements. So, it can be argued that Turkey has been tricked by the EU and by
                                                                                                                                         
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.” (The
Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions, June 1993).
76 Ibid. However, “there is an inherent danger that the EU-term ‘bilateral differences’ rather than
‘unilateral Turkish claims’ (which reflects the Greek view) could become a topic for EU diplomacy.
Prime Minister Costas Simitis stated for instance that the only formal difference between Greece and
Turkey was the delineation of the continental shelf, rejecting any broader interpretations Ankara might
attempt. Every Member State does not share this view. The German media i.e. interpret paragraph 4 of
the Helsinki Conclusions, in that way, that ‘disputes over borders between Athens and Ankara should
be solved by political means’. Furthermore, the term ‘territorial disputes in the Aegean’ is in use.
These terms do not correspond with the Greek version, ‘unilateral Turkish claims’.” (Jürgen Reuter,
“Reshaping Greek-Turkish Relations”).
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Greece. Though it has been argued that there has been a change in Greece’s policy
against Turkey, the reality might be interpreted quite differently. Greek interests and
policy have never changed. The change in Greek foreign policy vis á vis Turkey
initiated by the Mr. Papanderou can be described as a change of tactic rather than
substance.
There are various people who express all these reservations about the Helsinki
process. As one columnist commented:
...Greece has enlarged its territory seven times since its establishment as
an independent state. Accomplishing most of the enlargement process
without entering any battles Greece received the support of Europe in all
of them. It is very important and beneficial to establish good relations
with Greece which supported terrorism and hosted Öcalan in its Embassy
in Kenya. This should not be forgotten while establishing these relations.
We shall see what will happen in the coming days concerning Turkey’s
Partnership Accession document.  77
5.2.2. Accession Partnership Document for Turkey
The Accession Partnership document (APD) is the centerpiece of the pre-accession
strategy that identifies short and medium-term priorities, intermediate objectives as
well as the conditions on which accession preparations must concentrate. These
national preparations must concentrate on the political and economic criteria and on
the obligations of a member state as stated in the document. The member state is
under the responsibility to adopt, implement and enforce the Community acquis.78
                                                                                                                                         
77 Mustafa Balbay, “Greece: Yesterday and Today,” Cumhuriyet, 30 October 2000, obtained from
web site (http://www.turkishpress.com/). (Emphasis mine).
78  For more details, see Appendix B: Turkey’s Accession Partnership Document pp. 108-111 below.
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Having declared Turkey as a candidate, the Commission started to observe Turkey
closely for drawing up its pre-accession strategy. Finally, the Commission prepared
Turkey’s Accession Partnership document and submitted it to the Council for a final
decision to be reached on 20 November 2000. The Accession Partnership document
of Turkey was made public on 8 November 2000. According to it, the EU expects
Turkey to adopt a National Program to be drawn up on the basis of this Accession
Partnership document before the end of the year. However, the document created
great disillusionment and disappointment on the Turkish side. The Cyprus issue
figured among short-term political priorities though Turkey has never accepted any
linkage between the resolution of the Cyprus issue and its candidacy to the EU.
From the Turkish point of view, the Cyprus issue has always been treated as a
separate problem between the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Southern
Cyprus Greek Cypriot Administration (SCGA) on the island. However, what should
not be overlooked at this point is the reference to the Cyprus issue in the Helsinki
conclusions. Though the EU did not stipulate any obligation on Turkey for the
resolution of the Cyprus issue in the Helsinki conclusions, it was an indirect sign of
the possible inclusion of such imposition regarding Cyprus on Turkey in the
Accession Partnership document. Having seen the policy of linkage and the influence
of Greece inside the EU against Turkey, the expectation of a document different than
the one released was unrealistically optimistic and extremely visionary. Greece,
having received the green light from the EU in the Helsinki Summit, naturally
increased its efforts at high-level meetings against Turkey. Eventually, today the
Cyprus issue has become a direct link in Turkey’s accession to the EU.
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As one observer noted, the document satisfied Greece and the Greek Cypriots:
For some time Athens was unhappy with certain statements made by
Turkish politicians, including Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and even
more so the deputy prime minister in charge of European negotiation,
Mesut Yilmaz. Diplomatic circles were warning that if the situation were
allowed to carry on, Greece would ‘turn negative’ in forthcoming
meetings between European Union and Turkish officials. It seems that
various behind-the-scenes moves and British Foreign Secretary Robin
Cook’s visit to Athens have been quite helpful while Greece managed to
carry its position effectively to other member countries. The Brussels
document is considered by Athens as satisfactory. The European
Commissioners examined the entire framework of Brussels-Ankara
relations and decided that certain requirements in the Helsinki agreements
needed to be spelled out more firmly. One of the most delicate points was
the question of Cyprus. The new document makes it clear that Turkey
should contribute towards a solution of the problem and that such a
contribution would count in favour of Turkey during future entry
negotiations. It is worth mentioning that the great majority of
commissioners insisted that progress on the question of Cyprus should be
included in the so-called ‘short-term criteria’, which in practical terms
means that some evidence of a change in Turkey’s attitude should be
detectable within 2001 before entry negotiations could proceed. Greek
Cypriots are obviously happy with the above and the climate created has
played a part in President Glafcos Clerides’ decision to accept UN
Secretary Kofi Annan’s invitation for a sixth round in January. What
looks promising at first sight is the fact that Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf
Denktash has also accepted. However, less optimistic observers believe
that the Turkish Cypriot leader will find other ways of dragging on with
the talks. He has already expressed opposition to the Commission’s
document.79 There is no doubt that Greece will try to consolidate what
has been achieved. Diplomats in Athens point out that the European
Union summit in Nice in December will prove crucial in Turkey’s road to
                                                
79 After the declaration of Accession Partnership document for Turkey in which Cyprus figured
among the short-term political criteria to be accomplished by Turkey at the end of the year 2001 or at
the beginning of 2002, President of the TRNC, Mr. Denktaş visited Turkey on 24 November 2000 for
a special working summit held in the Office of the Turkish President between the Turkish and Turkish
Cypriot high-ranking officials and diplomats. In Çankaya summit they considered the recent
developments in EU-Turkey relations and the Accession Partnership document. President Denktaş
received assurances form Ankara that despite the APD Turkey’s Cyprus policy would not change.
Then he declared that he decided to withdraw from the Cyprus proximity talks. Many assumed that his
withdrawal was directly related to the EU imposition on Turkey in the APD. President Denktaş
rejected this linkage and noted that the APD had no effect on the Cyprus problem. His decision was
taken in relation to the UN Secretary General’s verbal statement on 8 November 2000 and to the
advancement of the proximity talks in the wrong direction (against the interests of the Turkish Cypriot
community). However it can be well argued that both the inclusion of Cyprus in the APD for Turkey
and the Statement of Kofi Annan had affected this decision of the President of the TRNC. For more
details on this issue see web page (http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/2000/00-12-06.tcpr.html.)
93
Europe. It should be made clear that Greece is not the only European
Union country that insists on the necessity of extracting commitments
from Turkey before seriously considering the possibility of a future entry
of that country into the Community. The question of human rights and the
treatment of the Kurds are matters that are considered of extreme
importance by several European countries. The human rights record of
Turkey would have to be improved considerably anyway, even if there
were no problems between Athens and Ankara.80
These views from the other shores of the Aegean have been reciprocated by many:
indeed, some in Turkey had even foreseen the shape of the document and the content
as one expert earlier put it on the visit of EU Commissioner responsible for
Enlargement Gunther Verheugen:
...As the Government did not deny the minutes of the talks published in
Hürriyet on 31 July, Verheugen’s words must have been true. In the
minutes recording Verheugen’s meeting with Foreign Minister İsmail
Cem, the EU  commissioner had said that conditions concerning the
Aegean and Cyprus would be taken into the ‘accession partnership’
document prepared for Turkey and that as Greece  was determined on  the
issue, if they were not mentioned, it would not sign the Accession
Partnership document. The document will not be ratified before Turkey
withdraws from Cyprus; Aegean becomes a Greek sea. They will take
Cyprus into the EU as a unitary state, severe its ties with Turkey, reduce
the status of Turks living there to a minority, meet Greek demands in the
Aegean and, for another forty years think if Turkey satisfies the
requirements for being an EU member. Verheugen revealed how we were
deceived in Helsinki. Cyprus and Aegean conditions would be taken into
the Accession Partnership document. He also added that they would ask
for new openings in Southeastern Anatolia within the framework of the
Copenhagen criteria. It seems that an extremely bitter ‘accession
partnership’ document will be approved in autumn. The plan, which
began to be prepared in Brussels in 1995, is continuing by raising the
standards. A few months’ later new pressures will be applied to Turkey
with the ‘accession partnership’ document. The procedure which began
with the Çiller government is continued by the Ecevit government.81
                                                
80 Paul Nathanail, “Greece, Cyprus Satisfied with EU Accession Road-Map for Turkey,” Athensnews,
11 November 2000, obtained from web site of Athens News Agency, (http://www.athensnews.gr/).
(Emphasis mine).
81 Erol Manisalı, “Verheugen Reveals EU Intentions,” Cumhuriyet, 2 August 2000, obtained from,
(http://www.turkishpress.com/). (Emphasis mine).
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After the declaration of the Accession Partnership document, Turkish Government
and the elite started questioning the future of the Turkey-EU relations in line with
their own analysis and interpretations of the document. Some of them argued that the
document is acceptable except the bit about Cyprus, while others claimed that this
document cannot be accepted altogether.
According to these views, the EU’s Accession Partnership document for Turkey
stated the same EU expectations about improvement of the Turkish democracy and
the Kurdish problem which was one of the focal points of the EU policy vis á vis
Turkey since 1990’s. As a result of the Greek demand, Cyprus was given priority and
placed among the short-term problems to be solved in the document. With this
Cyprus was officially tied to Turkey’s accession to the EU and became a
precondition for the Turkish side. So, the EU recognized the Greek Cypriot
Administration as the only government on the island and refused to treat the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus on equal terms. The EU also expects Turkey to take the
Aegean issue to the Court of Justice, in 2004, in line with the Greek demands.
Indeed, the document is extremely severe both in its wording and impositions. Some
people saw this document as a surprise but in fact, it was apparent for quite a long
time that such an extremely bitter document would be approved by the EU.82 This
tactical policy initiated by both Greece and the EU manifested itself in the Helsinki
conclusions a year ago. For instance, in the part mentioning Turkey’s accession to
the Union a reference was made to one of the paragraphs related to Cyprus in the
final conclusions. Apart from these, Turkey’s full support of the good missions of the
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UN in Cyprus was also mentioned in the conclusions. However, no reference was
made to the paragraph, which underlies that in case no political settlement was
reached by the completion of accession negotiations with Cyprus, the Council’s
decision on accession would be made without the political settlement precondition.
This gave hope to some circles in Turkey that Cyprus will not be a criterion to be
discussed and negotiated in Turkey’s accession talks. 83
Hence, they believed that Cyprus will not and cannot be a direct link in Turkey-EU
relations. Apart from these, the internal turbulence inside Greece, gave some signs of
the coming storm. For about a year, there had been disagreements inside the PASOK
Government of Greece. Some members stated their disillusionment about the
ineffective government policies on various issues. Some of them reacted to the
foreign policy followed by Foreign Minister Papandreou against Turkey.84
Apart from Cyprus and the minority issues regarding Kurds living in Turkey, the
main lacking point is that there is no reference to financial aid to be given to Turkey.
With this document the EU is explaining to “Turkey what it has to do one by one, but
is not giving a time-table or even any financial aid for that matter. The APD is a
unilateral document and creates an imposition on Turkey. Europe takes no
responsibility, and ignores Turkey’s wishes altogether.” 85
                                                                                                                                         
82 Erol Manisalı, “The Meaning of the Accession Partnership Document,” Cumhuriyet, 9 November
2000, obtained from,(http://www.turkishpress.com/). (Emphasis mine).
83 A summary of Hasan Ünal’s columns made by me. The translation from Turkish to English is also
mine. For more details, see the original articles, Hasan Ünal, “Helsinki Takkesi Düştü,” Zaman, 10
November 2000; “Son Dakika Golü Falan Değil; Üstelik Gol Nizami,” Zaman, 13 November 2000;
“Bu Belgeyle Bu İş Olmaz,” Zaman, 16 November 2000; “Parasız AB’ye Hazırlanmak,” Zaman, 17
November 2000, obtained from Zaman newspaper web site, (http://www.zaman.com.tr/).
84 Ibid.
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In Helsinki, Turkey became a ‘candidate on condition’. Turkey was not given a
calender or a guarantee, because it is viewed as ‘the other candidate’ by the EU and
separated from other candidates. In the Accession Partnership document a calendar
was given only for the resolution of the Cyprus issue, which meant that Turkey’s
conditional candidacy is continuing. Therefore “the Accession Partnership document
is a road-map, not for Turkey but for those who want to use this deception in their
favour. The APD shows that if Turkey does not enter the EU, it will also not be
governed or controlled by the EU Administration. There is no difference between
those wanting a mandate in 1919 and those wanting to enter the EU today.”86
According to this view, with this document Turkey–EU relations cannot work,
because:
Today, every official in Brussels knows the game saying Turkey will not
be admitted into the Union in the near future, no matter how hard it tries.
Political party leaders in all EU countries stand fast on the issue, and
demonstrate this by their actions. 80% of the EU population is against
Turkey’s full EU membership and as they will soon be faced with the
advent of Eastern European countries they will take a firmer stance
against Turkey. The aim of the EU is to place Turkey under the thumb of
the Union without offending it. Meanwhile, the EU also hopes to get
more concessions from Turkey. 87
Some moderates take a slightly different view. According to them, the EU’s demand
of the Turkish support to the UN Secretary General’s efforts concerning Cyprus issue
should not be seen as an imposition but rather a request as it leaves the issue where it
already is.88 These people are saying the APD is not very different from the Helsinki
                                                                                                                                         
85 Erol Manisalı, “The Meaning of the Accession Partnership Document,” (Emphasis mine).
86 Ibid.
87 Erol Manisalı, “Road Maps and Turkey,” Cumhuriyet, 15 November 2000, obtained from,
(http://www.turkishpress.com/).
88 Semih İdiz, “Is the Issue Cyprus?”  Star,  10 November 2000, (http://www.turkishpress.com/).
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declaration with the exception of Cyprus, and argue that Ankara is pleased with the
result as Turkey is now on the road to Europe, except, the two points on the ‘road-
map’.89
At any rate, it is clear that the document has created reservations at the back of the
mind of many in Turkey: for instance, one columnist commented that:
The last minute inclusion of the Cyprus problem to the Accession
Partnership document has greatly changed the climate. When we add up
the results with the inclusion of Cyprus a different picture appears. Let’s
take a glance at the situation without considering the Cyprus issue for a
minute. Both the European delegations coming to Turkey, and those who
received the Turkish delegations in Brussels created an expectation that
there would be nothing to offend Turkey in the document and that the
Cyprus question would not be a precondition. All messages given to the
Turkish public just hours before the announcement of the document
pointed to this. However, we saw that at the last minute an article was
added to the Document to please Greece. It said, The Cyprus question
should be solved within a year. Turkey should support more strongly the
UN efforts on the issue. The article is handicapped on three accounts.
First, asking for the solution of a 50 year-old problem within a year,
shows malintent and insincerity. Second, giving Ankara the impression
that Cyprus will not be a precondition, then including it at the last minute
among the short-term goals, lends an air of piracy to the document. Third,
the request to support UN efforts to find a solution to the problem is itself
problematic. The duty of the UN is to bring the two parties closer. The
UN is not the centre of the talks. The day when the EU requested Turkey
to increase support for the UN efforts, the Greek Cypriots leaked the UN
Secretary General’s proposals to the press. The news in the press
included the proposals resulting in Turkish complaints.90
Under these circumstances, some suggested that Turkey draws up its national
program without regard to certain parts of the APD. But it appears that it might not
be possible to do so as an experienced retired Ambassador explains:
                                                
89 Fikret Bila, “Ankara’s Viewpoint,” Milliyet, 10 November 2000, (http://www.turkishpress.com/).
90 Mustafa Balbay, “Arguments Over Cyprus,” Cumhuriyet, 13 November 2000, obtained from,
(http://www.turkishpress.com/). (Emphasis mine).
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The Turkish public is being misinformed and misled regarding the
Accession Partnership Document. The APD is presented by the
Government to the press as the basis for the National Program (NP)
Turkey will prepare. They are saying there could be deviation in the NP
from the Accession Partnership document. Such opinions are mistaken
and misleading, as the APD states the compulsory priorities necessary to
move forward on the road to full EU membership. During the accession
process, the EU will assess Turkey’s performance in light of this main
document. The National Program has to include the aims and priorities of
the APD. Turkish officials do not have the authority to change them.
However, Turkey can lengthen the implementation period for the aims
and, priorities and by penning them in uncertain terms, may try to palliate
the sensitivities of certain circles. The most important point the
Government is ignoring and misleading the public about, concerns
Cyprus. In the Government statement, the Document is accepted as is,
even though strong opposition is expressed over the Cyprus question
being included on short-term problem list. The government stated Turkey
would accept the Helsinki declaration and Lipponen letter on the issue.
The APD certainly has to be changed. Otherwise, even though Prime
Minister Ecevit states a link between Cyprus and full EU membership
cannot be tolerated, the Cyprus issue becomes a precondition.91
Accordingly, Ankara asked the EU Commission not to refer to either Cyprus or the
Aegean disputes in its short and medium measures set out for Turkey’s accession to
the EU. Turkey’s Accession Partnership document was discussed in the EU General
Affairs Council on 4 December 2000. In the revised APD, Cyprus is defined as an
issue to be solved by Turkey by the end of 2001 or the beginning of 2002, which
meant that it is put forth as a condition for Turkey. Turkey is also advised to carry on
its solution upon the UN Secretary General’s proposal which calls for the
establishment of a unitary state based on the Greek Cypriot sovereignty against the
Turkish proposal for a confederation.92 The statement in the Cyprus article is
strengthened upon Greece’s threat of veto for the EU financial aid, totaling 785
million Euros, for Turkey, and another paragraph is included in the document with a
                                                
91 Şükrü Elekdağ,“Prime Minister Ecevit Has to Intervene,” Milliyet, 13 November 2000, obtained
from,(http://www.turkishpress.com/). (Emphasis mine).
92 Erol Manisalı, “The Meaning of New Accession Partnership Document,” Cumhuriyet, 06 December
2000.
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solution favoring Greek demands to the Aegean problem. However, in the revised
document the Cyprus and the Aegean issues were put under a paragraph titled, ‘The
Strengthened Political Dialogue and Political Criteria’. Yalım Eralp, a retired
Turkish Ambassador commented, “The package hadn’t changed, only the wrapping
has changed.”93 Indeed, this is the reality. Though the Turkish Government
welcomed this development, nothing has changed in the substance of the document.
For instance, Ambassador Karen Fogg, European Commission Turkey
Representative, said Cyprus still constitutes to be a priority for the EU, even though
the statement regarding the issue had been removed from short-term priorities and
put under another heading in the APD.94
In fact, the reality seems that the Accession Partnership document is not agreeable as
a whole. The only disagreement is not over the Cyprus issue, Turkey has to analyze
the document in-depth and then decide according to its national interests. Greece has
once again scored successes over Turkey in achieving its aims by good maneuvers
and diplomacy within the EU, a policy that started from early 1990s, increased with
the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU in 1995 and reached its final stages
with the Helsinki conclusions and the Accessions Partnership document.
In addition to these, the EU in its Nice Summit meeting (7-9 December 2000), made
no mention of Turkey’s place within the enlargement process from now until 2010.
So, it can be said that nothing has changed both in the new APD and in the Nice
                                                
93 For more details on this issue, see front-page article on Turkish Cypriot newspaper Avrupa,
7/12/2000.
94 “Fogg: ‘Cyprus is the priority of the EU’,” Cumhuriyet, 07/12/2000.
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Summit about Turkey’s ‘conditional candidacy’ and position as the ‘other candidate’
in the enlargement process of the EU.
CONCLUSION
FUTURE OF TURKEY-EU-GREECE RELATIONS
Turkey’s immediate objectives in Europe will continue in the near future. Turkey
wants to be a full member of the EU but the critical question at this point is not just
whether Turkey is willing to pay the economic and political costs that may result, but
whether Europe will be able to meet its obligations towards Turkey. If the
conclusions of the Helsinki Summit and Accession Partnership document are being
carefully analyzed, the signals from the EU are not promising. It seems as if Turkey
will actually be a member of the EU by 2020 or even later. This is related to the fact
that the EU does not and probably will not treat Turkey fairly and equally when
compared with other candidates from the CEECs. Some of the former members of
the Warsaw Pact will likely to gain membership well before Turkey. Accordingly, in
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line with the EU attitude and perceptions about Turkey, Turkish intellectuals and
elite have started questioning the Turkish goal of entering the EU.1
On the other hand, Turkey’s relations with Greece are bilateral, intractable and deep-
rooted conflicts, which should be solved between the two sides. These problems
between two states, in fact, should not affect the EU-Turkey relations but they do
affect these relations, due to Greece’s advantageous position, as a full member of the
EU and the EU attitude towards Greece in general. Especially in the case of Cyprus,
the EU’s positive attitude towards the Greek Cypriots integration with the Union
exacerbates the problem. However, the EU is not in a position to act as a third party
for the settlement of the Cyprus issue. If it really wants to resolve the Cyprus
question, it should urge the Greek Cypriots to try to solve their problems in the
proximity talks and work for a real settlement. Accordingly, any attempt outside this
will very probably cause more trouble.
Therefore, for its part, the EU should “promote positive and close cooperation with
Turkey on a wide range of political and economic issues, find more effective ways of
conveying its policy towards Turkey, to government, political parties and civil
society, emphasize Turkey’s European credentials consistently and strongly, and take
action as necessary to prevent any individual member state damaging the overall EU-
                                                
1 Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, “ The European Union and Turkey,” in Survival, Vol.41(1), Spring
1999, pp.41-57; for a detailed discussion of the future developments in Turkey-EU relations especially
after the Helsinki Summit see articles by  Alan Makovsky,  “Turkey and the European Union: One
More Try,” in PolicyWatch, Number 427, 9 December 1999 and “Turkey: Europe-Bound?” in
PolicyWatch, Number 429, 15 December 1999.
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Turkey relations for domestic political reasons; and  release Customs Union funds to
Turkey as recommended by the European Council.” 2
Otherwise, Turkey has to rethink its policy both towards Greece and the EU. Indeed,
Greece and the EU are sometimes like the two sides of the same coin. On the front,
we usually see Greece but at the back the EU stands. This is the reality which Turkey
sooner or later has to face. However, the Turkish Government is still refusing to see
this reality even at this stage. The inclusion of Cyprus first among the short-term
political criteria and then in “The Strengthened Political Dialogue and Political
Criteria” together with the Aegean problem in the Accession Partnership document
has opened a decisive stage on Turkey’s relations with the Union.3  This might even
cause Turkey to rethink its European vocation, because in the long run Turkish
national interests might be affected very badly. This does not mean that Turkey
should not become a member of the EU or should follow a radical - hostile policy
against Greece but rather Turkey might follow a more rational and cautious policy
vis á vis Greece and the EU. Turkey might judge its own benefits and hence be more
courageous in its policy towards the EU. Turkey has nothing to lose, since it did not
get anything from its relations with the EU. Instead, Turkey is always the conceding
side, meaning that this relationship is not mutually satisfying. Turkey must put its
conditions clearly and must try to get its terms on Cyprus and the Aegean (as well as
                                                
2 “Turkey: A Future in Europe? ” 15-18  February 1999, from (http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/).
3 Though Turkey stated its opposition for any linkage between Turco-Greek differences and Turkish
accession to the EU, (if being carefully evaluated) nothing has changed in the new and the old EU
APD. As Prof. Dr. Mümtaz Soysal, said Turkey was convinced (to accept it) through a play of words.
(For more details on this issue, see front-page article on Turkish Cypriot newspaper Avrupa,
7/12/2000). All of these imply that Turkey is standing at a decisive stage on its relations with the
Union (whether to carry on or not to carry on).
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on other issues), in line with its national interests before becoming a full member of
the EU, just like Greece did.
Turkey has the option to change its policy. It can use a conditionality policy, for
example; in case the EU does not change the Accession Partnership document in line
with Turkey’s views, Turkey can say that it will not become a full member of the EU
and schedule its application and  the Customs Union.  In a way Turkey can freeze its
relations with the EU until the latter accepts its terms. This would disappoint the EU
and Greece who want to keep Turkey on the waiting room for forcing it to make
concessions. The EU has great advantages from the Customs Union which it will not
want to lose.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS
HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL
10 AND 11 DECEMBER 1999
(PART I.) PREPARING FOR ENLARGEMENT
The enlargement process
3. The European Council confirms the importance of the enlargement process
launched in Luxembourg in December 1997 for the stability and prosperity for
the entire European continent. An efficient and credible enlargement process
must be sustained.
4. The European Council reaffirms the inclusive nature of the accession process,
which now comprises 13 candidate States within a single framework. The
candidate States are participating in the accession process on an equal footing.
They must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the
Treaties. In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful
settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges
candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes
and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring
the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will
review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning
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the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their
settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of
2004. Moreover, the European Council recalls that compliance with the political
criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the
opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen
criteria is the basis for accession to the Union.
5. The Union has made a firm political commitment to make every effort to
complete the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reform by December
2000, to be followed by ratification. After ratification of the results of that
Conference the Union should be in a position to welcome new Member States
from the end of 2002 as soon as they have demonstrated their ability to assume
the obligations of membership and once the negotiating process has been
successfully completed.
6. The Commission has made a new detailed assessment of progress in the
candidate States. This assessment shows progress towards fulfilling the accession
criteria. At the same time, given that difficulties remain in certain sectors,
candidate States are encouraged to continue and step up their efforts to comply
with the accession criteria. It emerges that some candidates will not be in a
position to meet all the Copenhagen criteria in the medium term. The
Commission’s intention is to report in early 2000 to the Council on progress by
certain candidate States on fulfilling the Copenhagen economic criteria. The next
regular progress reports will be presented in good time before the European
Council in December 2000.
7. The European Council recalls the importance of high standards of nuclear
safety in Central and Eastern Europe. It calls on the Council to consider how to
address the issue of nuclear safety in the framework of the enlargement process
in accordance with the relevant Council conclusions.
8. The European Council notes with satisfaction the substantive work undertaken
and progress which has been achieved in accession negotiations with Cyprus,
Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia.
9. (a)The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York
and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to bring
the process to a successful conclusion.
(b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the
accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by
the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession
will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take
account of all relevant factors.
10. Determined to lend a positive contribution to security and stability on the
European continent and in the light of recent developments as well as the
Commission’s reports, the European Council has decided to convene bilateral
intergovernmental conferences in February 2000 to begin negotiations with
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Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta on the conditions for
their entry into the Union and the ensuing Treaty adjustments.
11. In the negotiations, each candidate State will be judged on its own merits.
This principle will apply both to opening of the various negotiating chapters and
to the conduct of the negotiations. In order to maintain momentum in the
negotiations, cumbersome procedures should be avoided. Candidate States which
have now been brought into the negotiating process will have the possibility to
catch up within a reasonable period of time with those already in negotiations if
they have made sufficient progress in their preparations. Progress in negotiations
must go hand in hand with progress in incorporating the acquis into legislation
and actually implementing and enforcing it.
12. The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as
noted in the Commission’s progress report, as well as its intention to continue its
reforms towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate
State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the
other candidate States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like
other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and
support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis
on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with
particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred
to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a). Turkey will also have the opportunity to participate
in Community programmes and agencies and in meetings between candidate
States and the Union in the context of the accession process. An accession
partnership will be drawn up on the basis of previous European Council
conclusions while containing priorities on which accession preparations must
concentrate in the light of the political and economic criteria and the obligations
of a Member State, combined with a national programme for the adoption of the
acquis. Appropriate monitoring mechanisms will be established. With a view to
intensifying the harmonisation of Turkey’s legislation and practice with the
acquis, the Commission is invited to prepare a process of analytical examination
of the acquis. The European Council asks the Commission to present a single
framework for coordinating all sources of European Union financial assistance
for pre-accession.
13. The future of the European Conference will be reviewed in the light of the
evolving situation and the decisions on the accession process taken at Helsinki.
The forthcoming French Presidency has announced its intention to convene a
meeting of the conference in the second half of 2000.
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APPENDIX B
ACCESSION PARTNERSHIP DOCUMENT FOR TURKEY
PREPARED BY EU COMMISSION, NOVEMBER 8, 2000
1. INTRODUCTION
The European Council in Helsinki (10-11 December 1999) welcomed the positive
developments in Turkey as well its intention to continue its reform towards
complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate country to join the
Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate countries.
At its meeting in Helsinki, the European Council decided that an Accession
Partnership will be drawn up “on the basis of previous European Council
conclusions.” It shall contain priorities on which accession preparations must
concentrate in the light of the political and economic criteria and the obligations of a
Member State combined with a National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis.
At its meeting in Luxembourg in December 1997, the European Council had decided
that the Accession Partnership would be the key feature of the enhanced pre-
accession strategy, mobilising all forms of assistance to the candidate countries
within a single framework. In this manner, the EU targets its assistance towards the
specific needs of each candidate so as to provide support for overcoming particular
problems in view of accession.
In full compliance with this approach, the Commission proposed on 26 July 2000 a
regulation for the establishment of a single framework for co-ordinating all sources
of EU financial assistance to Turkey for pre-accession and in particular on the
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establishment of an Accession Partnership.. This framework regulation for Turkey is
modelled on the regulation for the ten Central and Eastern European candidate
countries. (Council Regulation 622/98, OJ L85, 20.3. 1998,p.l).
The first Accession Partnership will be provided for in a Council Regulation on the
establishment of an Accession Partnership for Turkey. This Accession Partnership is
proposed by the Commission, after consulting Turkey and on the basis of the
principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions decided by the Council.
It takes into account the analysis in the 2000 Regular Report of the progress made by
Turkey towards membership.
2. OBJECTIVES
The purpose of the Accession Partnership is to set out in a single framework the
priority areas for further work identified in the Commission’s 2000 Regular Report
on the progress made by Turkey towards membership of the European Union, the
financial means available to help Turkey implement these priorities and the
conditions which will apply to that assistance. This Accession Partnership provides
the basis for a number of policy instruments, which will be used to help the candidate
States in their preparations for membership. It is expected that Turkey on the basis of
this Accession Partnership adopts before the end of the year a National Programme
for the Adoption of the Acquis. This is not an integral part of this Partnership but the
priorities they contain should be compatible with it.
3.  PRINCIPLES
The main priority areas identified for each candidate State relate to its ability to take
on the obligations of meeting the Copenhagen criteria which state that membership
requires:
!         that the candidate State has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities;
!         the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
!         the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence
to the aims of political, economic and monetary union;
At its meeting in Madrid, the European Council stressed the need for the candidate
Stales to adjust their administrative structures to ensure the harmonious operation of
Community policies after accession. At Luxembourg, it stressed that incorporation of
the acquis into legislation is necessary, but not in itself sufficient; it is necessary to
ensure that it is actually applied.
At its meeting in Helsinki the European Council has reaffirmed the inclusive nature
of the accession process comprising 13 candidate States within a single framework-
The candidate States are participating in the accession process on an equal footing.
The European Council stated that they must share the values and objectives of the
European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect the European Council
stressed the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the
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United Nations Charter and urged candidate States to make every effort to resolve
any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should
within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice.
The European Council also concluded that it will review the situation relating to any
outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession
process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of
Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004.
Furthermore, the European Council emphasised that Turkey will benefit from a pre-
accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms including an enhanced
political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political
criteria for accession with particular reference to human rights, as well as the issues
referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a) of the Helsinki conclusions; in this spirit, me
European Union encourages Turkey, together with all parties, to continue to support
the UN Secretary General’s efforts to bring the process, aiming at a comprehensive
settlement of the Cyprus problem, to a successful conclusion.
4. PRIORITIES AND INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVES
The Commission’s Regular Reports have highlighted the extent of the efforts which
still have to be made in certain areas by the candidate States to prepare for accession.
This situation requires the definition of intermediate stages in terms of priorities,
each to be accompanied by precise objectives to be set in collaboration with the
States concerned, the achievement of which will condition the degree of assistance
granted and the progress of the negotiations under way with some countries and the
opening of new negotiations with the others. The priorities and intermediate
objectives in the Accession Partnership are divided into two groups short and
medium term. Those listed under the short term have been selected on the basis that
it is realistic to expect that Turkey can complete or take them substantially forward
by the end of 2001. The priorities listed under the medium term are expected to take
more than one year to complete although work should, wherever possible, also begin
on them during 2001.
The Accession Partnership indicates the priority areas for Turkey’s membership
preparations. Turkey will nevertheless have to address all issues identified in the
Regular Report. It is also important that Turkey fulfils the commitments of
legislative approximation and implementation of the acquis in accordance with the
commitments made under the Association Agreement, Customs Union and related
decisions of the EC-Turkey Association Council for example on - the trade regime
for agricultural products. It should be recalled that incorporation of the acquis into
legislation is not in itself sufficient; it will also be necessary to ensure that if is
actually applied to the same standards as those, which apply within the Union. In all
of the areas listed below there is a need for credible and effective implementation
and enforcement of the acquis.
Drawing on the analysis of the Commission’s Regular Report, the following short
and medium term priorities and intermediate objectives have been identified for
Turkey here below:
4.1. SHORT-TERM (2001) POLITICAL CRITERIA
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!         Strengthen legal and constitutional guarantees for the right to freedom of
expression in line with article 10 of the European Convention of Human
Rights. Address in that context the situation of those persons in prison
sentenced for expressing non- violent opinions.
!         Strengthen legal and constitutional guarantees of the right to freedom of
association and peaceful assembly and encourage development of civil
society.
!         Strengthen legal provisions and undertake all necessary measures to
reinforce fight against torture practices, and ensure compliance with the
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture.
!         Further align legal procedures concerning pre-trial detention with the
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and with
recommendations of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture.
!         Strengthen opportunities for legal redress against all violations of human
rights.
!         Intensify training on human rights issues for law enforcement officials in
mutual cooperation with individual countries and international organisations.
!         Improve functioning and efficiency of the judiciary, including the state
security court in line with international standards. Strengthen in particular
training of judges and prosecutors on European Union legislation, including
in the field of human rights.
!         Maintain de facto moratorium on capital punishment
!         Remove any legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of
their mother tongue in TV/radio broadcasting.
!         Develop a comprehensive approach to reduce regional disparities, and in
particular to improve the situation In the South-East, with a view to
enhancing economic, social and cultural opportunities for all citizens.
!         Support strongly in the context of the political dialogue the UN Secretary
General’s efforts to bring the process of finding a comprehensive settlement
of the Cyprus problem to a successful conclusion.
4.2. MEDIUM-TERM POLITICAL CRITERIA
!         Guarantee full enjoyment by all individuals without any discrimination
and irrespective of their language, race, colour, sex, political opinion,
philosophical belief or religion of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Further develop conditions for the enjoyment of freedom of
thought, conscience and religion.
!         Review of the Turkish Constitution and other relevant legislation with a
view to guaranteeing rights and freedoms of all Turkish citizens as set forth in
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights; ensure the
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implementation of such legal reforms and conformity with practices in EU
Member States.
!         Abolish death penalty, sign and ratify Protocol N° 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights.
!         Ratify the International. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its
optional protocol and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.
!         Adjust detention conditions in prisons to-bring them in accordance with
the UN Standard Minimum Rules for me Treatment of Prisoners and other
international norms.
!         Align the constitutional role of the National Security Council as an
advisory body to the government in accordance with the practice of EU
member states.
!         Lift the remaining state of emergency in the South-East
!        Ensure cultural diversity and guarantee cultural rights for all citizens
irrespective of their origin. Any legal provisions preventing the enjoyment of
these rights should be abolished, including in the field of education.
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